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F O R E W O R D 
At the start of the new decade, the debate on economic policy centres on 
the consequence of the reforms implemented in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the last two decades. Trade and financial liberalization and the 
privatization of production activities have radically altered the rules of the game 
governing labour and business. The macroeconomic policy changes that 
accompanied or preceded the reforms sometimes strengthened the latter's 
specific objectives, especially the growth of exports, but on other occasions they 
had the opposite effect. That combination of factors prompted the emergence 
of new market structures and transformations in microeconomic behaviour. 
Assessing the effects of the reforms on economic growth, employment 
and income distribution is of more than academic interest. Governments, 
political parties and social actors require a thorough evaluation of the results, 
so as to devise or propose policies that complement the reforms or counter 
their unwanted consequences. The Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) actively participates in this process. 
This book is part of a project carried out by ECLAC, in conjunction with 
researchers from nine countries, to study the impact of the reforms. Directed 
by Dr. Barbara Stallings, the project has produced 14 books and 70 working 
papers. The summary appears in the first volume, entitled Growth, 
Employment and Equity: The Impact of  the Economic Reforms  in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. It is complemented by four issue-specific volumes 
analysing investment, technological change, employment and equity. 
Additionally, another nine country volumes examine the particular 
characteristics of the reforms in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico and Peru. The working papers are available at 
ECLAC's web site (www.cepal.cl). 
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One feature of the project that distinguishes it from other comparative 
studies of economic reform is that it specifically addresses the interaction 
between macroeconomic and microeconomic processes. To understand the 
impact of the reforms more fully, it is necessary to disaggregate the regional 
level and to study the differences between countries and in the microeconomic 
behaviour of firms according to sector, size and ownership. The globalization 
of the economy and government policies such as structural reform affect 
different countries and groups of firms in different ways. Some have been 
able to exploit the new opportunities, while the situation of others has 
deteriorated. The outcome of such developments gives rise to aggregate trends 
that others have observed and measured, but to design economic policy 
measures and improve future performance, it is essential to know what 
underlies those aggregates. 
In this book, ECLAC economists Graciela Moguillansky and Ricardo 
Bielschowsky analyze the investment process, using the methodology just 
mentioned. Unlike traditional analyses of the determinants of investment, 
which have tended to rely largely on macroeconomic variables, Moguillansky 
and Bielschowsky's study attempts to link macroeconomic aspects to sectoral, 
microeconomic and institutional factors. Thus, they examine the impact of 
structural reform, institutional change, market structures and the role of agents 
(both domestic and foreign private agents and the State) in conjunction with 
the increasingly important legal and regulatory aspects. This approach 
represents a major step forward in the development of a new methodology 
for analysing the complex determinants of investment. 
A second noteworthy feature of the book is its contribution to the 
understanding of the investment process in the context of the transition set in 
train by economic reform, by identifying the phases of the investment cycle 
and the way firms adapt to institutional change. The study looks at both 
permanent and transitory factors, the latter stemming from the effects of reform 
policies, which have a different impact at each phase of the investment cycle. 
An analysis of sectoral investment trends serves to discern patterns in the 
allocation of capital resources after reform and the strengths and vulnerabilities 
thus generated, which help to explain the existence of obstacles to the 
attainment of a high sustained growth rate in the region. 
As well as making a methodological and substantive contribution, the 
book adds new material to the existing stock of empirical information by 
supplying quantitative data on the distribution of investment by sector for 
each of the countries examined and a comparison of changes in legislation 
and sectoral regulations in different countries of the region. This material was 
not previously available and will without doubt be useful for those who profess 
an interest in this subject area. 
ECLAC could not have carried out a project of this scale without the 
cooperation of many individuals and institutions. We wish to thank the 
ECLAC 
researchers that participated in each of the nine countries, as well as the 
coordinators of the thematic and national volumes. We are also indebted to 
the members of the project's External Advisory Committee: Nancy Birdsall, 
Director of Economic Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace; René Cortázar, Executive Director of Chilean National Television; 
Norman Hicks, senior economist at the World Bank; Juan Antonio Morales, 
President of the Central Bank of Bolivia; Pitou van Dijck, Professor of 
Economics at the University of Amsterdam; and Dorothea Werneck, Executive 
Director of the Brazilian Agency for Export Promotion. 
External financing came from a number of international donors. First, 
we wish to recognize the central role of the Netherlands Ministry for 
Development Cooperation, which provided the project's basic donation. The 
International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC) also made a 
substantial contribution that allowed us to expand the scope of the project 
significantly. These two sources were supplemented with funds from the Ford 
Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency. We offer 
our deepest thanks to all the donors, without whose support this project would 
not have been possible. 
JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO 
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
P R E F A C E 
This book presents the findings of research into the effects of economic 
reform on investment. The research forms part of a larger multinational project, 
"Growth, employment and equity: the impact of economic reforms in Latin 
America and the Caribbean", carried out by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and researchers 
from nine countries in the region. 
In line with the other parts of the project, the research focused on analysing 
the interaction of macroeconomic, sectoral and microeconomic variables affected 
by the reforms. As a result, we have gained a better understanding of what 
influences private and public actors' decisions with regard to resource allocation. 
The study is limited to those countries which have microeconomic and sectoral 
information on investment or in which it was possible to compile such 
information. Hence we looked at eight of the nine countries in the larger project: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. 
With the exception of Colombia and Costa Rica, the statistical and national 
accounting institutions in the countries do not disaggregate investment 
accounts by destination. The consultants involved in the project therefore had 
to use microeconomic and sectoral information provided by firms and 
government sectoral organizations. 
Given the complexity of the subject, we chose a number of sectors which 
played an important role in the productive apparatus and in infrastructure 
services throughout the period studied, the 1990s. In the productive category, 
we chose mining, industry and hydrocarbon production. In the case of the 
first two, we were able to use information on investment published in company 
annual reports and provided by official sectoral bodies, including ministries 
and related units. The analysis of the industrial sector was based on annual 
surveys from national statistical offices and on organizations, such as the Central 
Bank of Mexico which carries out surveys on the capital stock in that country. 
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We chose three infrastructure sectors for analysis: electricity, 
telecommunications and highways. The first two were affected by the sectoral 
reforms and privatizations which took place throughout the 1990s, while 
private-sector participation in the third began to increase towards the end of 
the decade. In all three cases statistics on investment were taken from annual 
company reports and from official institutions, such as ministries of energy, 
public works, transport and communications. 
This study would not have been possible without the collaboration of 
many people. The contributions of Barbara Stallings (coordinator of the global 
project), Jorge Katz (coordinator of the module on technological change), 
Jurgen Weller (employment coordinator), Samuel Morley (equity coordinator) 
and our colleague Wilson Peres were invaluable in developing the 
methodology and helping us to achieve a multidimensional focus. In addition, 
ideas for combining micro- and macroeconomic analysis, which are the result 
of previous research by Jorge Katz, were extremely useful in designing the 
research methodology. 
Coodination and supervision of the sectoral studies in the countries were 
the responsibility of the following people: Bernardo Kosacoff, of the ECLAC 
office in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Gover Barja, associate professor in the M.A. 
program on development at the Catholic University, Bolivia; Juan Mauricio 
Ramírez, economist at Fedesarrollo, Colombia; Jorge Mattar, of the subregional 
office of ECLAC in Mexico; and Humberto Campodónico, economist at the 
Centre for Studies and Promotion of Development (DESCO) in Peru. The 
authors of this book coordinated the sectoral studies in Chile and Brazil. 
The studies which provided the foundation for the sectoral chapters were 
the responsibility of: Luis Abugattás, Gover Barja, Ricardo Bielschowsky, 
Roberto Bisang, José Antonio Cordero, Georgina Gómez, Gerardo Mendiola, 
Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Juan Mauricio Ramírez and Liliana Núñez, for the 
industrial sector; Víctor Ayala, Humberto Campodónico, Virginia de Moori, 
José Clemente de Oliveira, Israel Fainboim, Nicolás Gadano, Graciela 
Moguillansky, Carlos Jorge Rodriguez, Sebastião Soares and Ramón Torres, 
for the mining and hydrocarbon sectors; Gover Barja, Ricardo Bielschowsky, 
Humberto Campodónico, Marcelo Celani, José Antonio Cordero, Ricardo 
Delgado, Rebeca Escobar, Israel Fainboim, Graciela Moguillansky, Carlos Jorge 
Rodríguez, Víctor Rodríguez, Carlos Romero and Isaac Scheinver, for the 
infrastructure sectors. 
The authors would like to thank those who gave invaluable comments 
on preliminary versions of the book: Hector Assael, Renato Baumann, Alvaro 
Díaz, João Ferraz, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Stephany Griffith-Jones, André 
Hofman, Oscar Muñoz, Carlos Mussi, Jaime Ros, Osvaldo Rosales, Rogerio 
Studart, Anabelle Ulate and Pitou Van Dyck. Finally, we greatly appreciate 
the secretarial assistance of Ximena Sánchez and María Eugenia Johnson, the 
translation of Holly Mikkelson and Mary Stainer, and the English editing of 
Jennifer Hoover. The authors alone are responsible for the final product. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The recent economic reforms in Latin America undoubtedly represent a 
milestone in the region's history and account for many of the transformations 
that occurred there in the 1990s. In this context, it is important to ask what has 
happened with investment. Is investment exceeding historical levels? Has it 
been allocated to the right sectors to boost competitiveness and ensure steady 
growth? Or have the reforms served to weaken the investment process, in the 
context of the globalization and economic internationalization that characterize 
today's world? These are the principal questions this study attempts to answer. 
On reviewing the Latin American literature on the subject, it is possible 
to find studies that examine the effects of instability and adjustment on capital 
formation in their treatment of the main problems of the 1980s.1 In contrast, 
studies on economic reforms carried out in the 1990s look at their repercussions 
on growth, but they do not pay much attention to investment, on the 
assumption that its dynamic nature can be taken for granted.2 Unlike the 
latter group of studies, this one examines various aspects of macroeconomic 
policy and economic reform, while at the same time considering the process 
of capital formation from the macroeconomic, sectoral and microeconomic 
standpoints. In view of the fact that one of the principal obstacles to 
development and sustained growth in the region throughout its history has 
been external restrictions and a limited capacity to generate foreign exchange, 
it is particularly important to determine where capital is being channelled 
within the framework of the market-opening strategy. This book considers 
eight countries, large and small: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
1 See, for example, ECLAC (1992), Cardoso (1993), Corbo and Rojas (1993), Bacha (1993), Servén and 
Solimano (1993), ECLAC (1996), Schmidt Hebbel, Servén and Solimano (1996). 
2 See, for example, Edwards (1995), Lora and Barrera (1998), Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1998). 
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Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. In the 1990s these countries, which together 
account for 80% of the population and nearly 90% of the regional gross 
domestic product (GDP), consolidated their reforms or initiated the process. 
The analysis is based, in part, on 40 working papers related to various 
sectors, including a variety of industrial branches -at the three-digit level of 
the International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities 
(ISIC)- as well as mining, hydrocarbons and the infrastructure sectors most 
directly associated with competitiveness (electricity, telecommunications and 
highways). This material has been published by ECLAC; the respective 
bibliographic references appear in each chapter. 
Only in a few cases do the statistics come from public institutions (e.g., the 
countries' statistics bureaux, ministries or central banks); most have been 
generated by consultants who developed the series and carried out the specific 
studies of each sector. The research was conducted with a relatively uniform 
methodology, thereby ensuring reasonable homogeneity in the different studies. 
The analysis focuses on three dimensions in particular: the macroeconomic 
dimension, which is normally considered in economic theory; the sectoral or 
mesoeconomic dimension, which brings institutional factors into play; and 
the microeconomic dimension, which centres on firms' investment strategies 
as they deal with change. The need to analyse these three dimensions stems 
from the fact that there is no consolidated approach with generalized 
behaviours that can be subsumed under a new single model of investment. 
On the contrary, we find changes at the macroeconomic level (with respect to 
policies and reforms) that elicit different reactions among firms throughout a 
transition period. This leads us to look at the microeconomic dimension, that 
is, the reactions of different types of firms, to distinguish their responses. In 
addition, these responses reflect institutional changes at the sectoral level, 
which also affect investment decisions. These changes translate into new rules 
of the game, causing firms to gradually adapt to signals that have turned out 
to be neither linear nor unidirectional. Finally, in the first stages of the process, 
the effects of the reforms, the macroeconomic policies and the new international 
context are not independent of each other, but rather interact in such a way 
that affects investment. We discuss these characteristics in more detail below. 
We speak of a transition process for several reasons. In the first place, the 
countries that began their reforms in the 1990s (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Peru) have not had enough time to consolidate a new economic model, 
so investment decisions were made in the context of great uncertainty. Second, 
the reforms did not begin simultaneously on all fronts. In general, trade 
liberalization was the first measure, while labour reform and the privatization 
of public utilities were among the last to be adopted. Third, whereas in some 
countries all reforms were undertaken simultaneously (Argentina and Peru, 
beginning in 1990), in others the process developed slowly and in a different 
sequence, which prevented the reforms from maturing fully (Bolivia, Brazil 
and Costa Rica are good examples in this regard). Fourth, the reforms did not 
ECLAC 
proceed in linear fashion, which meant that economic actors were exposed to 
changing rules of the game. Consider, for example, the tariff surcharges and 
other obstacles to international trade that cropped up anew in these countries 
after each balance-of-payments crisis. 
Finally, the consolidation of the new market-oriented model -defined as 
the point at which new institutions have taken shape3 - has been hindered by 
crises resulting from the internal and external imbalances that have continued 
to plague these countries in the period following the reforms. The existence 
of an open capital account and local financial systems with weak institutions 
not only contributed to this destabilization, but also cast doubt on 
macroeconomic policies and exposed the weakness of the reforms. The initial 
deregulation of various markets (financial, securities, public utilities and 
others) gave rise to a number of problems, and over time, governments were 
forced to regulate, modify and strengthen the relevant laws and institutions. 
The reforms were thus reoriented, which led to new uncertainty among firms. 
As a result, the behaviour of these actors has not yet been fully defined. 
Firms have adapted to the changes in a variety of ways. In most countries, 
the economy has evolved from a closed system of protection, with strong 
State intervention, to a system characterized by openness, deregulation and 
privatization. Firms adapted to these changes to the extent they could, 
depending on their strength and their other microeconomic characteristics. It 
was much more difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises to respond 
to competition from imported goods in terms of quality and prices than it 
was for large enterprises or subsidiaries of transnational corporations. 
Reactions also differed among economic sectors. In some countries, 
opening up the economy strengthened sectors that were involved in processing 
natural resources, while in others it favoured the clothing, automotive and 
electronics sectors. Companies with a long history in these industries took 
advantage of their knowledge of production processes and the market, which 
enabled them to grow and increase profitability. The same policies depressed 
many other sectors, such as machine tools, electric machinery manufacturing 
and the textile and clothing industries (see Katz, 1996; Kosacoff, 1998). 
The nature of the period under study gave rise to a particular 
methodological approach that was basic to the research. Since the process in 
question has not yet solidified, we adopted an inductive method. In other 
words, we did not start with a theoretical model to try to see whether reality 
would conform to it; on the contrary, we analysed the behaviour of firms and 
sectors in different countries and tried to extrapolate certain general behaviours 
and responses with respect to investment. The behaviours may be consistent 
with those described in economic theory, or they may be more complex. 
3 The consolidation stage of the economic liberalization model, linked to that of a new institutionality 
and a new role for the State, was defined earlier by Edwards (1995). 
18 INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 
In studying the interactions among the macroeconomic, sectoral and 
microeconomic spheres, we analysed the links among policies, reforms and 
firms' reactions in each dimension.4 Thus, in the macroeconomic analysis, 
not only did we consider the variables that all economic theories view as causal 
factors in investment (i.e., relative prices, demand behaviour and financing), 
but we also looked at the institutional changes that have affected the economy 
as a whole. No one denies that opening up trade created a new institutional 
framework, and that this reoriented investment decisions across sectors 
producing tradable and non-tradable goods, as well as among tradables. 
Moreover, financial liberalization provided a framework that made some 
investment projects feasible and others not, depending on the type of firm 
and the sector. 
Other policies created a new institutional framework within specific 
sectors. In this connection, we analyse the effects of eliminating a broad range 
of sectoral policies originally aimed at the development of industrial activities; 
changes in mining legislation and in contracts for exploiting hydrocarbon 
reserves; and the impact of privatization and the new regulatory systems in 
place in infrastructure sectors. Finally, as is clear below, regional integration 
agreements established a new technological, financial and trade framework 
for some sectors of production, which had a decisive impact on business 
strategies and investment. 
At the microeconomic level, studying how change is handled by different 
types of firms (namely, transnational corporations, large firms associated with 
economic groups and small and medium-sized enterprises) reveals that they 
do not all receive the same stimuli. This is because they are involved in different 
markets, or operate in segmented markets, and thus do not have equal access 
to them all. An example is firms' reactions to financial reforms and to the 
opening and development of the capital market. Whereas the large enterprises 
have had access to new, sophisticated financing instruments, small and 
medium-sized firms have not been able to take advantage of them, thus 
limiting their ability to develop investment projects. These different reactions 
to the same stimulus are also observed among firms in different sectors. For 
instance, trade liberalization affected exporters differently than it did sectors 
oriented towards the domestic market. 
As the following diagram shows, the response to investment is more 
complex than could be represented by a single equation. The diagram outlines 
the three dimensions of analysis (the macroeconomic, sectoral and 
microeconomic dimensions) and the principal units of analysis (policies and 
reforms, sectors of economic activity and firms). 
4 A noteworthy contribution on this point was the exchange of opinions with Jorge Katz, who is 
developing this framework of analysis (beginning with microeconomics) in his attempt to determine 
the impact of economic reforms on countries' technological behaviour (Katz, 1996 and 2000). 
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THE DETERMINANTS OF INVESTMENT 
Macroeconomic level Institutional incentives Microeconomic level 
POLICIES AND SECTORS FIRMS 
REFORMS 
In fact, it is as if we were dealing with a system of simultaneous equations 
with an interaction among the various types of firms, the business strategies 
of the various groups that make up the system and the institutional context in 
which they are operating, as well as macroeconomic policy, the new rules of 
the game embodied in the reforms and the changing characteristics of the 
international environment. These elements play a greater or lesser role 
depending on which sector is being analysed. In the model, expectations are 
constantly changing and are dependent on the evolution of the process, which 
is neither linear nor unidirectional. 
In the system described above, we would have to consider the following 
circumstances: 
i) Demand, relative prices, costs and financing are not exogenous variables, 
but are affected by factors related to institutional changes, macroeconomic 
policy and changes in the international context (see the boxes in the above 
diagram corresponding to the macroeconomic level). The investment 
functions of some firms could be subject to financing restrictions, while 
those of others may not be.5 Moreover, no single interest rate prevails in 
5 An analysis of the specificity of the problem in developing countries can be found in Nissanke (1996). 
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the investment process, as it is possible to distinguish between firms with 
access to a domestic interest rate and others with access to the international 
rate, not to mention other distinctions. 
ii) Firms' certainty is affected by macroeconomic conditions, by reforms and 
by changes in the international context. The entire reform process was a 
time of uncertainty, from the moment the reforms were launched until 
they began to take root. The degree of instability and volatility of prices, 
how much confidence people had in the new rules and the impact of 
international financial crises on the confidence of foreign investors all 
determine the timing of the decision to invest.6 
iii) Behaviour within each sector is affected by macroeconomic factors and 
by the specific reforms taking place in the sector, such as privatizations 
and the regulation or deregulation of markets (see the boxes 
corresponding to the sectoral level in the diagram). 
iv) These sectoral changes alter the existing degree of market competition, 
which affects the structure and organization of an industry. In some 
sectors, the competition is the direct result of liberalizing trade, since 
allowing external trade transformed traditionally oligopolistic markets 
into competitive ones. In other sectors, it was the privatization process 
that allowed new firms in. The manner in which privatization takes place, 
in turn, determines how competitive a market is. In some markets, special 
investment incentives were created, while in others, serious market 
failures have impeded proper functioning, as not all countries established 
appropriate conditions for competition during sector-level reforms. These 
situations were not static, however; they were affected by the introduction 
of regulatory instruments and mechanisms and by the business strategies 
pursued by new actors. The amount of competition in a given sector was 
a function of the contrast between the market power of business and the 
power of the regulatory body. 
v) Because of the heterogeneity among the firms facing these changes, there 
is no single firm or representative sector function; various functions exist 
at the same time to strike a balance between the benefits expected of the 
projects and the costs and risks they imply. A given firm's response 
depends directly on its microeconomic strength and its history; some win 
and others lose in the process.7 Business strategies both respond to and 
affect the degree of competition that exists in markets (see the boxes 
corresponding to the microeconomic level in the diagram). 
vi) Finally, the equation between profit, risk and the requirements of a firm's 
strategic positioning determines the moment when an investment is 
actually made. 
6 See the theoretical studies of Dixit (1989), Pindyck (1988, 1990, and 1993) and Caballero and Pindyck (1996). 
7 These elements are derived from developments in the evolutionist school (see Nelson, 1991) and the 
interpretations Katz (1996 and 2000) and Kosacoff (1998) have made of microeconomics in Latin America. 
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Given the complexity of the analytical model and the inability to predict 
the direction and magnitude of the effects involved, we move from the 
microeconomic to the sectoral and then to the macroeconomic levels, but we 
also study the reverse direction of causality. The results of this analysis are 
described in the chapters on the investment behaviour of the different sectors. 
This book has five chapters. The first chapter discusses firms' adaptation 
to change, examining statistics at the aggregate and sectoral levels. The first 
section of the chapter presents the conceptualization of the "investment 
phases" of the period following the reforms, analysing the impact of the 
macroeconomic context on each phase. The second section looks at trends in 
sectoral investment, introducing the analysis of several "transitory factors" 
as crucial determinants of the investment process. 
The second chapter covers capital formation in the industrial sector. 
Industry was hit hardest by the economic reforms, and it has had the most 
difficulty recovering. In general, the investment coefficient of this sector fell, 
and although it is slowly increasing in some countries, only in Chile is it 
showing strong growth, above the average of previous decades. Within this 
sector, however, there is a great deal of heterogeneity among different types 
of firms (namely, subsidiaries of transnational corporations, firms belonging 
to large national conglomerates and small and medium-sized enterprises) and 
among different branches of individual sectors. The analysis shows why 
differences in behaviour were so marked after the reforms. The chapter ends 
with an analysis of each country's industrial performance. 
The third chapter looks at the mining and hydrocarbons sectors, for which 
the central objective of the reforms was to seek and promote foreign 
investment. Unlike the other sectors, in these two, investment depends on 
whether there are large reserves that can be exploited economically. Only a 
few countries meet this criterion, and the study therefore concentrates on them. 
Moreover, because the products of these sectors are aimed primarily at foreign 
markets, trends in the world mineral market are one of the main determinants 
of investment. Institutional changes are thus a necessary element for 
investment, but they are not sufficient in and of themselves. The institutional 
reform in these sectors concentrated on guaranteeing higher profits for foreign 
investment. These changes altered market structure and allowed for new firms 
and new business strategies, which affected investment. 
The fourth chapter covers electricity, telecommunications and highway 
infrastructure. Profound transformations took place in all three sectors. The 
infrastructure reform process began with the privatization of public utilities. 
It was followed by changes in industrial organization and market structure, 
together with the implementation of new rules of the game, new legislation 
and new supervisory and regulatory bodies. The participation of private firms 
and the new institutional environment transformed the logic of investment 
decisions. 
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The fifth and final chapter presents the synthesis and conclusions of the 
study, summing up its contributions to the interpretation of the capital 
accumulation process during a period of institutional change. 
CHAPTER I 
I N V E S T M E N T IN A P E R I O D O F T R A N S I T I O N 
The analysis of capital formation presented here focuses on a period when 
Latin American countries were undergoing changes in their economic 
institutions, implementing trade and financial liberalization, capital market 
opening, privatization and labour reforms. This strategy of market 
liberalization was aimed at integrating the region into the world economy in 
terms of both trade and finance, deregulating markets and reducing the role 
of the State as an agent of production, finance and regulation.8 These changes 
-whether gradual or abrupt- affected the behaviour of economic actors for a 
relatively long period of time, which we call the transition period. Our interest 
is to analyse how those changes affected investment. 
A. E C O N O M I C R E F O R M S A N D A D A P T A T I O N 
T O C H A N G E 
We were able to identify patterns in firms' investment behaviour during 
the transition period following the reforms. These patterns were repeated in 
different countries and across a number of sectors, resulting in what we have 
called investment phases. These phases are closely related to the macroeconomic, 
political and international context in which the reforms took place. 
8 See Stallings and Peres (2000) for a general analysis of this process. 
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1. The Context  of  the Economic Reforms 
An almost universal feature of the period immediately preceding the 
reforms was economic instability and, in many countries, political instability as 
well. In Chile, for example, the economic and political crisis unleashed by the 
Popular Unity government ended in a military coup. In this context, structural 
changes were imposed abruptly by decree. In Mexico, the foreign debt crisis, 
which entailed a huge balance-of-payments deficit and thus necessitated 
adjustments to control inflation, set the scene for reforms. In other cases, such 
as Argentina, Brazil and Peru, the foreign crisis caused hyperinflation, a 
phenomenon which also spurred reforms in Bolivia. These countries undertook 
reforms and a stabilization process simultaneously (see table I-1). 
There were two exceptions to this trend of drastic macroeconomic 
imbalances and major uncertainty leading to a reform process: Colombia and 
Costa Rica. The relative economic stability of these countries and the gradual 
manner in which changes were introduced allowed firms to adapt without 
the pressure of a negative atmosphere. 
The countries that launched reforms in the 1990s benefited from the liquidity 
of the international financial market. There is empirical evidence that adjustment 
or stabilization policies undertaken when the international situation is 
unfavourable provoke more intense recessions. This was true, for example, in 
Chile in 1975, in Bolivia in 1985 and Mexico in 1986.9 In contrast, the countries 
that began their reforms in the 1990s benefited from the influx of large amounts 
of foreign capital, which favoured the expansion of credit and stimulated 
demand. Consequently, the stabilization programmes came at a lower cost. 
Indeed, beginning in 1991, strong capital flows returned. The external 
interest rate also fell, debt service shrank and the terms of trade stabilized 
(Moguillansky, 1996). The tremendous increase in foreign direct investment 
(see table I-2) was identified as a determining factor in investment trends, 
even though a major part of this investment was concentrated on the purchase 
of existing assets under the privatization programmes (ECLAC, 1999). 
Regardless of the degree of instability prevailing at the time, the 
investment coefficient (investment as a share of GDP) declined in most 
countries during the period immediately following the reforms (see figure I-
1 and table A-1 in the Annex). The rate of decline and the speed of recovery 
depended on several factors, such as the degree of firms' uncertainty about 
institutional changes, the pace of the stabilization effort, the specific manner 
in which the reform policies and instruments were applied, the coherence of 
9 See ECLAC, Economic Survey of  Latin America and the Caribbean, for the corresponding years. In Chile, 
in 1975, the gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 13% and the terms of trade by 40%; in Bolivia, the 
GDP dropped by 3% in 1985 and the terms of trade by 6%; in Mexico in 1986, the declines were 4% 
and 24%, respectively. 
Table 1-1 
ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THE MACROECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
COUNTRY BEGINNING OF REFORMS MACROECONOMIC SITUATION INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 





1991 (resumption) Stabilization programme (previous 
hyperinflation: 4,924% in 1989) 
Financial liquidity 
Slight improvement in terms of trade 
Bolivia 1985 Stabilization programme (previous 
hyperinflation: 11,750% in 1985) 
Financial illiquidity 
Sharp decline in terms of trade 
Brazil 1990 (beginning) Successive failure of stabilization programmes Financial liquidity 
1994 (new phase) Real Plan: price stabilization (1994) Decline in terms of trade 
Chile 1974 (beginning) 
1982-1985 (crisis in model) 
Stabilization programme (previous 
hyperinflation: 559% in 1973) 
Adjustment and stabilization programme 
Financial liquidity 
Decline in terms of trade 
Financial illiquidity 
1986 (new reform phase) Stability Improved terms of trade 
Colombia 1990 Stability 
Reform preceded by sharp devaluations 
Financial liquidity 
Decline in terms of trade 
Table 1-1 continued 
COUNTRY BEGINNING OF REFORMS MACROECONOMIC SITUATION INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Costa Rica 1986 Stability Financial illiquidity 
Sharp decline in terms of trade 
Mexico 1986 High inflation 
Stabilization programme 
Financial illiquidity 
Sharp decline in terms of trade 
Peru 1990 Stabilization programme (previous 
hyperinflation: 7,482% in 1990) 
Financial liquidity 
Decline in terms of trade 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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Table I-2 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1980-1998 
(annual  average,  millions  of  dollars) 
COUNTRY 1980-1981 1982-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1998 
Argentina 866 236 730 2 908 5 490 
Bolivia 61 15 25 96 583 
Brazil 1 929 1 836 1 166 1 035 15 778 
Chile 298 201 714 832 3 472 
Colombia 140 471 531 763 3 345 
Costa Rica 57 45 83 218 448 
Jamaica 8 -7 17 122 218 
Mexico 2 584 1 878 2 000 5 409 10 426 
Peru 76 -1 28 785 2 313 
Total 6 018 4 673 5 294 12 167 42 071 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the Unit on Investment and Corporate 
Strategies in the ECLAC Division of Production, Productivity and Management. 
the signals sent by these policies and instruments with respect to investment, 
and the international context in which the process evolved. This series of factors 
resulted in an extremely long period of low investment in some countries. In 
Chile, for example, it lasted more than a decade, from 1974 to 1985; in Mexico 
and Bolivia it lasted from 1986 to 1990. In other countries, in contrast, it was 
brief. In Argentina, in particular, after a long period of declining investment 
and economic stagnation, there was a positive reaction during the year after 
the reforms were launched, once hyperinflation was under control. 
2. Phases of  Post-Reform  Investment 
The distinction between the initial period of falling investment10 and the 
ensuing recovery period gives rise to what we call the phases of firm behaviour 
during the transition period (see table I-3). These phases coincide with the 
observed responses not only in the industrial sector, but in all markets that 
were opened up to national and international competition. Each phase is 
characterized by one of two identifiable behaviours within a firm: the first 
10 Part of this decline corresponds to trends in public investment. Unfortunately, the national accounts 
of the countries under consideration do not have data on public investment. Nevertheless, the 
deterioration of public-sector capital spending, as reflected in the fiscal accounts, provides important 
information (see table A-6 in the Annex). The fall in this spending does not, however, account for the 
total reduction in gross fixed capital formation, which indicates that private investment also fell. This 
is corroborated by microeconomic information on private firms presented in the chapters on the 
individual sectors. 
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Figure I-1 











Source: Annex Table A-1. 
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Table I-3 
INVESTMENT PHASES: INVESTMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
(percent) 
COUNTRY PRE-REFORM FIRST PHASE: SECOND PHASE: 
RATIONALIZATION MODERNIZATION 
Argentina 23.4 1990-1991 13.9 1992-1998 20.5 
Bolivia 16.9 1986-1989 13.4 1990-1998 17.9 
Brazil 23.3 1990-1993 14.5 1995-1998 16.8 
Chilea/ 21.4 1974-1976 14.6 1977-1981 16.7 
1982-1985 14.2 1986-1989 18.3 
Mexico 21.8 1986-1990 17.0 1991-1998 b/ 19.7 
Peru 21.8 1990-1992 17.7 1993-1998 23.3 
Colombia 16.1 1990-1991 13.5 1992-1998 17.8 




Source: Authors' compilation on the basis of Annex Table A-1. 
a/ The period prior to the reforms in Chile is the 1960s. 
b/ Excludes 1995. 
features rationalization and "disembodied" technical progress (that is, 
modernization of business management), and the second is based on 
modernization embodied in machinery and equipment. 
A third response was observed in some firms, although it did not appear 
across the board in any particular sector: investing to expand production 
capacity. The only case in which it took place in all industrial sectors was in 
Chile during the phase of the consolidated model. In the other countries, as 
demonstrated in the chapters on the individual sectors, investment in 
expanding capacity was a more widespread response in the privatized 
infrastructure sectors. 
The fact that one type of behaviour predominates does not mean that one 
firm or sector may not simultaneously exhibit rationalization and investment 
in modernization, or modernization and expansion, or even all three at once. 
The analysis of different countries and sectors generally allows us to conclude, 
however, that a single type of behaviour predominates in each phase. 
A key element in distinguishing whether one response or another 
predominates is the detection of a group of transitory factors stimulating or 
discouraging investment. These factors are called transitory because they are 
active during a certain part of the change process, and then cease to stimulate 
or discourage investment. Thereafter, the factors that have historically 
determined capital accumulation, which are also present during the transition, 
take on greater importance. These include changes in demand, variations in 
relative prices or the cost of capital, technological development and market 
strategies. 
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a. First Phase: Decline in Investment 
The first phase is characterized by the strong impact of transitory factors 
that discourage investment. We have identified two of these: 
- Caution in decision-making: Given the uncertainty created by all of the 
institutional and political changes undertaken to cope with macroeconomic 
instability, the period immediately following the reforms was marked by 
heightened caution. Firms tended to investigate the economic and political 
environment, the sustainability of the reforms, trends in relative prices and 
the behaviour of internal and external competitors, all of which resulted in 
passive observation and restrained the investment process. 
- Rationalization of  production: Before investing, firms tended to rationalize 
their operations, lay off employees and introduce new management 
techniques as an initial defensive move to deal with the opening of the 
market and imports. This is particularly true of the industrial sector, as 
well as other sectors of production that are opened up to competition 
(e.g., energy, mining, infrastructure). It also occurred in privatized 
enterprises as they attempted to give productivity a quick boost. 
In addition to these factors, which are related to the reaction to a new 
climate of uncertainty, the macroeconomic context provided a disincentive 
for investment. Table I-4 sums up the principal components of this context, 
which are also key factors in investment. 
Financial liberalization and the lack of bank regulation, together with the 
monetary contraction required in the stabilization process, produced a 
domestic interest rate which, when corrected for the exchange rate variation, 
proved to be grossly out of line with the international interest rate, often 
resulting in a crisis (see box I-1). 
At the same time, the reduction in public spending moderated economic 
growth rates or generated a recession, although the averages often hid this 
fact. For example, during the 1974-1985 period, which we have defined as the 
first phase in Chile, GDP grew at an average rate of 4.4% in the first seven 
years. That average rate, however, conceals the fact that in 1975, right after 
the reforms began, GDP plunged 12% in a climate of great instability. GDP 
rallied later on, only to plummet again in 1982 by 14%. In Argentina in 1990, 
with the reforms already under way, GDP dipped 1.9%, after a 7% decline the 
year before. As a result, the average growth of nearly 5% shown in table I-4 
actually represents a recovery from previous years' losses. 
One consequence of recession is that it aggravates the underutilization of 
productive capacity, which curbs investment even more sharply. In almost all 
these countries, opening up the economy coincided with a period of 
revaluation of the local currency, which diminished the possibility of protecting 
the industrial sector's markets. Table I-4 shows that revaluation was 
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Table I-4 
F U N D A M E N T A L M A C R O E C O N O M I C V A R I A B L E S 
(percent) 
COUNTRY Y E A R S G D P GROWTH U S E OF VARIATION IN G A P BETWEEN VARIATION IN HIGHEST 
RATE(AVERAGE INSTALLED PRICE OF CAPITAL DOMESTIC AND REAL EXCHANGE INFLATION 
ANNUAL VARIATION) CAPACITY GOODS A / INTERNATIONAL RATE FOR THE RATE OF 
(ANNUAL AVERAGE : ) INTEREST RATES
B / PERIODC / THE PERIOD 
F I R S T P O S T - R E F O R M P H A S E 
Argentina 1990-1991 4.7 50.5 -11.0 100.0 -29.0 1 344 
Bolivia 1986-1989 1.7 n.a. 22.4 n.a. 7.9 8 171 
Brazil 1990-1993 0.3 72.6 2.9 247.6 -19.5 2 489 
Chile 1974-1981 4.4 n.a. -13.9 26.7 -45.1 375 
Chile 1982-1985 -1.3 n.a. 7.8 -10.8 60.1 26 
Colombia 1990-1991 2.7 73.1 -4.6 1.7 1.0 32 
Costa Rica 1986-1991 4.2 n.a. 4.5 n.a. 9.7 27 
Mexico 1986-1990 1.6 n.a. -11.5 18.3 -38.2 159 
Peru 1990-1993 0.6 51.4 -16.4 148.5 -6.9 7 649 
S E C O N D P O S T - R E F O R M P H A S E 
Argentina 1992-1998 5.3 70.0 -8.8 14.8 -6.1 17.6 
Bolivia 1990-1998 4.3 n.a. 3.9 n.a. 3.9 18.0 
Brazil 1995-1998 2.9 78.8 -12.3 48.5 -14.1 22.0 
Chile 1986-1989 6.9 n.a. -3.7 3.0 6.5 21.5 
Chiled/ 1990-1998 6.9 80.4 -19.2 10.7 -17.6 27.3 
Colombia 1992-1998 3.5 74.4 -22.4 19.9 -22.8 25.1 
Costa Rica 1992-1998 4.3 n.a. -10.2 n.a. -17.6 22.6 
Mexico 1991-1998 3.1 n.a. 3.9 7.8 3.4 18.9 
Peru 1994-1998 6.6 70.0 -8.5 23.2 0.3 15.4 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of ECLAC's Economic Development Division. 
a/ Variation of the gross capital formation deflator with respect to the GDP deflator, from the 
beginning of the period to the end of the period. 
b/ Calculated as the difference between the domestic nominal rate (i), deflated by the devaluation 
rate (e), and the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR): [((1+i)/(1+e)-1) - LIBOR]. 
c/ Last year in period compared to first year; a decline means appreciation of the local currency. 
d/ Corresponds to a phase of the consolidated model. 
part icularly p r o n o u n c e d in Argent ina, Brazil (after 1988), Chile (between 1974 
a n d 1981) a n d Mexico . 
T h e init ial r e s p o n s e to e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s w a s to rat ional ize b u s i n e s s 
m a n a g e m e n t a n d product ion processes , w h i c h w e identi f ied a s a k e y factor 
in this phase . In larger f irms, the result w a s a m a s s i v e layoff of employees , 
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Box I-1 
MACROECONOMIC POLICY, FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, CAPITAL 
MARKET OPENING AND CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Capital market opening, a policy intended to promote foreign investment and reduce external 
restrictions, has been one of the most controversial reforms. Theoretically, opening the market 
stimulates the flow of capital and the availability of one of the scarcest resources in Latin 
American countries, namely, foreign exchange. In recent decades, however, the main 
characteristic of these flows has been their volatility. 
In the context of macroeconomic policies for stabilizing prices through an exchange rate 
anchor, governments tended to control spending through monetary policies that drove up 
interest rates, thus creating a vicious circle that encouraged the entry of short-term foreign 
capital, accelerated the decline of the real exchange rate, hampered exports and stimulated 
imports while depressing investment. 
This process led to profound financial crises and balance-of-payments problems when the 
flows changed direction in response to some internal or external stimulus. To avoid future 
repetitions of this scenario, one group of economists proposes controlling the capital market 
with different types of instruments (see Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones, 1995; Ffrench-Davis 
and Reisen, 1998; and Ocampo, 1999). Another group maintains, in contrast, that the most 
efficient alternative is the complete "dollarization" of economies (see Hausman and others, 
1999). This difference of opinion has not yet been resolved. 
FINANCIAL CRISES 














Budget deficit and high inflation; stabilization 
based on exchange-rate anchor (1978-1981) 
Sharp adjustment and macroeconomic rigidity 
due to convertibility law 
Stabilization and structural adjustment after large 
budget deficits and hyperinflation 
Stabilization plan with exchange rate anchor; large 
current-account deficit 
Structural reforms and financial adjustment in the 
public sector; heavy foreign debt; stabilization based 
on exchange rate anchor (1978-1982) 
Increased inflation, fiscal and monetary adjustment 
programme to deal with economic crisis unleashed 
in late 1994 
Stabilization and structural adjustment after large 
budget deficits and hyperinflation 
Banking crisis 
Banking crisis 
Isolated bank failures 
Liquidity and solvency problems in 
the banking industry 
Widespread banking crisis 
Widespread crisis in the financial 
system 
Solvency problems in banking 
industry 
Source: Compiled by the authors on the basis of Günter Held, "Bank regulation, liberalization and 
financial instability in Latin American and Caribbean countries", Finance and the Real Economy: Issues 
and Case Studies in Developing Countries, Yilmaz Akyüz and Günter Held (eds.), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and World Institute of 
Development Economics Research (WIDER ), 1993; Günter Held, "Liberalization or financial 
development?", CEPAL Review, No. 54 (LC/G.1845-P), Santiago, Chile, December 1994; and Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Strengthening Development: The Interplay 
of  Macro- and Microeconomics, Libros de la CEPAL series, No. 42 (LC/G.1898/Rev.1-P), Santiago, Chile, 
March 1996. United Nations Publication, sales No. E.96.II.G.2. 
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which was exacerbated by the failure of small and medium-sized businesses 
and the restructuring of subsidiaries of transnational and public enterprises. 
The rationalization process tended to be faster and more intense when the 
economy was liberalized against a backdrop of severe recession, as happened 
in Argentina and Chile in the 1970s, Mexico in the early 1980s and Brazil in 
the early 1990s. 
During this initial phase, the capacity to react by boosting exports was 
generally low in countries whose capital markets had not yet been modernized. 
In these cases, production processes and machinery were obsolete, and the 
resulting products could not compete in foreign markets. This was true in 
several industrial sectors of Peru and Chile when the reforms were 
implemented. Only in a few exceptional cases were specific industries 
operating in competitive markets able to quickly reorient their production to 
the foreign market. 
b. Second Phase: Increased Investment in Modernization 
In this second phase, the transitory factors primarily stimulated 
investment and were associated with the emergence of various phenomena: 
- Cost-cutting modernization: The need to update equipment and machinery 
is of particular importance after a firm has gone through a period of 
rationalization and wants to enhance its competitiveness to survive in 
the market. This is a defensive effort linked to the opening of the economy 
and the emergence of new actors (firms that import and those that 
produce) in the same sector. 
- Reorientation towards exports: Market liberalization and new relative prices 
created a special stimulus for investment in export sectors in some 
countries. At the same time, however, there was a wave of destruction, 
which we could call "disinvestment", which was not reflected in aggregate 
investment statistics. This trend went hand in hand with an exceptional 
rise in the import coefficient. Because it is very difficult to measure the 
latter phenomenon, we cannot calculate the net effects of the new 
allocation of resources to exports versus imports. 
- Strategic repositioning of  transnational firms:  The opening of new markets 
led to an increased role for transnational corporations, which were able 
to take advantage of their larger size and the appearance of potential 
markets in new countries. In addition, prospects for higher profits 
emerged, especially in sectors in which firms were privatized. This was 
true not only in industrial sectors, but also in basic infrastructure services 
-telecommunications, electricity, water and sanitation- and in the oil and 
gas sectors, where net investment rose sharply as a result of both the 
acquisition and the expansion of productive capacity. 
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- Investments required by privatization contracts: This phenomenon occurred 
in countries that imposed as a condition of privatization the expansion 
of services -particularly in the telecommunications sector- or new 
investments. For example, investment commitments were required in 
Peru, and the "capitalization" of enterprises was a condition in Bolivia.11 
These temporary factors tend to provide a one-time stimulus to investment 
or, in some cases, for as long as the stimulus for change lasts. The tendency 
dissipates in the long run, however, when the new economic model takes hold. 
Following the initial step of adjusting business management, firms were 
faced with a macroeconomic context of less uncertainty, a clear trend towards 
price stability, higher growth in demand, increased utilization of installed 
capacity and in general less instability of different variables, especially those 
that are key determinants of the profitability of investment projects. 
Consequently, the capital accumulation effort picked up steam. Positive factors 
came to predominate, even though in some countries various macroeconomic 
imbalances persisted and contributed to great uncertainty throughout the 
process -albeit to a lesser extent than in the previous phase. 
Table I-4 shows that in the second phase GDP grew at an average annual 
rate ranging from nearly 3% in Brazil and Mexico to nearly 7% in Chile. In 
five of the eight countries, there was a sharp revaluation of the local currency, 
which helped bring down the cost of capital goods. The average annual rate 
of inflation was much lower than in the preceding phase, while the cost of 
internal financing followed different trajectories in different countries. The 
gap between the domestic and international interest rates ranged from just 
3% in Chile between 1986 and 1989 to 48% in Brazil between 1995 and 1998. 
Obviously, this is an element that hindered investment in some countries. 
Investment in modernization had a high marginal yield in countries where 
instability had long been an obstacle to healthy investment. This can be 
explained by at least three factors. First, the relative technological obsolescence 
of existing capital goods meant that investment in modernization quickly 
increased average productivity. Second, investment in modernization occurred 
after the rationalization phase, which prepared businesses to make efficient 
investment decisions and maximize their technical and operational yields. 
Third, economic liberalization tended to lower the price of capital goods, a 
trend which gathered momentum in the 1990s as currencies appreciated. 
The high yield resulting from modernizing machinery and equipment 
explains the increase in investment despite the high real interest rate that 
11 In Bolivia, the State contributed the public enterprise and the national or foreign investor contributed 
the capital, in an amount equal to the market value of the public enterprise. This created a new 
company with twice the value, in which the investor held 50% of the shares and controlled the 
management of the business, while the remaining shares were distributed to the citizens either directly 
or by means of the reformed pension fund system. 
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persisted in some countries (especially Brazil), and despite the microeconomic 
uncertainties and the consequent need to make drastic changes in growth 
strategies.12 Investment during this phase may also take place under adverse 
circumstances, because the need to lower costs to deal with competition cannot 
be put off. 
It is interesting to note that the main components of gross fixed capital 
formation -represented by machinery and equipment and by construction 
(see table I-5)- show the same trends; both rise or fall in consonance with 
overall gross capital formation during the periods examined. Contrasts among 
Table I-5 
COMPONENTS AND COEFFICIENT OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL 
FORMATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
(percent) 
COUNTRY 1970-1980 1990-1998 1970 1975 1980 1986 1990 1998 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 
Argentina 6.8 7.8 6.3 5.9 8.1 7.3 6.0 9.6 
Bolivia 8.8 9.0 7.7 9.2 8.2 5.7 6.1 15.2 
Brazil 9.8 5.2 8.6 11.7 9.0 6.4 4.6 6.3 
Chile 6.3 10.6 7.3 5.8 8.6 4.6 8.0 13.0 
Colombia 6.8 8.6 6.9 6.2 7.7 6.1 6.7 8.1 
Costa Rica 10.0 12.6 8.2 8.9 10.2 9.0 12.7 15.3 
Mexico 9.0 8.7 8.4 9.8 10.9 5.9 8.0 10.7 
Peru 10.4 4.5 7.7 14.9 10.9 5.5 3.8 5.0 
CONSTRUCTION 
Argentina 16.6 11.8 16.5 15.3 17.0 9.2 6.7 14.9 
Bolivia 8.2 9.0 7.5 9.0 6.0 7.7 7.8 11.3 
Brazil 13.6 10.4 12.0 14.1 14.6 12.3 11.0 10.6 
Chile 9.9 14.5 14.3 9.0 10.0 10.7 13.6 15.9 
Colombia 9.4 8.3 10.5 9.1 9.1 10.1 7.4 7.4 
Costa Rica 11.7 10.2 10.2 10.8 13.7 10.5 10.4 11.5 
Mexico 12.8 10.3 12.7 13.1 13.9 10.5 10.4 10.0 
Peru 11.4 17.0 9.1 12.6 12.6 11.8 13.6 20.1 
Source: Annex tables A-2 and A-3. 
12 See Kosacoff (1998) and Bielschowsky (1999a). 
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countries can be seen, however. In the 1990s, the investment coefficient in 
machinery and equipment fell in Brazil, Mexico and Peru in comparison with 
historic levels, while in Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica it rose significantly. 
As the next section shows, this rise was a function of the increased dynamism 
of the production sectors. Furthermore, average annual investment in 
construction jumped sharply in Chile and Peru, and in 1998 this sector's share 
in the GDP expanded considerably in Argentina, as well. 
3. Consolidation of  the Economic Model 
We define the consolidation phase as one in which the temporary 
incentives for investment have disappeared, and therefore the peculiar 
elements of the transition period are no longer key determinants of investment. 
The new institutionality has matured, and investment now depends on factors 
that are recognized as the determinants in business cycles in normal times. 
This phase has not occurred in most of the countries under study; several 
more years will be required for the processes to mature and the investment 
environment to become consolidated. Depending on macroeconomic and 
institutional factors and the entrepreneurial spirit of the actors, investment 
could either became more or less dynamic in this new period. There is no 
guarantee that the new set of signals will be able to solve the risk-return 
equation in such a way as to encourage investment in expanding capacity 
beyond the achievements of the previous economic model. This is due 
primarily to the fact that the region still faces a situation of instability, 
characterized by the following factors: 
a) Great vulnerability: The globalization of finance and the fact that economies 
have no protection against the volatility of international capital flows or 
the fragility of the regional financial system create an atmosphere of 
vulnerability. These factors do not create a macroeconomic context that 
favours productive investment in expanding capacity, when such 
investment is irreversible. 
b) Lower profits,  higher risks: Before the macroeconomic instability that 
resulted from the debt crisis of the 1980s, investments in tradable goods 
yielded high profits -albeit thanks to protection in many cases- in a 
microeconomic context of less uncertainty, and with capital costs that 
were negative in real terms. The economic reforms created an open, 
universal microeconomic institutionality without protection and with 
greater risks. National firms responded by concentrating investment in 
sectors with very high profits. 
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c) Less public investment in infrastructure:  Historically, the public sector 
invested in basic services in order to create positive externalities. The 
privatization of these sectors was accompanied by greater demands for 
profitability, the incorporation of risk costs and an aversion to 
macroeconomic and microeconomic uncertainty. If the State does not 
intervene to offset these factors, there is no reason to expect investment 
to be higher than in the past, especially in energy sectors (electricity and 
hydrocarbons), highway infrastructure, water and sanitation. 
d) New firms  and business strategies: This could be the most positive 
development for the future. After abandoning the region throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, foreign direct investment returned in the 1990s, attracted 
by the stabilization of the Latin American economies and the liberalization 
and deregulation of markets. The question that arises is whether this 
movement will spur a new cycle of investment in new sectors and new 
areas of business. So far, there are good signs in certain infrastructure 
sectors, but they have not spread to the productive sectors. 
Chile is the only country that has reached this stage of model 
consolidation. Since 1990, investment has been more dynamic there than it 
was in the decades preceding 1970. It is interesting to study the reasons behind 
this new stage in Chile. As explained in box I-2, the State played a much more 
important role in this process than is normally acknowledged. On the other 
hand, this vigour could dissipate in the future if the proper policies are not 
maintained (Moguillansky, 1999). 
In three countries, nearly 15 years have passed since the reforms were 
launched, and the model has not yet been consolidated. The transitory factors 
typical of a process of change are still having a tremendous impact on investment 
decisions. In Bolivia, at the end of the 1990s investment behaviour was still 
strongly influenced by the ongoing capitalization of formerly public enterprises; 
in Costa Rica, the reforms have been implemented gradually, and they are now 
in a phase of strong investment resulting from the continued repositioning of 
transnational corporations; and in Mexico, an ongoing trend toward the 
reallocation of resources was prompted by the entry of United States firms, 
stimulated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
opening of a huge market thanks to the integration process, coupled with the 
devaluation following the 1994 crisis. Finally, in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Peru, the reforms have been in place less than 10 years and the transition is 
still under way, so the new institutional structure has not yet taken root. 
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Box I-2 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE CONSOLIDATION 
OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL IN CHILE 
Chile began its economic reforms 25 years ago, undergoing at that time the process that the 
other countries in the region are experiencing now. In the transition period characterized by 
economic orthodoxy, we can identify an initial phase dominated by a number of negative 
signals stemming from the interaction of policies and reforms that led to unsatisfactory 
investment behaviour. This phase, which began in 1974, culminated in a severe economic 
crisis, catalysed by the impact of external events in 1982. 
In order to overcome the economic crisis and help private industry recover, the military 
regime supported and stimulated productive activity, assuming debts and losses and granting 
subsidies. As a result, large amounts of money were transferred from the public to the private 
sector. 
Beginning in 1985, the State employed a variety of mechanisms as it continued to intervene 
to strengthen private industry: 
• It regulated financial markets, providing agents with a strict framework of rules and 
penalizing the misuse of resources. 
• It intervened to reincorporate the private sector into production, generating stimuli with 
new and creative instruments, including reduced share prices in enterprises and banks 
that were transferred to the private sector after going bankrupt, special credits and the 
privatization of public utilities through the mechanism of "popular capitalism" (thanks 
to this formula, public officials and executives of State enterprises and economic groups 
were able to obtain controlling interest in privatized companies). 
• It intervened to create new stimuli for foreign investment (Chapter XIX of the Central 
Bank's Compendium of Standards for International Change). 
• It intervened to expand the financial market, establishing mechanisms to allow for part 
of the resources accumulated by pension fund administrators (long-term resources) to be 
used as a source of investment financing. 
• It applied a series of incentives to promote exports, which, together with the policy of 
favouring a low value for the local currency that would remain stable in the medium 
term, generated the profits required for the diversification of exports into non-traditional 
areas. 
The "dirigisme" in public policy that characterized the second phase paved the way for the 
restructuring of economic groups, the emergence of new domestic and foreign firms, the 
modernization of production in industries processing natural resources and an orientation 
towards competing in foreign markets. 
The post-reform transition period ended in early 1990, giving way to the consolidation of the 
economic model. There was a strong surge in investment during this period, which can be 
explained by four elements: positive macroeconomic trends, expansion of the capital market, 
a favourable international context and the dynamic that had characterized sectors 
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Box I-2 continued 
making intensive use of natural resources and various infrastructure sectors since the late 
1980s as they forged ahead without obstacles to development. 
In the second half of the 1990s, however, as the economic model matured, a fourth phase 
began to take shape. It marks the culmination of a business cycle resulting from the declining 
yields of capital in activities where investment had been concentrated in the last decade, the 
disappearance of the major incentives provided by the State, the fall in international prices 
for some products that had become principal exports and the extension of market regulation 
or the implementation of stricter regulations. 
Source: Compiled by the authors on the basis of Graciela Moguillansky, La inversión en Chile: ¿el fin  de un ciclo 
de expansión?, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)/Fondo 
de Cultura Económica, 1999. 
B. T R A N S I T O R Y F A C T O R S IN S E C T O R A L I N V E S T M E N T 
The research project that resulted in this book made it possible to compile 
statistics for various countries showing the development of sector-level 
investment in the period following the reforms. This, in turn, enabled us to 
make a comparison with a previous period, which would be as long as possible. 
The latter exercise was limited by the lack of information, as figures dated 
back only to 1970 in most cases or, exceptionally, to the 1960s.13 
1. What  the Sectoral  Data Show 
Table I-6 shows data for the sectors that we believe are essential to 
sustained growth over the long term. These sectors are divided into two 
groups: the first includes industry, mining and hydrocarbons, and the second 
includes electricity, telecommunications and transportation. The first group 
is characterized by the generation or savings of foreign exchange, so its 
13 With respect to Argentina and Mexico, it was not possible to construct a full data matrix because of 
the lack of historical data in some cases, or because only very partial information was available. In 
these countries, therefore, the analysis focused on each sector individually. 
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Table i-6 
SECTORAL INVESTMENT COEFFICIENTS 
(annual  average  for  the period,  as percent  of  overall  GDP) 
COUNTRY/SECTOR PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM 
BOLIVIA 1987-1989 1990-1995 1996-1997 
Production sectors n.a. 5.11 6.13 6.23 
Hydrocarbons 3.40 3.90 4.06 
Industry 1.40 1.49 1.40 
Mining 0.31 0.74 0.77 
Infrastructure  sectors 1.56 2.35 3.81 
Electricity 0.83 1.53 2.16 
sanitation 0.32 0.15 0.23 
Telecommunications 0.41 0.67 1.42 
BRAZIL 1970-1989 1990-1994 1995-1997 
Production sectors 5.05 2.60 3.80 
Hydrocarbons 0.95 0.50 0.40 
industry 3.90 2.00 3.30 
Mining 0.20 0.10 0.10 
infrastructure  sectors4.58 2.34 2.18 
Electricity 1.83 0.91 0.55 
sanitation 0.35 0.19 0.13 
Telecommunications 0.62 0.49 0.70 
Transportation 1.78 0.75 0.80 
CHILE 1980-1985 1986-1989 1990-1997 
Production sectors n.a. 5.18 6.32 8.98 
Hydrocarbons 0.93 0.80 0.81 
industry 1.87 2.31 3.81 
Mining 2.38 3.21 4.36 
infrastructure  sectors 4.68 4.14 5.59 
Electricity 1.82 1.56 1.52 
Sanitation, roads, ports 1.47 1.15 1.71 
Telecommunications 0.47 0.68 1.50 
others 0.92 0.75 0.86 
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Table I-6 continued 
COUNTRY/SECTOR PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM 
COLOMBIA 1975-1989 1990-1991 1992-1995 1996-1997 
Production sectors 3.33 3.30 4.69 n.a. 
Hydrocarbons 0.96 1.05 2.22 2.96 
Industry 2.37 2.25 2.47 n.a. 
Infrastructure  sectors 4.04 3.52 5.84 6.52 
Water and sanitation 0.30 0.35 0.60 0.70 
Communications 0.37 0.40 0.71 1.61 
Electricity 1.95 1.68 2.45 2.73 
Transportation 1.42 1.09 2.08 1.48 
COSTA RICA 1970-1985 1986-1991 1992-1994 
Production sectors 5.89 7.36 8.26 
Agriculture 1.75 2.45 2.82 
Industry 4.14 4.91 5.44 
Infrastructure  sectors 5.71 5.87 7.79 
Electricity 1.90 1.83 2.60 
Transportation 3.81 4.04 5.19 
PERU 1970-1989 1992-1993 1994-1997 
Production sectors 7.99 4.18 4.79 
Agriculture 0.38 0.75 0.79 
Hydrocarbons 0.74 0.21 0.22 
Industry 4.84 2.23 2.84 
Mining 2.03 0.99 0.94 
Infrastructure  sectors 3.94 3.48 3.84 
Electricity and water 0.81 1.14 1.24 
Transportation 
and communications 3.13 2.34 2.60 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. Note: The coefficients 
are expressed in constant currency of each country. The figures of the various countries are not 
comparable with each other. 
expansion prevents recurring crises in the balance of payments and external 
limitations on growth; the sectors in the second group are characterized by 
their contribution to strong international competitiveness, and they are 
fundamental to the growth of the first group. 
The first significant result in the sectors that produce goods (the first 
group) is that in the period following the reforms, capital was channelled 
preferentially to sectors exporting primary goods, while investment in the 
industrial sector declined. This is consistent with the general tendency for the 
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gross industrial product's share of the overall GDP to gradually shrink. In 
only two countries did investment in the industrial sector rise, as measured 
by the coefficient of investment with respect to GDP: Chile and Costa Rica. 
This result also explains the small proportion of manufactured goods in 
exports, which continues to characterize in the region's export sector, with 
the exception of Mexico and Brazil. Moreover, the weakness of investments 
in the industrial sector in the latter two countries demonstrates the 
vulnerability of the export sector when looking toward the future. 
According to a survey conducted in Argentina, investment had recovered 
in a small group of industrial branches by 1996. The same can be seen in an 
industrial survey carried out in Brazil between 1995 and 1997, but in this case 
the investment coefficient was lower than that registered prior to the reforms. 
In Peru, the figures compiled by the National Institute of Statistics and 
Computing (INEI) show that by 1997 the industrial sector as a whole was still 
far from regaining the levels of investment of the period preceding the reforms. 
In the mining and hydrocarbons sectors, Chile and Colombia stand out 
for the dynamic nature of investment. In addition, as is discussed in the 
corresponding chapter, the country-by-country sectoral studies indicate that 
investment projects in mining are being considered in Argentina and Peru, 
and projects are also being evaluated in different segments of the petroleum 
and gas industry. The prospects for these sectors appear to be favourable in 
countries where the effects of incentives for foreign investment are maturing. 
With the exception of Brazil and Peru, investment in infrastructure rose 
sharply after the reforms were implemented, in comparison with the 1980s; 
such investment also increased its share of GDP. Unlike Argentina and Chile, 
where the private sector has played a major role in sectoral growth, in Colombia 
and Costa Rica the public sector has led the accumulation effort in 
infrastructure to date. In the other countries, it is too early to draw a definite 
conclusion about the future behaviour of private firms. In the respective 
chapters, however, sectoral and microeconomic factors that could hinder the 
future development of investment are discussed. 
2. Transitory  Factors  as Determinants  of  Sectoral  Investment 
Table I-7 analyses the performance of the different sectors in the 1990s, 
classifying them as highly dynamic, moderately dynamic, or non-dynamic 
and comparing production and service activities in the different countries. 
Some noteworthy points are as follows: 
a) The country-by-country analysis reveals that all sectors in Chile were 
highly dynamic, whereas investment in Brazil followed a negative trend 
in most sectors. This indicates that as the liberalization model took root 
in Chile, the private sector adopted a general pro-expansion attitude 
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Table I-7 
DYNAMIC SECTORS IN THE 1990s 











































Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
H = highly dynamic; M = moderately dynamic; N = non-dynamic. 
(although as shown below, this is not true across the board in all companies 
or in all subsectors; the most dynamic firms raise the investment average). 
In Brazil, on the other hand, the difficulty in achieving stabilization and 
the turbulence that characterized the initial post-reform transition period 
dampened investment in the 1990s. The remaining countries reveal 
heterogeneous situations across sectors, as some benefited and others 
suffered. 
b) In the sector-by-sector analysis, telecommunications appears to have been 
the most dynamic, followed by energy and transportation, while the 
performance of production sectors was much more moderate. In the 
infrastructure sectors, investment was favoured by transitory factors, 
which are examined in detail in the respective chapters. In mining and 
petroleum, the transformations occurred too recently to reach a 
conclusion, given that the time between exploration, the beginning of 
feasibility studies and actual mining or drilling is quite long. Finally, as 
the figures show, industry was among the worst-performing sectors in 
the period following the reforms. 
How dynamic investment was in a given sector can be explained by 
specific factors. Certain institutional aspects, linked to changes in legal and 
regulatory frameworks and to the nature of the markets, became particularly 
important to investment. Many of these aspects were only temporary, however 




TRANSITORY FACTORS STIMULATING INVESTMENT 
COUNTRY SPECIAL INVESTMENT IN STRATEGIC INVESTMENT AND SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS 
INCENTIVES FOR DEFENSIVE REPOSITIONING OF EXPANSION INSTITUTIONAL STIMULATED BY 
FOREIGN MODERNIZATION TRANSNATIONAL COMMITMENTS CHANGES REGIONAL 
INVESTMENT FIRMS AFTER PRIVATIZATION INTEGRATION 
INDUSTRY 
Argentina + + + + 
Bolivia + + 
Brazil + + + + 
Chile + + + 
Colombia + + 
Costa Rica + + + + 
Mexico + + + + 
Peru + + 
MINING 
Argentina + + + + + + 
Bolivia + + + 
Brazil + 
Chile + + + + 
Colombia 
Costa Rica + 
Mexico 
Peru + + + + + 
HYDROCARBONS 
Argentina + + + + + 
Bolivia + + + + + + 
Brazil + + 
Chile 
Colombia + + + 
Costa Rica + 
Mexico + + 
Peru + + + 
ELECTRICITY 
Argentina + + + + 
Bolivia + + + + + 
Brazil + + + + 
Chile + + + + 
Colombia + + + 
Costa Rica + + + 
Mexico + + + 
Peru + + + + 
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Table I-8 continued 
COUNTRY SPECIAL INVESTMENT IN STRATEGIC INVESTMENT AND SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS 
INCENTIVES FOR DEFENSIVE REPOSITIONING OF EXPANSION INSTITUTIONAL STIMULATED BY 
FOREIGN MODERNIZATION TRANSNATIONAL COMMITMENTS CHANGES REGIONAL 
INVESTMENT FIRMS AFTER PRIVATIZATION INTEGRATION 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Argentina + + + + 
Bolivia + + + + 
Brazil + + + + 
Chile + + + + + 
Colombia + + + + 
Costa Rica + 
Mexico + + + + 
Peru + + + + 
HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Argentina + + + 
Bolivia + + 
Brazil + + + 
Chile + + + 
Colombia + + + 
Costa Rica + 
Mexico + + + 
Peru + + 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
a) Defensive modernization (to boost competitiveness) was especially 
significant in industry, but it was also observed in both private and public 
enterprises in the mining and hydrocarbons sectors. This kind of 
modernizing investment, aimed at increasing efficiency and profitability, 
also occurred in electricity, telecommunications and highway 
infrastructure. 
b) Most industrial branches in which investment grew strongly saw an 
increase in investment by transnational firms seeking to bolster their 
strategic share in markets opening up to competition. This is also true of 
mining and hydrocarbons, where institutional changes allowed the entry 
of foreign capital, and of electricity and telecommunications after 
privatization was implemented. 
c) Changes in legislation governing mining and hydrocarbons provided an 
additional stimulus to foreign investment. This also occurred in specific 
industrial branches (including the automotive industry, textiles and 
electronics assembly) when incentive mechanisms were introduced or 
enhanced. 
d) The commitment to invest in privatized companies boosted investment, 
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either because stock was sold under the rubric of capitalization, as in the 
case of Bolivia, or because investment commitments were made, as in 
the case of Peru. There were also commitments to expand and modernize 
services, which entailed large investments; this was an especially 
important factor in telecommunications. 
e) The vigour of investment in telecommunications can be explained by the 
battle among transnational firms to dominate the world market and the 
Latin American market in particular, the tremendous pent-up demand 
for fixed telephone service, the strong development of technology and 
the backwardness of the existing industry. 
f) In the particular case of Mexico and other Central American and 
Caribbean countries, a wave of investment was associated with integration 
with the United States market. Although this trend began before the 
reforms were launched, they have given it greater impetus. The same 
occurred in the countries that make up the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur). 
All of these elements together contributed to the improved investment 
behaviour that characterized the second phase of the transition to a new 
economic model. It is not possible, however, to determine how the individual 
sectors will evolve once the new institutions become entrenched and the 
transitory incentives disappear. 

CHAPTER I I 
I N V E S T M E N T I N T H E I N D U S T R I A L S E C T O R 
A. A D E F E N S I V E S T A N C E IN T H E F A C E OF C H A N G E : 
A S E C T O R A L O V E R V I E W 
The industrial sector was hardest hit by the economic reforms, with a 
higher cost of adjustment than in any other sector.14 The investment coefficient 
for this sector fell, recovered slowly in some countries and only in the case of 
Chile was able to grow strongly enough to exceed the averages for previous 
decades. The most drastic changes in the industrial sector were triggered by 
market opening and liberalization. Interviews with businesspeople and 
detailed surveys carried out in several countries all lead to the conclusion 
that entrepreneurs in the industrial sector adopted a defensive position in 
response to liberalization and deregulation. 
1. The First  Phase in the Industrial  Sector 
The simple need to ensure survival forced the industrial sector into 
rationalization and cost reduction, with no medium-term alternative. The 
impact on industry of both institutional and macroeconomic change was 
therefore greater than that on the economy as a whole. 
14 The information contained in the text, tables, boxes and figures in this chapter is taken from the 
database of this research. It is the result of work by the following authors: Abugattás (1999); Barja 
(1999a); Bielschowsky (1999a); Bisang and Gómez (1999); Cordero (2000); Mendiola (1999); Moreno-
Brid (1999); Ramirez and Nunez (1999). 
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Table 11-1 
T H E T H R E E P H A S E S OF P O S T - R E F O R M I N V E S T M E N T IN I N D U S T R Y 
Cn O 
COUNTRY PRE-REFORM PHASE I: 
INVESTMENT IN RATIONALIZATION 
PHASE II: 
INVESTMENT IN MODERNIZATION 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE MODEL 
PERIOD SHARE OF PERIOD PRE-REFORM SHARE PERIOD PRE-REFORM SHARE OF PERIOD PRE-REFORM SHARE 
ANNUAL INDEX OF INDEX = 100 ANNUAL INDEX = 100 OF ANNUAL 
AVERAGE G D P = 100 37 ANNUAL PERIOD AVERAGE AVERAGE PERIOD AVERAGE AVERAGE 
% PERIOD INDEX AVERAGE G D P % G D P % 
G D P % 
Argentina 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 9 0 3 . 3 1 9 9 1 1 0 0 2 . 0 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 7 1 6 6 3 . 0 
Brazil 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 9 3 . 9 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 4 7 8 2 . 0 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 7 1 3 0 3 . 3 
Chile 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 4 n.a. 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 5 1 0 0 1 .4 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 9 1 7 7 2 . 3 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 7 4 6 0 3 . 8 
Colombia 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 9 2 . 3 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5 1 6 6 2 . 3 
Mexico 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 5 1 . 9 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 0 6 7 1 .0 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 4 1 1 8 1 .4 












Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
a/The figure for Chile and Argentina corresponds to the average of phase I = 100. 






Key among the institutional changes that affected the sector was the 
scrapping of tariff and non-tariff barriers in specific branches of industry, as 
well as the elimination of sectoral policies providing subsidies, tax exemptions 
and loans at preferential rates. This coincided with the elimination of policies 
to promote industrial exports. The combined effect of these changes was a 
disincentive to investment in the industrial sector. 
As a consequence, the investment coefficient registered in the countries 
during the first phase was well below the historical average for the period 
prior to liberalization. This is confirmed by table II-1, which shows not only 
lower shares of GDP, but also lower absolute levels compared to those of the 
pre-reform period. 
2. The Second Phase in the Industrial  Sector 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the second phase of the post-reform 
transition took place in an improved macroeconomic climate with stronger 
incentives to modernize. Three factors combined to foster modernization in 
the industrial sector: the improvement in the macroeconomic environment; 
rising inflows of foreign capital (with a growing share of foreign direct 
investment within these); and the greater availability of domestic loans and 
finance. 
Alongside these factors, others of a more institutional nature played an 
important role in defining the development of industrial investment in each 
country. Particularly significant among these were the establishment of export 
promotion policies; the reassessment of special industrial regimes; the 
absorption of national firms by transnational corporations; and other policies 
which, as shown below, contributed to different investment patterns across 
the numerous industrial sectors. 
This second phase featured a generalized recovery of investment in all 
countries (table II-1). In Chile, although data are not available for the pre-
reform period (in this case the 1960s), the strong growth in investment 
registered between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s is likely to have 
surpassed that of the 1960s. The other countries in the study grew at a slower 
pace, although they were approaching the pre-reform periods. 
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Table II-2 
SECTORAL POLICIES IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
COUNTRY AND PERIOD SECTORAL POLICY 
ARGENTINA 
1978 Existence of special programmes for manufacturing 
1990-1998 Elimination of special regimes apart from in the automotive industry 
1991-1998 Elimination of subsidies and loans to specific sectors 
1991-1992 Elimination of special export incentives 
1993-1998 Tariff  and tax benefits for export firms 
Intensification of integration with Mercosur 
BRAZIL 
1990-1994 Elimination of special export incentives 
Elimination of subsidized resources for investment 
1994-1999 Intensification of integration with Mercosur 
COLOMBIA 
1990 Elimination of industrial promotion policies 
CHILE 
1974-1984 Elimination of export subsidies 
Reform of land and water markets to foster agroindustrial growth 
Reforestation subsidies 
1985 Reform of laws regulating pension fund administrators (AFPS) to permit 
investment in companies 
1986-1989 Temporary tariff  increases 
1985-1995 Export promotion policies 
MEXICO 
1986-1990 Elimination of specific programmes except for in automotive industry 
Elimination of subsidies 
Increased tax benefits for assembly plants and their suppliers 
1992-1998 Development bank operating like a "second tier bank", but providing few 
resources to small and medium-sized firms 
Tax promotion schemes for exports 
Special loans for production and import of assembly plant inputs 
(decree 1994) 
PERU 
1990-1998 Elimination of specific industrial development programmes 
Elimination of subsidies 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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B. T H E VARYING R E S P O N S E S OF F I R M S A N D S E C T O R S 
Moving the analysis to the sectoral and firm level demonstrates that 
neither the incentives themselves nor the entrepreneurs' responses to them 
were homogeneous. Indeed, the processes of rationalization and 
modernization acquired their own particular characteristics among the 
different firms. Firms generally tended to cut costs and improve both product 
quality and client-supplier relations, which led to efficiency gains and massive 
unemployment. Other responses differed according to the type of firm. 
1. The Reactions of  Large  Firms 
Large firms -both national and transnational- dealt with the institutional 
changes by restructuring, which in turn led to the specialization of production; 
the breakdown of linkages in both processes and products, which transformed 
complex productive processes into simple assembly operations (the emergence 
of the assembly plant industry in Mexico and Central America is perhaps the 
most obvious example of this); and an increase in outsourcing within industry 
(Katz, 1996; Kosacoff, 1998). A number of innovative organizational practices 
were introduced to increase efficiency ("total quality", "just-in-time", Japan's 
"kamban" and others) in what has come to be known as "disembodied" 
technical progress. These transformations allowed large firms, including the 
subsidiaries of transnational corporations, to adapt to the new competitive 
environment. 
With the economy stabilized, firms began to employ a longer-term 
planning horizon. In the largest firms this meant taking decisions on several 
issues, including strategic partnerships with foreign investors; expansion into 
new markets; alliances with firms in other countries; introduction of new 
technologies in terms of products, processes and organization; and the sale of 
the firm to actors better positioned to exploit its particular assets. 
Greater access to credit and a stable economic environment combined 
to create an incentive to modernize and raise both production and 
productivity. Such behaviour was observed in most industrial branches, 
although the degree to which it occurred and the type of transformation it 
produced varied across firms. 
Investment was therefore at its most dynamic in large firms, particularly 
transnational corporations. This was the case not only because these firms 
started from a more solid competitive and financial position, but also because 
capital market liberalization provided them with more financing options, and 
at lower costs. Indeed, the opening of financial markets in a context of strong 
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international liquidity favoured the execution of large investment projects. 
These projects were financed with new resources provided directly by foreign 
investors, with the issue of shares and bonds by the largest firms in 
international markets and with loans from foreign banks at interest rates far 
lower than those offered by the domestic financial system. 
Another group of factors, however, further explains the particularly 
dynamic investment patterns found among transnationals. 
a) These firms face fewer risks and less uncertainty. For national firms, 
financial risk was concentrated in a single country, whereas transnational 
corporations diversified their investments across many countries. 
b) The features of the oligopolistic markets in which transnational 
corporations prefer to operate -product markets that are undergoing 
constant differentiation in Latin America- encouraged long-term 
investment aimed at acquiring a stronger market position that was to 
some extent insulated from the short- and medium-term fluctuations of 
the local economy. 
c) The Latin American subsidiaries of transnational corporations suffered 
less as a result of liberalization than did local enterprises because of the 
financial solidity of their parent companies, better access to all types of 
financing and technology and greater experience in competing 
internationally thanks to their global networks of input sourcing, export 
distribution and sales. Consequently, they were more flexible than national 
firms in the face of the new conditions emerging from liberalization. 
Studies carried out among the 100 largest industrial companies in Latin 
America indicate that between 1990 and 1996 transnational corporations 
increased their relative share among the large private industrial enterprises.15 
ECLAC (1998) shows that in 1997 foreign investors accelerated their acquisition 
of assets from local private firms, representing 40% of total foreign investment 
inflows into Latin America. Because this process was concentrated in three 
countries, the share of such flows was much higher there: 98% in Argentina 
and 62% in Mexico. 
The larger the presence of transnational corporations, the greater the 
growth of investment. Bisang and Gómez (1999), who surveyed approximately 
1,400 firms in Argentina, show that the participation of transnational in total 
manufacturing investment exceeded 52% in 1992 and rose to 57% by 1996. 
Kosacoff and Porta (1997) calculate that the participation of transnational in 
15 See peres (1998) and CEpAL (1998). 
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the invoicing of Argentina's 500 largest industrial enterprises grew from 33.6% 
in 1990 to 51% in 1995.16 
In Brazil, transnational corporations were dominant in four of the six 
fastest growing industrial branches: automobiles, electric and electronic 
products, branded processed foods targeted at the domestic market, and 
hygiene and cleaning products (Bielschowsky, 1999a). 
In Mexico, where the sectoral profile of investment growth is similar to 
that in Brazil, transnationals were responsible for most of the jump in 
investment. According to a study by Moreno-Brid (1999), the presence of 
foreign capital is a key feature in most of the fastest growing industrial 
branches, which were the recipients of significant levels of foreign direct 
investment. Mexico's assembly (maquila) industry, which is the nucleus of 
manufacturing growth, is very closely associated with foreign capital. 
In Chile, transnational corporations did not represent a dominant share 
of the fastest growing manufacturing sectors until the mid-1990s, with the 
exception of food and beverages. However, local economic groups had 
developed strategic alliances with foreign capital to promote the growth and 
modernization of production. These alliances, which had until then been 
restricted to capital contributions with no equity participation, allowed these 
conglomerates to penetrate foreign markets, to grow and subsequently to 
develop cross-border production. 
2. The Reactions of  Small and Medium-Sized Firms 
Small and medium-sized firms have been marginal to the process of 
capital formation in the post-reform period. The share of these enterprises fell 
not only in gross capital formation but also in production owing to two factors. 
First, they were not able to compete with cheaper imported products. This 
phenomenon became widespread in some industrial branches, including 
textiles, footwear, machine tools. The second factor was the elimination of 
preferential loans at subsidized interest rates, which had been targeted to small 
and medium-sized firms. The institutions that provided these loans were 
closed down during this period, most notably in Argentina, Chile, Mexico 
and Peru. Because small and medium-sized firms were largely characterized 
by fragile microeconomic features, low productivity and limited access to 
financial resources, they were seriously affected by liberalization and 
constituted a high percentage of total bankruptcies in the market. 
16 Chudnovsky, López and Porta (1995) refer to a foreign direct investment boom in Argentina following 
stabilization and, following Dunning's analytical approach, produce an excellent table outlining the 
different strategies pursued by multinationals in that country over the 1990s. Kosacoff and Porta (1997) 
return to this theme, updating the information and completing the analysis of strategies in a broad 
and creative manner. 
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Once they had taken the first steps in adapting to the reforms, small and 
medium-sized enterprises benefited from the more stable environment, growth 
and the indirect demand generated by the most dynamic sectors. Particularly 
in foodstuffs, large firms demanded specific inputs from small and medium-
sized firms, thereby spreading some of their own growth. This allowed them 
to grow in absolute terms in certain countries (for example, Mexico), although 
in others their development was hindered by an inability to compete with 
imported products and by high domestic interest rates. 
With only limited access to capital markets, small and medium-sized firms 
were adversely affected by financial costs that grew fasten than their profits. 
Mexico maintained some financing targeted specifically to this sector, 
particularly when the former development bank became a second-tier public 
financial institution that lent at preferential rates to small and medium-sized 
firms, export firms and infrastructure projects. In Chile (Moguillansky, 1999) 
and Peru (Abugattás, 1999), small firms were marginalized from the market 
in almost all sectors, while in Mexico this occurred in productive activities in 
which the process of capital concentration became accelerated. 
3. The Heterogeneity  Among Branches of  Industry 
A degree of heterogeneity in the effects of the reforms is also evident 
across the different industrial branches. Studies on the first phase conducted 
in Chile (Mizala, 1992) and Argentina (Kosacoff, 1998; Bisang and Gómez, 
1999) show that in the early years following market liberalization, investment 
in non-tradable goods was prioritized over that in tradables. 
To evaluate the behaviour of investment in the post-reform transition, 
we developed the concept of "relative dynamism". We calculated historical 
averages based on the two previous decades wherever the information was 
available, otherwise using the longest previous period possible. Those 
segments of manufacturing industry whose participation in aggregate 
industrial investment in the post-liberalization period surpassed the historical 
average are then defined as the most dynamic branches within a country.17 
The studies cited, which are the main sources for this analysis, provide a 
detailed presentation, description and analysis of the evidence on the 
development of the different branches within each country, disaggregated to 
three and four digits of the ISIC code. 
Table II-3 (which summarizes the table in annex A-7) presents the 
industrial branches which experienced the most dynamic investment growth, 
17 Our definition of "relative dynamism" means that some firms registering scarce absolute expansion 
are included in the branches labelled "more dynamic". By the same token, in those countries 
registering a greater aggregate dynamism -especially Chile- some branches experiencing a high rate 
of expansion are included amongst the "least dynamic" ones. 
Table 11-3 
DECLINING SECTORAL GROWTH 
BRANCHES ORGANIZED ACCORDING TO 
"RELATIVE DYNAMISM'W 
1 S I C CODE COUNTRIES WHERE THE BRANCH HAS 
BEEN "RELATIVELY" DYNAMIC3' 
MAIN INVESTORS 
Food 311 All countries Transnationals, conglomerates 








All countries except Chile 
Transnationals, conglomerates and large 
national firms 
Transnationals 
Basic metallurgy 371 All countries except Peru Large national firms 
Other foodstuffs,  beverages 
and tobacco 31 
(excluding 311) 
Argentina, Colombia, Chile and 
Mexico 
Large national firms and 
some transnationals 
Chemicals/basic petrochemicals 351 Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru Transnationals 
Plastics 356 Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico Medium-sized and large national firms 
Other non-metal minerals 369 Chile, Colombia and Mexico Large national firms 
Automotive industry 384 Argentina, Brazil and Mexico Transnationals 
Wood, paper and pulp 341 Colombia, Chile and Peru Large national firms 
Textile industry/ clothing 321-322 Colombia, Peru and Mexico 
(maquila assembly plants) 
Medium-sized and large national firms 
Machinery and mechanical and 
electrical equipment 382-383 _ _ 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
a/ Criteria of "relative dynamism": increase in share of aggregate post-reform industrial investment, over that in pre-reform period in each country. 
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ranked by their prevalence in the individual countries. All countries report 
particularly dynamic rates of investment in foodstuffs and basic metals. At 
the next level in terms of relative sectoral growth are the activities associated 
with the pharmaceutical industry, beauty products and other chemical 
products; basic metallurgy; basic chemicals and petrochemicals; plastics; other 
non-metallic minerals; automobiles; wood, pulp and paper; machinery and 
mechanical and electrical equipment and textiles and clothing. 
The concentration of investment in certain branches is explained either 
by characteristics specific to the branch or by the institutional changes that 
facilitated branch development. 
- Branches with natural comparative advantages: The economic reforms allowed 
such activities to develop in some countries, but behaviour among industrial 
branches was not homogeneous. In the case of foodstuffs, the elimination of 
price controls was important, together with corrections in relative prices and, 
in some countries, a new treatment of agriculture (such as the development 
of the land and water markets which stimulated investment in primary 
production and thereby generated the conditions for the broader development 
of agroindustry). In other countries, policies were designed to stimulate 
primary production; the elimination of controls in industrial fishing; subsidies 
for forest exploitation (Chile); and the lifting of restrictions on the exploitation 
of these resources by private and foreign firms (Mexico). All of this was 
beneficial to the development of industry's potential, particularly within the 
foodstuffs, wood and pulp branches. 
The iron and steel industry and petrochemicals are two other branches 
with natural comparative advantages. The former was still predominantly 
State owned in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As the firms were privatized 
and absorbed into large economic conglomerates, rapid capital accumulation 
led to modernization and expansion, particularly in Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile. 
In the case of petrochemicals, some countries witnessed great investment 
growth following privatization. However, capital formation did not rise in 
those countries where privatization failed to inspire confidence among private 
actors, or where institutional problems marred the process. This was the case 
in Brazil and Mexico (Bielschowsky, 1999a; Moreno-Brid, 1999). 
- Branches linked to construction and infrastructure:  These include metal products 
and basic inputs for civil engineering, such as cement, glass, clay products and 
other products unlikely to be exported owing to high transport and distribution 
costs. These products have a high elasticity with respect to domestic demand, 
and their development therefore depends on local macroeconomic conditions. 
They benefited from the re-activation and growth of construction in the 1990s 
and, in some countries, from infrastructure privatizations, which gave rise to 
strong investment designed to increase capacity. 
ECLAC 59 
- Pharmaceuticals and other chemical products: Aside from demand growth, these 
goods benefited from the growth strategies of transnationals, which 
successfully exploited the new industrial property laws and the elimination 
of barriers on importing raw materials from parent companies. These firms 
invested in continuing to produce final goods for the local market, thereby 
avoiding the importation costs and risks associated with possible technical 
and hygiene restrictions, while also exploiting the sunk costs in marketing 
and distribution. 
- The automotive industry: This branch benefited from sectoral development 
policies that were maintained during the implementation of reforms or that 
are currently in transition. It was the best performer in terms of investment in 
the three largest countries in the region. In Mexico, the three existing North 
American assembly plants reinforced an investment strategy favouring 
integration with the United States, a strategy that first emerged in the 1970s 
and was consolidated in the 1990s under the impetus of the North American 
Free Trade Association (NAFTA). The strategy in Brazil and Argentina was to 
increase their share of the wider Mercosur market. It is estimated that the 
productive capacity of the European and North American firms increased 
from two to four million vehicles per year, even though the combined market 
of these two countries is unable to absorb more than two and a half million. 
Colombia is a different case in the sense that the local assembly plants sought 
not to increase capacity but rather to guarantee the recovery of their sunk 
costs -which the other countries accomplished through special protection 
schemes- by investing in modernization. For obvious reasons associated with 
market size and economies of scale, Chile saw little investment in its 
automotive industry, while firms actually closed down in Peru. 
- The electronic industry: This branch was strengthened in Mexico and Brazil as 
a result of the growth strategy pursued by the transnational firms operating 
in these countries. In the case of Mexico, the improvement was directly related 
to the development of the maquila industry, as well as integration with the 
United States. In Brazil, the domestic market and Mercosur -which was 
expanding rapidly in terms of both household and telecommunications 
equipment- together stimulated modernization, diversification and the local 
expansion of existing productive activity. In general, however, the fact that 
transnational corporations dominate global technological development, 
combined with the absence of both economies of scale and an industrial culture 
in this type of products, resulted in a lack of local investment in the most 
technologically sophisticated components of the branch. Consequently, these 
links in the productive chain were lost -a phenomenon which was common 
in all the countries of the region. 
In Colombia, the electronic industry survived despite its limited scope by 
concentrating investment in certain niches in the local market. Of the 
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remaining countries, only Argentina has an electronic industry of any 
significance. However, transnationals generally prefer to locate their affiliates 
in Brazil due to the size of the latter's market and the fact that costs are far 
higher in Argentina. 
- Textiles and clothing: In the aggregate, the textiles, clothing and leather 
industries were negatively affected by trade liberalization in almost all 
countries of the region, to the extent that all such activities were characterized 
by low investment in the post-reform period. By investing in modernization, 
however, two countries (Colombia and Peru) were able to achieve a recovery, 
although not in every subsector. In Peru, investment in the textile industry staged 
a full recovery between 1994 and 1997 after falling to less than 50% of the 
historical average. In the case of Colombia, investment in the clothing industry 
exceeded the average of the pre-reform period by 97%. Investments targeted at 
both the domestic and foreign markets, together with the quality of raw materials 
in these countries, allowed the branch to withstand foreign competition. Finally, 
the growth of the clothing industry in Mexico deserves special mention, having 
become the principal supplier to the United States market. 
- Mechanical and electrical equipment: This branch encountered great difficulties 
with economic liberalization, after having grown significantly in Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico towards the end of the import substitution process and 
then contracting since the 1980s. The reforms highlighted problems of 
inadequate scale, specialization and technological capacity; a decisive blow 
was dealt by policies which led appreciation of the local currency. 
C. I N V E S T M E N T G R O W T H A N D S E C T O R A L 
P E R F O R M A N C E 
Having examined the industrial branches with the highest investment 
growth, it is worth asking whether strong investment led to greater value 
added and productivity. 
1. Value  Added and Productivity 
The most dynamic branches with respect to investment also saw their value 
added and productivity expand more rapidly than the less dynamic branches 
(see table II-4). Chile registered the strongest gains in value added, after a surge 
in investment in modernizing the productive apparatus and expanding capacity. 
Colombia and Mexico followed in terms of production increases. 
Table 11-4 
STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT, OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY BY LEVEL OF INVESTMENT GROWTH 
COUNTRY INVESTMENT VALUE ADDED LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
(SHARE OF TOTAL) (SHARE OF TOTAL) (INDEX OF PERIOD AVERAGE PRE-REFORM = 100) 
PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM CONSOLIDATED PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM CONSOLIDATED POST-REFORM CONSOLIDATED MODEL 
MODEL MODEL 
Argentina 1991 1 9 9 6 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 6 
More dynamic group 71 7 9 6 5 7 3 1 9 5 
Less dynamic group 2 9 21 3 5 2 6 171 
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 191 
Brazil 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 5 - 9 7 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6 
More dynamic group 4 4 5 7 4 5 5 0 1 7 2 
Less dynamic group 5 6 4 3 5 5 5 0 161 
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 6 7 
Colombia 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 - 9 5 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 6 
More dynamic group 5 8 6 7 6 0 6 0 1 4 2 
Less dynamic group 4 2 3 3 4 0 4 0 1 5 5 
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 8 
Chile 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 3 1 9 8 6 - 8 9 1 9 9 0 - 9 7 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5 
More dynamic group 6 6 8 0 5 3 6 5 6 5 1 3 9 150 
Less dynamic group 3 4 2 0 4 7 3 5 3 5 1 3 3 156 
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 2 1 5 8 
Mexico 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 1 - 9 4 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 4 
More dynamic group 4 4 61 4 9 5 3 1 5 7 
Less dynamic group 5 6 3 9 51 4 7 1 4 6 
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 151 
Peru 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 4 - 9 5 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 6 
More dynamic group 5 7 7 3 5 4 5 9 8 0 
Less dynamic group 4 3 2 7 4 6 4 1 8 3 
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 8 2 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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It is interesting to note that even when there was a trend toward increased 
investment in the most dynamic branches, the overall structure of the branches 
(that is, the share of each in the total) did not change radically since many of 
them were already important investment destinations in the pre-reform period. 
The firms in these branches were thus able to use their experience and the 
learning process to bolster growth as the reforms were introduced. 
Nevertheless, the flow of new resources by-passed certain industrial activities 
which had shown strong growth under the pre-reform model. This was the 
case for the textiles, footwear and metal tools and equipment sectors. 
All the countries significantly improved labour productivity compared 
to the pre-reform period.18 Argentina currently has the highest level of labour 
productivity; it is far above that registered in Colombia, which had a similar 
evolution of investment. It should be noted that the principal factor explaining 
the positive trends in productivity has been the extraordinary industrial 
unemployment throughout the post-reform period. 
The varied behaviour of the different branches caused a strong dispersing 
effect in the value of productivity, even within the group of fast-growing 
branches. In the case of Chile, for example, some productive branches 
stagnated while others doubled or even quadrupled the value of productivity 
in the 25 years following the initiation of the reform process. Executives of 
firms belonging to the former group are keen to point out that while Chilean 
firms have indeed acquired cutting-edge technologies for many of their 
productive processes, other activities maintain a more traditional character. A 
clear example is the acquisition of latest-technology machinery in production, 
while activities such as packaging and quality control -which in industrialized 
countries tend to be automated- continue to be highly labour intensive. These 
firms face problems of scale and profitability which constrain improvements 
in labour productivity. 
2. Technological  Development 
Another key question is whether the increase in investment led to 
technological development. One way of measuring this is by using an indicator 
which gauges the gap between domestic technology and that found at the 
global level. Katz (2000) uses regression analysis to estimate the difference in 
the rate of labour productivity growth in every industrial branch of each 
country (at the three-digit level of the ISIC) in relation to the corresponding 
rates in the United States for the periods 1970-1990 and 1970-1996. 
The results are presented in table II-5. A number greater than one 
represents a positive change, while a number below one reflects a widening 
18 Labour productivity is calculated as the value added in each branch, measured in constant currency, 
over the number of employees in the branch. 
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Table II -5 
CHANGE IN PRODUCTIVITY GAP IN RELATION TO THE 
UNITED STATES, 1970-1996 
INVESTMENT GROWTH IN DESCENDING ORDER ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILEA/ COLOMBIA MEXICO" 
1970-1990 
Food products 0.96 0.91 0.72 1.19 1.34 
Metal products 1.75 1.08 1.14 1.28 1.40 
Other chemical products 1.80 0.7 1.15 1.01 0.79 
Chemical industry 1.78 1.12 3.10 1.42 1.16 
Plastic products 0.6 0.86 0.73 1.40 1.45 
Non-metal minerals 1.19 0.85 1.50 1.69 1.69 
Transport equipment 1.01 1.40 1.00 1.44 1.81 
Paper and pulp 0.85 1.20 1.61 1.50 1.40 
Textiles 1.40 1.48 0.85 1.48 1.01 
Clothing 0.80 1.06 0.80 1.01 2.44 
Non-electrical machinery 1.47 1.03 1.00 0.79 0.74 
Electrical machinery 1.79 1.14 1.00 1.20 1.82 
1970-1996 
Food products 1.10 1.14 0.67 0.93 1.21 
Metal products 2.07 1.78 1.22 1.79 1.39 
Other chemical products 1.98 0.60 0.97 0.86 0.58 
Chemical industry 1.92 1.18 1.79 1.09 0.88 
Plastic products 0.81 1.25 0.51 1.50 1.25 
Non-metal minerals 2.35 1.28 1.68 1.36 1.39 
Transport equipment 2.00 1.33 0.76 2.07 1.81 
Paper and pulp 0.99 1.26 1.10 1.12 1.03 
Textiles 1.67 1.43 0.77 1.23 0.75 
Clothing 1.17 1.20 0.75 1.3 1.85 
Non-electrical machinery 1.91 1.12 1.31 0.75 0.72 
Electrical machinery 2.68 1.97 0.94 0.99 1.76 
CHANGE 1990-1996 
Food products + + - - -
Metal products + + + + -
Other chemical products + - - - -
Chemical industry + + - - -
Plastic products + + - + -
Non-metal minerals + + + - -
Transport equipment + - - + + 
Paper and pulp + + - - -
Textiles + - - - -
Clothing + + - + -
Non-electrical machinery + + + - -
Electrical machinery + + - - -
Source: Authors' compilation based on Jorge Katz, Reformas  estructurales, productividad y conducta 
tecnológica en América Latina, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC)/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000. 
a/ Through 1995. 
b/ Through 1994. 
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of the gap during the sample period. Comparing the two periods gives an 
indication of what occurred between 1990 and 1996. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
for example, productivity in Argentina's food industry displayed a growth 
rate below that of the United States (the ratio of variation in productivity 
between the two countries is 0.96). However, the calculation for the 1970-1996 
period demonstrates that the gap narrowed (the ratio is 1.10); this is explained 
by improved performance during the post-reform period. 
In the case of Argentina and Brazil, the labour productivity gap in relation 
to the United States narrowed in the 1990s for all industrial branches, although 
this was not necessarily related to investment growth. Instead, it is explained 
by the marked reduction in the workforce and general rationalization 
undertaken by firms in the years following the introduction of reforms. 
Some branches experienced a reverse trend, in which the gap had been 
narrowing prior to 1990, but widened thereafter. Examples include the "other 
chemicals" category in both Chile and Colombia and the food and electrical 
machinery industries in the latter. Mexico is the one country that definitely 
did not see a noticeable narrowing of the productivity gap in the post-reform 
period. It is possible, however, that this process may have occurred after 1994 
in response to the policy adjustments which followed the Tequila crisis. 
The exercise leads to two conclusions. First, there was not an investment 
drive which led directly to the acquisition of cutting-edge technology. Second, 
technological progress had historical precedents. As shown in table II-5 with 
the index for the period 1970-1990, it occurred in the productive branches 
that were already developing in this regard prior to the introduction of reforms. 
3. Market  Orientation 
One of the objectives of economic liberalization was to reorient industrial 
products from the domestic to the foreign market. This strategy became 
widespread in the 1990s, but the degree of success varied across countries. 
- In Chile and Mexico investment growth shows a clear correlation with 
that of exports. While Chile achieved a high degree of diversification in 
its export markets thanks to trade with Asian and European countries, 
the growth of the Mexican export sector was closely tied to the United 
States market. 
- The reorientation of Chile's production to foreign markets was 
consolidated between 1986 and 1989, when firms mounted a 
comprehensive export drive. This phenomenon was extended to industrial 
branches which historically had no export record, as these benefited from 
synergies between macroeconomic policies and reform instruments and 
from the numerous incentives provided by the State. Export growth 
continued into the 1990s, but it became increasingly concentrated in 
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activities associated with the processing of natural resources. This 
encompassed a relatively small number of productive branches 
characterized by fragile productive linkages and volatile international 
prices. 
- In Mexico, the development of the export sector triggered an investment 
drive in the automotive, computer, electronic and clothing industries, as 
firms aimed to improve competitiveness in order to increase market share 
in the NAFTA area. Investment in export-oriented industries had its first 
boost in the 1980s and early 1990s; the devaluation which marked the 
beginning of the Tequila crisis triggered a second boost in the latter half 
of the 1990s. Clearly, the exchange rate appreciation which took place 
between 1990 and 1994 delayed the reorientation of production towards 
foreign markets in certain industrial branches. The export sector comprises 
affiliates of transnational corporations and medium-sized and large 
national enterprises with links to transnational and with access to foreign 
finance. 
- In the case of Argentina, investment growth was associated with both 
the domestic market and Mercosur. The branches that benefited from 
this were, in the first instance, those linked directly or indirectly to the 
special schemes operating in the automotive industry; second, those 
associated with the processing of natural resources; and finally, those 
producing other consumption goods with important markets in Mercosur 
and particularly in Brazil. 
- Finally, Brazil, Colombia and Peru retained a growth model based on the 
domestic market, and they fostered only marginal export growth. In the 
case of Brazil, the Mercosur market has not made it to the top of the 
entrepreneurial agenda despite its considerable importance. Due to 
Brazil's size, it is possible that an inward looking tendency will prevail in 
the post-reform period, even if the exchange rate recovers from the 
devaluation of recent years. According to a survey carried out among 
730 firms, the emphasis on the domestic market is not inconsistent with 
an increasing export coefficient in a context of prices favourable to the 
sector (Bielschowsky 1999a). This confirms that the historical development 
of the manufacturing industry is similar to that observed in larger, more 
developed economies, where exports are a consequence of good 
performance in the domestic market. 
- According to Ramírez and Núñez (1999), the investment drive in 
Colombia was not only the result of the growth in domestic demand, but 
was also stimulated by the tougher competition in a more open 
environment and the new dynamics generated by export-oriented 
industrial activities. Their study does not enable us to draw a causal 
relation between investment and exports, even after taking into account 
the general effort to re-direct part of output to foreign markets in 
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Figure II-1 
SHARE OF INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS IN GDP AND TOTAL EXPORTS 
ARGENTINA 
Manufactured exports/GDP - - - - Share in total exports 
BRAZIL 
Manufactured exports/GDP - - - - Share in total exports 
CHILE 
Manufactured exports/GDP - - - - Share in total exports 
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Figure II-1 continued COLOMBIA 
Manufactured exports/GDP - - - - Share in total exports 
MEXICO 
Manufactured exports/GDP - - - - Share in total exports 
PERU 
Manufactured exports/GDP - - - - Share in total exports 
Source: Foreign Trade Data Base for Latin America and the Caribbean (Banco de Datos del 
Comercio Exterior de América Latina y el Caribe, BADECEL), Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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branches which have experienced little change in investment levels. 
Future export growth in these areas will be limited. 
Despite a dynamic export performance, the trade balance of the industrial 
sector is deteriorating. Indeed, the positive relation between investment and 
export growth did not prevent a deterioration in the trade balance of the 
manufacturing sector in five of the sample countries. Table II-6 presents an 
indicator of the trade balance as a share of the total trade both for the dynamic 
branches and for manufacturing as a whole. Not only was this balance 
markedly negative in 1998, but it generally suffered a significant deterioration 
over the pre-reform average. 
This deterioration is explained by both structural factors and conjunctural 
policies. The former include a tendency within industry to source production 
inputs from abroad, the breakdown of productive chains and a propensity 
among firms to assemble products previously manufactured locally. Notable 
among the conjunctural factors is the tendency towards the appreciation of 
local currencies, prompted by financial and capital account liberalization. 
Table II-6 
MANUFACTURING TRADE BALANCE3' 
(percent) 
COUNTRY PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM 
P E R I O D P E R I O D 
1970-1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
Argentina -2.7 44.1 4.5 -27.1 -28.2 -32.2 -14.8 -19.4 -23.7 -27.0 
Brazil 12.4 24.1 21.3 30.0 19.2 9.3 -9.3 -9.0 -14.2 -13.6 
Chile a/ -6.9 .0 -1.4 -10.1 -19.1 -11.5 -9.6 -17.4 -17.1 -20.6 
Colombia -50.6 -35.9 -20.8 -36.5 -47.3 -49.8 -47.2 -46.2 -50.1 -49.5 
Mexico -44.4 -30.2 -36.8 -23.9 -19.0 -19.1 -1.1 -1.0 -3.1 -5.1 
Peru -10.0 3.6 1.2 -8.2 -16.6 -20.8 -27.1 -23.8 -21.2 -25.6 
SECTORS POSTING INVESTMENT GROWTH 
Argentina 15.1 55.9 28.4 -0.7 -3.8 -11.8 5.7 3.5 -0.3 -2.8 
Brazil 38.6 40.3 38.1 45.7 32.0 19.3 -0.8 1.5 -4.4 -4.4 
Chile a/ 6.5 -8.6 -7.1 -5.5 -13.3 -7.0 -5.6 -12.9 -14.9 -15.5 
Colombia -8.1 14.45 17.2 -1.5 -10.5 -14.7 -17.3 -18.3 -22.1 -16.4 
Mexico -37.3 -25.9 -29.0 -15.0 -9.8 -9.1 6.1 8.3 5.2 3.7 
Peru 13.2 20.3 18.2 -1.4 2.8 5.0 -3.7 -3.0 4.8 -19.2 
Source: Authors' compilation based on information from Foreign Trade Data Base for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Banco de Datos del Comercio Exterior de América Latina y el Caribe, 
BADECEL), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a/ Trade balance (X-M)/total trade (X+M). 
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D. H E T E R O G E N E I T Y OF C O U N T R Y P E R F O R M A N C E 
Just as sectors and firms demonstrated considerable heterogeneity in 
performance, marked differences can also be seen in investment behaviour 
across countries during the transition process. 
1. The Determinants  of  Industrial  Investment 
Table II-7 presents the main factors determining this behaviour, which in 
analytical terms can be classified as follows: (a) elements of business strategies, 
(b) microeconomic strengths and weaknesses and (c) macroeconomic strengths 
and weaknesses. All of these factors are associated with phenomena which in 
some cases will be temporary and in others permanent.19 
The factors motivating business strategy include the re-orientation of 
production towards foreign markets; the strategic re-positioning on the part 
of transnational corporations following the introduction of reforms; and the 
use of new machinery and equipment to raise competitiveness. These elements 
are all transitory. They were particularly important in those countries where 
industry entered the second phase of the transition process during the 1990s. 
The impact of microeconomic strengths and weaknesses refers mainly to 
the degree of import penetration and the capacity of firms to defend themselves 
-a transitory factor which later disappears with industrial restructuring- and 
to the size of firms dominating the market. 
Finally, the factors associated with the macroeconomic context are those 
elements which have a permanent bearing on investment: variations in 
demand, macroeconomic stability and variations in the cost of capital, the 
exchange rate and real interest rates. 
2. The Industrial  Investment  Process by Country 
The heterogeneity in industrial investment is a result of differences in 
macro- and microeconomic contexts and the impact on these of institutional 
changes. With regard to the investment phases, in the 1990s there was one 
country (Peru) where industry was dominated by a process of rationalization; 
three countries (Argentina, Brazil and, from 1994 onwards, Colombia) which 
19 That is to say, they are recognized in economic theory as determinants of investment in any historical 
process. 
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Table II-7 
DETERMINANTS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOUR IN 
MANUFACTURING IN THE 1990s 
DETERMINANT CHILE PERU ARGENTINA BRAZIL MEXICO COLOMBIA 
BUSINESS STRATEGIES 
Shift to export-oriented output P P P N P N 
strategic repositioning 
of transnationals N N P P M/P N 
Increase in competitiveness 
(modernization) M N/M P P P P 
MICROECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Degree of import penetration M/N N N N N N 
Average size of firms M N M M M N 
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
Growth of industrial demand 
("accelerator effect") P M P N N N 
Macroeconomic stability 
(balanced fundamental variables) P M N N N M/N 
Real interest rates P N/M M N M M 
Variation of real exchange rate P/M N N N N P/M 
Variation in capital goods prices M P P P M M 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
P= Positive impact on investment 
N= Negative impact on investment 
M= Moderate impact on investment 
initiated a modernization drive; one country (Mexico) where the second phase 
was characterized by a combined effort to modernize and expand; and lastly, 
one country (Chile) where industry enjoyed strong investment growth during 
the consolidation of the new model, which led to increased capacity (table II-
8). As mentioned in earlier sections, this does not mean that all industrial 
branches and firms display this behaviour, but rather that such behaviour 
predominated within industry at a generalized level. 
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Table II-8 
INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR IN THE 1990s 
COUNTRY RATIONALIZATION MODERNIZATION GROWTH 
Argentina + + 
Brazil + + 
Colombia + + 
Chile + + 
Mexico + + + 
Peru + 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
a. The Industrial Sector in Argentina 
To understand the development of the Argentine industrial sector in the 
1990s, it is necessary to take into account that one set of reforms had already 
been introduced in the 1970s. Even though the debt crisis reversed the process, 
this early liberalization drive -together with the extreme uncertainty and 
instability generated by the hyperinflation of the late 1980s- speeded up 
rationalization within firms. The new period of liberalization was undertaken 
in more favourable macroeconomic conditions, which contributed to further 
progress in modernization. 
In effect, when the stabilization plan was initiated in 1990, a number of 
projects were salvaged after having been cancelled, postponed, or deemed 
impossible to develop during the macroeconomic turbulence of the 1980s. 
Also in contrast to the previous decade, a high proportion of total investment 
was in machinery, usually of foreign origin. In this way, economic liberalization 
and the control of exchange rate risk facilitated the process of modernizing 
machinery and equipment. Even though price stability contributed 
significantly to the re-activation of investment, however, the uncertainty 
generated by internal (the fiscal deficit) and external disequilibria did not 
create an adequate climate for investment in expansion. 
As highlighted in a study of the investment behaviour of 1,500 Argentine 
firms, "the nature of productive capacity incorporation in factories during 
the 1990s was characterized by the low level of plant construction... and a 
strong emphasis on technological modernization" (Bisang and Gómez, 1999, 
p. 48). That is to say, the process of investment in Argentina between 1992 and 
1997 was predominantly concentrated in the transition stage of the 
modernization process, and to a lesser degree in the more advanced stage of 
expansion. In support of this argument, it is worth noting that during this 
period the average growth rate for investment in industrial machinery and 
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equipment was 17.3%, compared to 4.9% for investment in construction. This 
suggests that firms invested relatively little in new plants or in the expansion 
of existing ones. Nonetheless, some industrial branches and firms pursued a 
strategy of local and regional growth, for which they adopted an offensive 
position by expanding their productive capacity while at the same time 
acquiring advanced technology. 
The development among firms and branches was not homogeneous. As 
indicated by Bisang and Gómez (1999), the shift from macroeconomic 
uncertainty to microeconomic uncertainty in a context of greater stability led 
to the design of highly heterogeneous strategies. 
Large industrial firms with links to national conglomerates account for a 
significant percentage of the growth in sectoral investment. For these firms, 
growth was concentrated in the clothing, oil, electrical machinery, automotive, 
metal products, plastic products and paper branches. 
The business strategy of transnational was geared toward consolidating 
market share, improving competitiveness in order to export -particularly to 
Brazil- and modernizing the capital stock to compete successfully with imports 
in those sectors oriented to the domestic market. Subsidiaries of transnational 
corporations concentrated their investments in the following branches: 
tobacco, electrical machinery manufactures, metal products manufactures, 
clothing, paper, oil and derivatives, chemical substances, rubber and plastics. 
By 1996 capital allocation was re-oriented to the last three branches. These 
shared certain characteristics: they employed mature technologies, they were 
based on natural resources, and they had the capacity for large-scale 
production oriented at the broader Mercosur market. Economies of scale 
pertained in sectors experiencing investment growth not only among firms 
associated with the national economic conglomerates, but also among the 
subsidiaries of transnational corporations. 
Furthermore, Bisang and Gómez (1999) show that in the 1990s these 
groups of firms invested heavily in machinery and equipment, although in 
contrast to the previous decade the equipment was mostly of foreign origin. 
New plants were also established in certain branches: food and beverages 
(dairy products, beer, confectionery, pastas, oils), ceramics, medicines, and 
iron and steel products. 
No capacity expansion occurred in sectors considered key at the global 
level: electronics, new materials and pharmo-chemicals. Investments of this 
type were concentrated among a limited number of firms. 
Small and medium-sized firms performed well in some sectors, 
modernizing machinery and equipment of a predominantly domestic origin. 
Finally, a large number of industrial branches were adversely affected by 
liberalization and appreciation of the local currency, to the extent that they 
were unable to recover during the last decade. The small average size and 
general weakness of these firms made it very difficult for them to withstand 
competition. 
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b. The Industrial Sector in Brazil 
The persistent hyperinflation prevailing in the early 1990s was the 
principal factor prolonging the rationalization process in Brazil, with the 
modernization stage not getting underway until the mid-1990s. 
A survey of investment behaviour carried out among 730 large firms in 
1998 shows that priorities in firm strategy included cost-reducing investment, 
the resolution of problems associated with certain bottlenecks, the replacement 
of equipment and quality improvements (Bielschowsky, 1999a). A short cycle 
of modernization followed stabilization. The recorded investment rates did 
not reach the levels attained in the 1970s, however, but rather were closer to 
those observed in the 1980s. Bielschowsky (1999a) concludes that a drive to 
modernize did take place, but this was concentrated in a relatively small group 
of branches, almost all producing consumer goods. 
Between 1995 and 1997 -the period covered by the investment survey-
aggregate industrial growth was low, as was export performance. This leads 
to the conclusion that in contrast to other countries, Brazil did not reorient 
output to the foreign market. Nor did Brazilian firms prioritize the Mercosur 
market to the extent that their Argentine counterparts did. 
The low stimulus derived from both the meagre growth of the domestic 
market and general macroeconomic instability was offset in the case of 
transnational corporations by the need to improve their future position in the 
Brazilian market. In contrast to the rest of Latin America, progress in economic 
liberalization allowed the Brazilian market -by virtue of its size- to generate 
its own momentum, thereby attracting transnational. Brazil also experienced 
a lesser degree of microeconomic fragility, due to a relatively lower penetration 
of imports and the relatively large size of its firms. 
The stabilization model, featuring the revaluation of the currency and 
the introduction of an exchange rate anchor with the consequent unfavourable 
effect on the profitability of tradable goods, provoked great uncertainty among 
firms. The growing fiscal and balance-of-payments deficits generated negative 
expectations of future economic development. As a consequence, the Brazilian 
stabilization model had to co-exist with domestic interest rates far above those 
prevailing in the rest of the countries. 
Domestic interest rates were virtually prohibitive for investment purposes, 
with the exception of the interest rates on loans from the State development 
bank, Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social (BNDES), which were 
around 10% per year in real terms. This explains why firms preferred to 
concentrate their investment in cost-reducing modernization, financed partly 
by BNDES and partly with foreign credits. Such investments embodied an 
extremely high marginal productivity of capital, so high, in fact, that it 
compensated for the financial cost. While the high cost of capital slowed 
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investment in expansion, this type of investment nevertheless occurred in 
branches dominated by foreign firms with access to foreign financing. 
c. The Industrial Sector in Colombia 
After a brief and ephemeral recovery in investment geared towards 
adjustment and expansion, the increases in industrial investment in Colombia 
were directed primarily to capital replenishment, the purchase of parts, 
accessories and office equipment and, in general, the introduction of processes 
that did not increase existing capacity. They did, however, contribute to more 
efficient output and administrative processes, as well as to the profitability of 
firms (Ramírez and Núñez, 1999). 
The macroeconomic climate was more stable than that prevailing in the 
other countries at the time of the reforms, and the country's microeconomic 
strength was greater in relation to the smaller countries in the study. 
Consequently, industrial investment did not fall in the first post-reform stage 
as it did in the other countries. While these conditions were not sufficient to 
produce investment geared toward expansion of capacity, the benign 
macroeconomic climate quickly gave rise to "defensive" cost-reducing 
investment, which partially compensated for the microeconomic fragility and 
allowed the challenges posed by institutional changes and market 
liberalization to be met on better terms. 
The investment surveys carried out periodically in Colombia show that 
investment was concentrated in the modernization of equipment designed to 
substitute obsolete capital and increase the competitiveness of national 
industry. This led to important improvements in productivity. Disincentives 
for investment in expansion came from the relatively marginal growth in 
demand, the low income elasticity of supply (which was indicative of the lack 
of competitiveness of domestic industry) and the instability of the principal 
markets for Colombian industrial exports (Venezuela and the rest of the 
Andean Pact). 
Judging by the increase in import penetration, which was inferior only to 
that registered in Mexico, liberalization introduced a high degree of uncertainty 
into investment decisions. Another factor contributing to increased uncertainty 
was the smaller size of industrial firms relative to those in Brazil, Argentina, 
and Mexico. 
d. The Industrial Sector in Chile 
Over the course of the last 25 years, four stages can be identified in the 
development of investment in the Chilean industrial sector. Two of these took 
place during the transition process, while the remaining two appeared during 
the process of consolidating the new economic model created by the reforms 
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(Moguillansky, 1999). The four stages are as follows: (a) the reallocation of 
capital assets and low investment, brought about by the drastic changes 
generated by the economic transformations and by macroeconomic signals 
inconsistent with an investment effort; (b) the modernization of production 
in the processing of natural resources and in activities exposed to competition 
in foreign markets, in which the State played a fundamental role in supporting 
and strengthening the private sector; (c) productive consolidation and 
expansion, characterized by dynamic investment during the first half of the 
1990s, which coincided with the model's consolidation phase; and (d) the 
restructuring of conglomerates and the deepening of globalization in the later 
1990s, characterized by a trend toward slower investment growth in the export 
sectors which had underpinned the growth model. 
The economic groups have been key to this development. They took 
advantage of the direct stimulus provided by the second stage of privatizations 
-from 1986 onwards- to rearticulate conglomerates, redirect resources towards 
activities enjoying natural comparative advantages, increase competitiveness 
and capture new foreign markets. 
This strategy demanded new and significant investment, which enjoyed 
State support throughout the period covering the second stage of the 
investment process: there was a correction in relative prices (including a 
sustained decline in interest rates, a devaluation of the local currency and 
slow growth in wages), resource transfers, debt-for-equity swaps -which 
implied strong subsidies for capital entering the economy as foreign 
investment- and numerous export promotion policies. 
Certain factors nevertheless hindered the sustained growth of industrial 
investment, such as the high concentration of investment in a few branches and 
activities. An analysis of these branches suggests that the business cycle peaked 
by the beginning of 2000. This phenomenon may have several explanations, 
including the decreasing return to capital in some activities, the reduction of 
incentives provided by the State, reductions in world prices (which affected 
many branches that had become leading exporters of certain products), the 
appreciation of the local currency, the emergence of new actors, increasing 
competition, declining profitability and the introduction of stricter and more 
comprehensive market regulation (clearly visible in the Chilean financial market, 
stock exchange, and environmental requirements, among others). Firms reacted 
to these changes by searching abroad for profits similar to those generated at 
the start of the privatization process. This development corresponds to a 
structural shift, which was exacerbated by the effects of the Asian crisis. 
e. The Industrial Sector in Mexico 
Although Mexican industry embarked on a process of rationalization as 
soon as the recovery from the 1982 crisis got underway, this process was 
prolonged by the growing pressures from the liberalization that was initiated 
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in the middle of the decade. The period was characterized by low levels of 
fixed investment, although a recovery did begin in 1991. 
From the mid-1980s onwards, the change in the strategy of large Mexican 
firms was driven by growing integration with the United States, which was 
sealed in 1994 with the NAFTA treaty. In the 1990s, and with transnational 
corporations at the helm, the industrial branches that had been at the forefront 
of growing integration with the United States (namely, the automotive, 
electronic and assembly plant operations) became the fastest growing branches, 
rapidly expanding productive capacity (Calderón, Mortimore and Peres, 1995). 
However, these were an exception to a mediocre aggregate performance of 
investment. 
By 1994, considerable progress in price stability had not been sufficient 
to generate confidence with respect to future macroeconomic performance. 
Exchange rate appreciation, trade deficits and, from 1992 onwards, the rise in 
domestic interest rates led to a cautious attitude among firms producing for 
the domestic market. 
This context increased the degree of heterogeneity within industry. The 
stagnant, least competitive branches -dominated by small and medium-sized 
firms (footwear, clothing, mechanical equipment)- benefited very little from 
the recovery of the domestic market owing to their lack of competitiveness. 
In contrast, the dynamic branches were able to strengthen and adjust to the 
challenges of foreign trade, combining increases in domestic sales with export 
growth, even in a context of exchange rate appreciation. 
The evaluation of the Mexican industrial sector by Moreno-Brid (1999), 
based on data for the mid-1990s, is not positive. The upgrading of the 
productive apparatus was incomplete or insufficient to meet the levels of 
competition prevailing in global markets. Mattar and Peres (1999) confirm 
this assertion: both transnationals and large national firms, many of which 
are exporters, headed the process of capital formation, while the rest of the 
industrial sector (made up of small and medium-sized firms) found itself 
marginalized from the modernization process due to the scarcity of investment 
funds. 
Perhaps unlike any other country, Mexico suffered for having combined 
trade liberalization with an appreciating currency. This is confirmed by the 
fact that import penetration in Mexico was well above that observed in any of 
the other countries studied. Integrating with the United States market was a 
radical policy choice for Mexico, and one that was heavily dependent on the 
exchange rate. However, exchange rate policy was geared more toward price 
stabilization than toward improving the relative competitiveness of the 
productive sectors. 
Consequently, a negative synergy developed between the microeconomic 
uncertainty generated by liberalization and the macroeconomic uncertainty 
derived from the stabilization model. This notwithstanding, an export boom 
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developed following the Tequila crisis, with the virtuous combination of 
exchange rate depreciation and the fruits of steady investment in export-
oriented sectors. This may foster growth in industrial investment, although 
data are not available to corroborate this view. 
Business strategies have been partly geared towards assembly activities 
(maquila). According to Mendiola (1999), the assembly plant industry was 
the only sector that grew steadily after the early 1980s. This pattern became 
even more marked during the 1990s. By 1997, the maquila sector comprised 
2,717 firms producing a high proportion of Mexico's total exports (US$ 45 
billion, primarily in automotive parts, electric and electronic products and 
textiles and clothing). Annual investment in the maquila sector between 1993 
and 1997 reached US$ 2.4 billion, with a strong upward trend (rising from 
US$ 1.1 billion in 1993 to US$ 3.1 billion in 1997). To provide a better idea of 
magnitude, we have calculated that annual investment in all non-assembly 
manufacturing averaged US$ 5.3 billion between 1991 and 1994, or just over 
double the average annual investment in the assembly industry in the 1993-
1997 period. 
f.  The Industrial Sector in Peru 
Peruvian industry was weakened by the economic and political instability 
of the 1980s. The capacity of industrial enterprises to adopt defensive strategies 
in the face of liberalization was adversely affected not only by hyperinflation, 
but also by stabilization measures. Economic reform therefore contributed 
more to the weakening of the sector than to its strengthening. In contrast to 
the other countries, it is not possible to observe any significant subsector 
enjoying a more positive trend. 
The low levels of industrial investment are explained by the high incidence 
of idle capacity, severe microeconomic weaknesses, the absence of any stimulus 
from export-oriented production, and a lack of interest on the part of 
transnationals in achieving positions in the domestic market. Aside from the 
foodstuffs branch, transnationals have not been incorporated into Peruvian 
industry. This explains as well the low levels of investment in modernization 
and cost-reduction. As a result, Peruvian industry was still in the 
rationalization stage at the end of the 1990s. 
Such microeconomic uncertainty combined with and was fuelled by the 
relatively unfavourable macroeconomic conditions that hindered investment 
decisions. The stabilization of prices and of political and social conditions 
introduced the bare minimum in terms of the necessary conditions for a 
recovery in investment, as did the new equilibrium in public finances. 
However, industrial investment was hindered by high interest rates and a 
potentially destabilizing current account deficit. This external disequilibrium 
generated uncertainty about future macroeconomic performance, and it 
introduced a considerable degree of caution into investment decisions. 

CHAPTER I I I 
I N V E S T M E N T IN T H E M I N I N G A N D 
H Y D R O C A R B O N S E C T O R S 
The mining and hydrocarbon sectors have certain characteristics in 
common.20 Not only do they stem from the same source, but the two sectors 
account for a considerable proportion of fiscal revenue and total exports in 
many countries in the region. The importance of oil and gas in energy 
generation also means that they are significant components of the countries' 
infrastructure. Historically, these productive activities have undergone periods 
of domination by transnational capital and periods of complete State control. 
Toward the end of the 1990s, institutional change accelerated to the extent 
that some countries actually privatized their State-owned mineral and 
hydrocarbon deposits outright. However, the economic power of these firms and 
the strategic nature of the product -particularly in the case of oil, which is crucial 
to the global competitiveness of an economy- forced most countries to approach 
the privatization process with caution. They thus formed strategic partnerships 
with transnational capital instead of privatizing, and they passed legislation to 
regulate the monopolistic markets, fix tariffs and ensure security of supply. 
Consequently, a variety of different situations arose in the region's mining 
and hydrocarbon sectors in the 1990s. In some countries firms were sold off 
entirely, while in others the State retained a strong presence. In all countries, 
however, a process of internationalization took place which was linked not 
20 The information contained in the text, tables, boxes and figures in this chapter comes from the database 
of the research project. It is taken from the following authors and bibliographical references: 
Campodónico (1999b, 1999c); Moguillansky (1998b); de Moori Koening (1999); Soares (1998); Ayala 
(1998); Fainboim and Rodriguez (2000); Gadano (1998); Oliveira (1999); Torres (1999). 
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only to foreign trade, but also to the participation of transnational companies 
in sectoral investment. 
Because the development of the mining sector and the extraction of 
hydrocarbons depend primarily on the availability of the resources, this study 
focuses on those countries which have large mineral deposits. In the case of 
mineral products, we concentrate on four of the eight countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Peru. In the case of hydrocarbons, we examine Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
A particular characteristic of these sectors is that a large amount of capital 
is required before exploitation projects can be developed to full capacity. This 
means that the period between discovering deposits and exploiting them 
depends in large part on the prevailing characteristics and situation of the 
markets in which the minerals and hydrocarbons will be sold. Consequently, 
the market determines the timing of investment, and even when specific 
investment incentives are in place, the investment response can take several 
years. Institutional changes must be accompanied by positive signals in the 
international market in order to attract investment. 
A. T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L M I N E R A L A N D 
H Y D R O C A R B O N M A R K E T S 
Since these resources are mostly sold on the international market, 
investment is largely determined by international prices and medium-term 
expectations of world demand. In the case of hydrocarbons, the development 
of the international market can have either a primary or secondary role, 
depending on the product and specific market segment, that is, the exploration, 
production, distribution and commercialization of oil, gas and their 
derivatives. 
1. The Evolution of  the International  Minerals  Market 
The 1990s was a positive period for Latin American mineral products 
because of the upturn in world consumption compared with the 1980s and 
the relative improvement in prices despite the long-term downward trend. 
At the same time, the availability of financing, in the form of international 
loans and resources from foreign investors, helped to bring about investment 
in exploiting the deposits that had been studied and evaluated in the previous 
decade. 
As Sánchez Albavera and others (1998) show, the world market for mineral 
products is heavily correlated with output and demand growth. Copper, for 
example, experienced similar levels of growth in production and consumption 
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over the last three decades: in the 1970s, growth rates were 2.03% in production 
and 2.57% in consumption; in the 1980s, they were 1.55% and 1.41%; and 
between 1990 and 1997 they were 2.15% and 2.34%, respectively. Expected 
consumption growth is what stimulates production. 
The mining industry experiences periods of expansion and recession as a 
function of the level of output growth in industrialized countries and in a 
number of developing countries. Unlike the industrialized countries, this 
group of developing countries increased their minerals consumption during 
the 1990s, until the Asian crisis. As a result, world mineral and metals 
consumption rose from US$ 93 billion to US$ 162 billion between 1980 and 
1996. During that period, the participation of developed countries as a whole 
in total consumption fell from 79% to 65%, while the fastest growing 
developing countries came to account for 24% of total consumption, up from 
10%.21 Table III-1 shows that consumption of copper, lead and zinc rose sharply 
between 1990 and 1996 compared with the 1980s, while that of aluminium 
and tin experienced the continuation of a downward trend. 
When consumption is rising and price forecasts show favourable margins 
over costs, mining activity expands and investors increase the exploitation of 
deposits. A boom is characterized by rising prices and shrinking stocks. If the 
cycle also coincides with high levels of liquidity in international markets -
demonstrated by a large supply of loans and resources- then large investment 
projects begin and capital formation accelerates. This occurred between the 
end of the 1980s and the 1990s, generating a rise in investment in the sector. In 
contrast, the 1980s were largely characterized by extremely negative prices 
and demand. 
Although consumption growth stimulated supply in the 1990s, real prices 
of metals experienced a decline (figure III-1), which was exacerbated from 
1998 onwards by the Asian and international financial crises. Historically, a 
fall in prices often led to technological innovation -developed by transnational 
mining companies- in order to reduce costs and increase the productivity 
and profitability of deposits. Changes were introduced in all areas of the 
industry, including the use of computers and satellites in mineral prospecting, 
new forms of mechanization and automation of operations, the application of 
new methods for processing minerals, the introduction of automatic control 
and the use of robots in some operations. Such innovations were particularly 
prevalent in the exploitation and production of refined iron, copper and gold 
in the 1980s. They were adopted throughout the Latin American region thanks 
to foreign investment in mining. 
21 Figures are taken from United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of  Statistics, various issues. 
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Table III-1 
G R O W T H OF W O R L D M E T A L C O N S U M P T I O N 
(annual  average  growth  rates) 
METAL 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-1996 
Aluminum 9.0 4.4 2.3 1.3 
Copper 4.3 2.6 1.4 2.4 
Tin 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.3 
Nickel 6.1 2.2 1.6 1.6 
Lead 4.1 3.1 0.0 1.3 
Zinc 4.8 2.2 0.7 2.4 
Source: Metallgesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft, Metal Statistics, and World Office of Metal Statistics. 
Figure III-1 
R E A L PRICES OF FIVE METALS, 1980-1999 
(Index,  1980 = 100) 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the Natural Resources Division, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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2. The Evolution of  the International  Hydrocarbon  Market 
World GDP growth projections provide the basis for assessing the future 
evolution of primary energy demand. Population growth, industrialization, 
urbanization and projections on the availability of non-commercial energy 
sources also play a role. The latest projections estimate that world demand 
will grow at an annual average rate of between 2.7% and 3.7% through 2010. 
International Energy Outlook projects that oil demand in Latin America will 
double between 1995 and 2020, growing at an annual rate of 4.3%, which is 
much higher than the forecast for developed countries (1.1%) and very close 
to the rate projected for Southeast Asia. Demand for natural gas will be even 
higher: most will be destined for energy generation in developed countries, 
but demand will also rise in developing countries. In Latin America, it is 
estimated that this demand will grow by 7% per year over the next twenty 
years. These projections represent an incentive for new investment in the 
region, but they should be considered against the backdrop of falling real 
prices, as Campodónico (1999c) shows. If the trend of recent decades continues, 
falling profit margins will force oil companies to reduce costs by pursuing 
technological progress in the exploration and development processes, 
improving management and business practices and increasing productivity. 
Investment in natural gas is likely to increase, since -with the exception 
of Argentina and Venezuela- the industry in Latin America is still very 
underdeveloped with respect to production and existing reserves. Increased 
government efforts in the area of cleaner energy would also foster investment, 
as it would encourage thermoelectric plants and public transportation to switch 
from oil and coal inputs to natural gas. 
B. I N S T I T U T I O N A L R E F O R M 
In the 1970s, mineral and oil deposits were largely State owned under a 
policy of defending strategically important natural resources. By the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, however, the lack of public resources for investing in the 
exploration, development and exploitation of new deposits generated an 
opposite trend. Incentives for foreign investment in mining were introduced 
as part of the structural changes underway in the region. Some of the incentives 
were provided by the institutional framework, which can be summarized as 
follows: (a) the treatment of foreign investment in general, (b) changes in oil 
legislation and in the administrative regime governing mining concessions, 
(c) changes in the tax regime for mining and hydrocarbons and (d) the 
privatization of mineral deposits or segments of the hydrocarbon production 
and distribution chain. 
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1. Reform  of  Foreign  Investment  Laws 
Most countries in the region eliminated the barriers to foreign capital, 
which had been imposed at the national or subregional level during the 1970s. 
Chile pioneered this reform with the incorporation of Decree Law 600 in 1974. 
In the early 1990s, other countries used that legislation as a model for 
liberalizing the conditions of entry, capitalization, and profit remittances, 
ensuring the stability of taxation and tariffs, and removing discriminatory 
rules that favoured national investors. Argentina, Brazil and Chile now have 
laws embodied in the constitution which grant the same treatment to both 
foreign and national capital, while other countries achieve this with specific 
legislation22 (see Table III-2). 
Table III-2 
CHANGES IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS 
COUNTRY YEAR CHANGES IN LAWS 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
1993 Foreign investment law, Decree 1,853 
1990 Investment law No. 1,182 
1991 Decision 291 
1995 Constitutional amendment 






of the constitution, and article No. 15 of law No. 9 
1974 Foreign investment statute, or decree law 600 
1993 Foreign investment law 
1992 Foreign investment development law, or legislative decree 662 
Source: Authors' compilation from country legislation. 
22 For a complete review of foreign investment laws, see Moussa (1998) and Sánchez Albavera and others 
(1998). 
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2. Changes in Sectoral  Legislation 
In the 1990s legislation on concessions and contracts for mining and 
hydrocarbons was modified to reduce the risk and uncertainty for foreign 
investors. Rules were introduced to maximize the guarantees and legal stability 
for foreign investment and reduce discretionary authority. 
a. Reforms  of  the Legislation on Mining Concessions 
Sánchez Albavera and others (1998) show that economic reforms 
introduced three types of regimes governing mining concessions. Most 
countries in the region employ an administrative regime under which the 
State grants mineral rights through a public administration entity, which takes 
the place of a mining authority. Chile uses a judicial regime, which differs 
from normal concessions in that the judiciary holds the power to establish, 
maintain and revoke concessions without the intervention of another authority. 
Finally, Venezuela applies a contractual regime, in which the rights and 
obligations of the concessionaire are formalized by an administrative contract. 
Colombia is considering similar legislation. 
Most regional legislation grants mineral rights for exploration and 
exploitation; some countries also provide for processing and a few for 
commercialization. Legislation outlining procedures for obtaining concessions 
was designed to avoid subjecting the process to regulation in order to promote 
legal stability and provide greater guarantees for investors. Countries generally 
tried to reduce discretionary authority to a minimum: in Chile this was 
achieved through the judicial regime for concessions, while in Peru it came 
about through "administrative silence" and the "presumption of truth". 
Legislation establishes that mining claims must be recorded in a special registry 
maintained by the authorities. Disputes are resolved by the mining court, 
which is one of the functions of the central mining authority. In the case of 
Chile, the judiciary exercises jurisdiction. In countries where a concession is 
protected by the payment of a right or patent, the concession expires if payment 
is not made (see Table III-3). 
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Table III-3 
PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF REFORMS TO 
MINING LEGISLATION 
COUNTRY LEGAL REFORMS CONCESSION REGIME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REFORM 
Argentina Legislative changes Administrative End to exclusive State control of 
in 1993 and 1995 regime exploitation 
Elimination of areas reserved for the 
public company 
Application of uniform mining policy 
between the provinces and the 
executive power; harmonization of 
procedures in different  jurisdictions 
Brazil Constitutional Administrative Autional Restoration of equal access to mining for 
amendment of 1995 regime foreign and domestic firms 
Chile Constitution of 1980 Judicial regime Establishment of judicial concession regime 
and judicial term for full concession 
Constitutional Definition of concession as an unlimited 
organic law of 1983 right; expropriation would require full 
compensation of commercial value of the 
concession 
Change to ordinary mining procedures for 
obtaining a concession 
Elimination of red tape 
Creation of a legal framework  to solve the 
problem of access 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project, and Nicole Moussa, "Los 
cambios en la legislación sobre inversión extranjera directa en ocho países de América Latina", 
Santiago, Chile, Environment and Development Division, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), unpublished. 
b. Reforms  of  Hydrocarbon Contracts 
In the early 1990s most hydrocarbon-producing countries in the region 
changed their oil contracting regimes.23 The changes facilitated a greater 
participation of foreign capital in oil production, longer time frames for 
exploration and the so-called seismic option, which eliminated the obligation 
Peru Decree law 708 1992 Administrative regime 
Article 7 of the land law 
23 For an in-depth study of Latin American contracting regimes, see Campodónico (1996a). 
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to drill exploratory wells, thereby helping to reduce the cost of exploration 
considerably. 
Of all the contractual changes, the most radical was that promoted by 
Argentina in 1989 and implemented between 1990 and 1991, granting 
exploration and exploitation permits in which the oil or natural gas becomes 
the property of the concessionaire. Peru followed suit in August 1993, when it 
passed the new hydrocarbon law, Law 26,221. This law modified the oil 
contracting rules for exploration and production, granting ownership of the 
oil and gas to the contractors. 
The Bolivian capitalization law converted State firms into mixed 
corporations. Later, Law 1,689 on hydrocarbons introduced joint-risk contracts 
with Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) for the exploration, 
exploitation and commercialization of hydrocarbons. 
The other countries in the study did not transfer ownership of the firms to 
the private sector, but legal reforms permitted the participation of private actors 
in some segments of hydrocarbon production and distribution (see table III-4). 
In an effort to stimulate foreign investment, taxes and royalties were also 
been reduced. Most of the countries in the region introduced changes to the 
tax laws and specific mining and hydrocarbon laws. Together with the 
extension of the value added tax (VAT) and the elimination of VAT exemptions, 
income tax were generally reduced.24 Guarantees of tax stability were also 
granted for both mining and hydrocarbons. Both sectors are subject to the 
same tariff regime. 
C. T H E N E W M A R K E T S T R U C T U R E A N D R E G U L A T I O N 
New legislation on foreign investment and on sectoral contracts and 
concessions encouraged the entry of domestic and foreign private actors into 
the market. In the mining sector, capital has been introduced largely by 
transnational corporations that explore for and exploit copper and gold mines, 
while in the hydrocarbon sector both domestic and foreign firms are active in 
extraction, production and the distribution of oil and gas. The participation 
of new actors changed the structure of the markets. Whereas a vertically 
integrated State monopoly once dominated, a group of firms is now operating 
in the sector, which introduced considerable competition in some segments. 
24 See Sánchez Albavera and others (1998) and Montalbán (1997). 
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1. The Structure  of  the Mining  Sector  Market 
In the mining sector, State firms were privatized and transnational 
corporations fought to gain control over new deposits. The new laws did not 
impose barriers to the participation of new firms, such that any entity can 
now explore for and exploit reserves. These activities are not regulated, and 
the price is determined in the international market. 
Essentially two types of change occurred in this sector. Some countries 
(such as Chile from 1974 to present and Brazil until 1996) incorporated private 
Table III-4 
REFORMS IN HYDROCARBON CONTRACTS 
COUNTRY LEGAL CHANGES INCORPORATION OF PRIVATE FIRMS CHANGES IN CONTRACTS 
Argentina Decrees 1989 Transfer  of areas for exploration Exploration and concession 
and production to private firms permits with royalty payments 
1990 Bidding for secondary areas and oil ownership rights 
1991 Bidding for central areas 
1992 Privatization of Gas del Estado 
1993 Privatization of YPFa/ 
Brazil 1995: Concessions for private firms End to Petrobrasb/ monopoly in 
Constitutional in new areas of exploration exploration, production, distribution 
Amendment No.9 and production and refining of hydrocarbons 
Partnership with State company 
Change to partnership contract 
with Ecopetrolc/ 
Bolivia 1996: Law 1,689 
on hydrocarbons 
Colombia 1994 
Peru 1993: Law 26,221 
on hydrocarbons 
Incorporation of licensing contract 
Shared-risk contracts 
Introduction of the R factor (relation 
between revenue and expenditure) 
in distribution of production and 
reimbursement of productive wells 
Transfer  of property rights over the 
product; royalty payment to the 
State 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
a/ Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales. 
b/ Petróleo Brasileño. 
c/ Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos. 
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actors into the exploration and exploitation of new mineral deposits -
transnational firms in large projects and domestic firms in small and medium-
sized projects- while the State retained ownership of the State firm. The second 
approach was to completely sell-off of the publicly owned firm, as occurred 
in Argentina and Peru starting in 1992 and in Brazil in 1997. The Argentine 
case is somewhat different, however, in that mining was not an important 
activity until the 1990s. 
Competition in the sector is demonstrated by the active participation of 
Australian, Canadian, American, English and South African firms in the search 
for and exploration of new deposits (table III-5). In Chile this process began 
after the recovery of the international copper market in the mid-1980s, almost 
five years after the constitutional reform gave foreign investors full protection. 
It coincided with the recovery of the copper price and greater liquidity in 
international financial markets. In contrast, the privatization of mineral 
deposits fostered the entry of foreign capital to Peru. 
In Argentina, an infant mining industry was established in the 1990s. 
This development was fostered not only by structural and regulatory change, 
but also by the corporate strategies of transnational mining companies, new 
technology -which allowed the profitable exploitation of deposits that 
previously could not be mined economically- and the advantages associated 
with location (including Argentina's considerable, largely unexploited 
geological potential, the low environmental costs, the mining integration treaty 
with Chile and the availability of low-cost electricity and natural gas). 
2. Market  Structure  in the Hydrocarbons  Sector 
With the exception of Mexico, the increased involvement of private actors 
in the hydrocarbons sector led to the elimination of the State monopoly, in 
both upstream and downstream activities.25 
In the case of oil, of the six countries studied, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru 
privatized the State monopoly as a first step toward decentralizing the firm 
both vertically and horizontally, incorporating national and transnational firms 
in exploration, production, commercialization and distribution of oil and 
derivatives. Brazil opened its market to the private sector in 1995, but only 
held the first auction for concessions in 1999. In Bolivia, risk capital was 
incorporated through partnerships with the State firm (see table III-6). 
In the case of gas, the 1990s represented the start of a significant growth 
period in Latin America, as in the rest of the world. As Campodónico (1996b) 
25 "Upstream" activities in the oil and gas industry are those related to exploration and production of 
deposits. "Downstream" refers to refining, derivatives production, commercialization and distribution 
of these products. 
Table 111-5 
PROJECTS INVOLVING TRANSNATIONAL MINING COMPANIES 
o 
PROJECT OWNERS METAL COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
ARGENTINA (1990s) 
Minera Andes S.A. Newcrest Resources, Comineo, Pegasus Gold International Gold, copper and silver United States, Canada 
Minera Triton Branch of Triton Mining Corp., Northern Orion Exploration Gold, silver, copper Canada 
Viceroy Resource Bell Coast Corp. Gold United States 
Corporation 
El Abra S.A. Apertura Bi-Regional Andina S.A., Cidef Argentina S.A., Copper Canada 
Comineo Ingeniería y Proyectos Argentina 
Compañía Minera Northern Orion Exploration Copper, lead, silver, Canada 
Antofalla S.A. zinc and gold 
Bajo La Alumbrera Mim Holdings Limited, North Limited, RíoAlgom Limited Gold and copper Australia 
project Canada 
CHILE (SINCE THE 1 9 8 0 S ) 
Cerro Colorado RíoAlgom Ltda. Copper Canada 
Quebrada Blanca Comineo, Q.B Resources Ltda. Copper Canada 
Collahuasi Falconbridge, Shell, Chevron Copper United States 
Lince Outokumpu Copper Finland 
Iván y Zar Minera Rayrock Ltda. Copper 
Zaldívar Outokumpu Copper Finland 
Escondida BHP-Utah, RTZ, Jeco, IFC Copper Australia 
England, Japan 
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Table III-5 continued 
PROJECT OWNERS METAL COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
CHILE (SINCE THE 1 9 8 0 S ) 
La Candelaria Phelps Dodge Copper United States 
Pelambres Anaconda Chile Inc. Copper Chile, Japan 
Los Bronces Exxon Minerals Inc. Copper United States 
El Indio/Tambo American Barrick Gold United States 
La Coipa Placer Dome Gold United States 
San Cristóbal Niugini Gold Japan 
Andacollo Dayton Developments Gold 
Guanaco Amax Gold Gold United States 
PERU ( 1 9 9 0 S ) 
Southern Peru Asarco, Marmon Group, Phelps Dodge Copper United States 
Copper Corporation 
Cerro Verde Cyprus Amax, Buenaventura Copper United States 
Peru 
Yanacocha Newmont, Buenaventura Gold United States 
Peru 
Antamina Noranda, Algom, Río Teck Copper Canada 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
Table 111-6 
REFORMS IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
START OF THE PROCESS PRIVATIZATION MECHANISMS MARKET STRUCTURE PRICE REGULATION/DEREGULATION 
ARGENTINA 
September 1992, Law Decree 2,778 Share of production in 1996: Since January 1991: 
24,135: transferred  control of Transformation  of YPF into a YPF: 46% Deregulation of crude oil 
hydrocarbons to provinces corporation; initiation of Perez Companc: 11.9% prices and derivatives prices 
Law 21,145: declared total privatization process in two stages Petróleos San Jorge: 7.4% 
privatization of YPF Transformation  stage: sale of Amoco: 6.9% 
shares considered unnecessary Austral:5.8% 
for future business (January Astra: 4.7% 
1991 to December 1992) Tecpetrol: 3.2% 
Restructuring stage: ended in Bridas: 3.0% 
June 1993 with the public sale Pluspetrol: 2.3% 




1996: Law 1,689 on Capitalization process of State Share of production in 1997: Willingness to deregulate 
hydrocarbons firm YPFB Chaco: 35% prices but until 1998 the 
Split of YPFB into two Andina: 38% government negotiated with 
companies: Chaco and Andina Other private: 27% producers to establish a price 
Incorporation of new private firms (Diamond Shamrock, band based on international 









n o z o 










1997: Law 9,478 
Opening of exploration, 
production and distribution to 
private firms 
Promotion of open competition in 
the sector 
Share of production in 1997: 
Petrobras: 100% 
Partnerships of private 
investors with the State firm, 
under negotiation 
Prices regulated by the public 
sector 
COLOMBIA 
1994: Modification of 
partnership contracts with 
private capital 
Did not privatize State firm 
Partnership with domestic and 
foreign capital in exploration and 
exploitation 
State monopoly in 
exploration and production 
Limited competition in 
distribution and 
commercialization 
Prices regulated by the public 
sector 
PERU 
Legislative decree 655, 1991: Privatization of Petroperú: 
Eliminated State monopoly 
in exploration, exploitation, 
commercialization and 
distribution 
Privatization: 1992-1993 and 
1996-1997 
Sale of shares in the firm 
Licensing contracts for production 
shares 
Sale of shares in the refinery 
Sale of production shares 
Limited competition in 
distribution and 
commercialization 
Free market rates 
Source: Authors' compilation of statistics from the research database. 
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indicates, this growth was fostered by the discovery of new reserves and the 
reorientation of energy policy in almost all countries, which began to place a 
higher priority on environmental concerns. Argentina, Colombia and even 
Mexico introduced legislative reform and new regulatory frameworks that 
encouraged the participation of private actors in production (only in Argentina) 
and in transport and distribution (in all three countries). 
This led to significant development of the Argentine gas industry, which 
traditionally was hindered by regulations and low prices. The discovery of 
the Cuenca Austral and Noroeste reserves, in addition to the mega-deposits 
at Loma de Lata in Neuquén, have forced private producers to find new 
applications, thereby increasing the vertical integration of the value chain with 
petrochemicals, on the one hand, and electricity generation, on the other, 
providing the inputs for combined cycle plants. Large reserves have recently 
been discovered in Colombia, where the regulatory framework and 
incorporation of private capital in the gas pipeline network facilitated a sharp 
increase in the domestic and industrial use of natural gas. In Mexico, this 
process has just started. 
The new structure adopted by different market segments generated new 
rules for setting prices. In the countries in which hydrocarbon production is 
still in State hands, prices are fixed by a governmental authority. In Argentina 
and Peru, which established a competitive market, prices are unregulated. 
Prices of oil derivatives are generally set by the market, with the international 
price strongly influencing the domestic price. 
With the exception of Argentina, gas prices are regulated, with tariffs set 
as a function of production, transport and distribution costs. The consumer 
price is the sum of these three components, to which are added national and 
provincial taxes in some countries. The costs cover investment and a reasonable 
profit margin, which is negotiated between the authorities and companies 
(see table III-7). 
D. F I R M S T R A T E G I E S A N D T Y P E S OF F I N A N C I N G 
Sectoral reforms and incentives to encourage new entrants into the mining 
and hydrocarbon sectors led to new business development strategies. These 
were implemented not only by transnational corporations but also by public 
firms, boosting the growth of the sector, in particular capital accumulation. 
The new strategies were compatible with the process of globalization and 
internationalization of productive markets and financing. 
Table 111-7 
REFORMS IN THE GAS INDUSTRY 
START OF THE PROCESS PRIVATIZATION MECHANISMS MARKET STRUCTURE PRICE REGULATION/DEREGULATION 
ARGENTINA 
Law 24.076 1992: approve 
privatization of Gas del 
Estado 
Define sectoral regulatory 
framework 
Transfer  areas of production to 
private firms 
Sale of gas pipelines to two firms 
in different  geographical locations 
Definition of eight geographical 
areas for distribution 




Distribution market: eight 
firms in each of the 
geographical areas 
Free market rate for output 
Regulated transport and 
distribution prices: reflect cost 
plus a "reasonable" profit 
Consumer price: sum of 
producer price plus transport tariff, 
plus national and provincial taxes 
COLOMBIA 
Law 142 1994: law of public 
domestic services 
Participation in partnership with 
Ecopetrol, in exploration and 
production 
Concessions, or type of 
build, operate and transfer  to 
State 
Sale of shares in distribution 
State monopoly in 
exploration and production 
Transport concessions 
Limited competition in 
distribution and 
commercialization 
Prices regulated by public 
sector 
Producer prices: changing 
calculation 
Transport prices: consider 
loads of connection and loads 
of use, and set maximum tariff 
for three years 
Consumer prices: sum of production 
price, plus transport tariff,  plus 
distribution tariff,  plus national and 
provincial taxes 
MEXICO 
1995: modification of 
regulatory law of article 27 
of the constitution 
Incorporation of private or foreign 
firms in transport, storage, 
distribution and commercialization 
Developing process of 
granting permits 
Building new pipelines 
Prices regulated by Energy 
Regulatory Commission 
March 1996: creation of 
Energy regulatory commission 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
On 
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1. Firm Strategies 
Since the international market is the primary destination of the products 
from these sectors, State firms as well as subsidiaries of transnational 
corporations have had to work hard to modernize their productive processes 
and machinery and equipment to reduce costs and compete globally. 
In the hydrocarbon sector, the State continues to be the main player in 
the Latin American market, through firms such as Petróleos de Venezuela, 
S.A. (PDVSA) in Venezuela; Petróleo Brasileiro (PETROBRAS) in Brazil; 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) in Mexico; PETROECUADOR, the Ecuadoran 
State oil company; and the Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos (ECOPETROL) 
in Colombia. In mining, Chile has the only important State-owned company, 
namely, the Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO-Chile), since 
the Brazilian Compañía Vale do Río Doce (CVRD) was privatized in 1997. 
The modernization of management led to the introduction of 
decentralized administrative bodies grouped by business area, each of which 
is an independent profit centre, and to the incorporation of a holding company 
that controls the various business units of the firm. This process occurred in 
PDVSA, PEMEX, PETROBRAS, and ECOPETROL. In the case of CODELCO-
Chile, organizational change is a legislative matter for the national congress, 
but since recent governments have not made CODELCO a priority, the firm 
has opted to strengthen corporate development without legally separating its 
various divisions. 
To foster growth and increase world market share, these state firms 
introduced a number of policies that vary considerably from earlier strategies. 
In particular, the firms sought strategic partnerships with transnational 
corporations for exploration and exploitation contracts for mineral and 
hydrocarbon deposits, and they undertook the internationalization of 
production. 
Strategic partnerships facilitated the strong development of exploration 
and exploitation of hydrocarbons. Table III-8 presents investment figures for 
1997, stemming from the various contracts that firms in Bolivia, Colombia 
and Venezuela signed, mainly with transnational firms. 
With regard to the mining sector, CODELCO has benefited from Law 
19,137, passed in 1992, which permits the company to form partnerships with 
third parties. The so-called CODELCO law has enabled the company to enter 
into strategic partnerships with foreign investors for the exploration and 
exploitation of hitherto unexploited mineral deposits. The company would 
not have been able to finance these projects on its own, and consequently the 
right to enter into partnerships has increased capacity. Partnerships currently 
represent over US$ 800 million of the corporation's assets, compared with 
only around US$ 15 million ten years ago (table III- 9). 
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Table 111-8 
PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS BETWEEN STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL 
FIRMS IN HYDROCARBONS, 1997 
COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
EXPLORATION EXPLOITATION TOTAL 
Bolivia 573 573 
Colombia 335 1,183 1,518 
Venezuela 12,000 12,000 
Source: Authors' compilation based on information quoted in Humberto Campodónico, "La 
inversión en el sector petrolero peruano en le período 1993-2000", Reformas económicas series, 
No. 23 (LC/L.11207), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 1999. 
Table 111-9 
CODELCO PARTNERSHIPS WITH TRANSNATIONAL 
MINING COMPANIES 
PROJECT PARTNER PRODUCT NEGOTIATION 
Exploitation contracts 
El Abra Cyprus Amax (United States) Copper 
Agua de la Falda Homestake (United States) Gold 
Exploration contracts 
Pastos Largos MMAJ (Japan) Copper Current 
Los Andes AMP (Australia) Copper Current 
El Loa Asarco (United States) Copper Current 
inca de oro Rio Algom (Canada) Copper, gold In planning phase 
Yabricoya Cominco (Canada) Copper Current 
Quebrada Valiente Orvana/Helmo (Canada) Gold in planning phase 
Manto Rojo Cyprus Amax (United States) Copper in negotiation 
Sierra Mariposa Outokumpu (Finland) Copper in negotiation 
Anillo Several interested parties Copper, gold Bidding 
San Antonio Several interested parties Copper Bidding 
Source: Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO-Chile), Annual Report, Santiago, 
Chile, 1997. 
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The internationalization of the exploration and exploitation of mineral 
and hydrocarbon deposits is a strategy to promote the discovery of new high-
grade deposits now that national geological areas have largely been explored 
(this was the case for CODELCO at the end of the 1990s), or to find reserves in 
oil importing countries (PETROBRAS in Brazil and ENAP in Chile). 
Large oil exporters, such as PDVSA and PEMEX, have focused their 
internationalization strategy on selling refined products on the international 
market. In Venezuela, strategic partnerships with foreign firms have enabled 
PDVSA to refine its oil surplus on several continents. In the 1990s, PEMEX 
followed this policy and entered the refining market in the United States. 
As part of the internationalization policy, some State oil firms also 
designed strategies to penetrate the market for oil derivatives. In Brazil, 
PETROBRAS Internacional S.A. (BRASPETRO), a subsidiary of PETROBRAS, 
sells its products in Colombia, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
PDVSA has begun to break into the market through the firm Maraven, selling 
oil derivatives in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 
In the natural gas sector, the sharp increase in reserves and regional 
production encouraged firms (State-owned, mixed and private) to develop gas 
transport infrastructure and to sell the product to neighbouring countries. Gas 
pipeline projects are currently underway between Argentina and Chile, 
Argentina and Brazil, Bolivia and Brazil, and Bolivia and Paraguay. The projects 
are part of a regional effort to bring about energy integration in Latin America. 
Institutional reforms also promoted the adoption of new growth strategies 
among State-owned firms, including both the oil companies and the Chilean 
mining company (CODELCO). They were thus able to increase their investment 
levels substantially throughout the 1990s. Investment was further boosted by 
high liquidity levels in international capital markets, which gave the firms access 
to resources that were not available in previous decades (see table III-10). 
Table 111-10 
INVESTMENT BY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN THE MINING AND 
HYDROCARBON SECTORS, 1990-1998 
(millions  of  dollars) 
FIRM 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
PDVSA 3 472 4 192 4 405 4 598 4 766 5 089 5 372 n.a. 6 000 
PEMEX 1 967 2 943 2 907 2 726 1 879 2 072 3 286 4 543 7 793 
PETROBRAS 2 736 3 517 3 660 3 452 2 791 3 094 3 052 2 925 n.a. 
ECOPETROL 311 312 493 698 790 1 059 1 433 1 518 n.a. 
YPFB 100 105 108 70 72 35 40 n.a. n.a. 
CODELCO 331 343 425 402 341 365 702 853 600 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
ECLAC 99 
Transnational firms also increased their investment in the region, 
encouraged by new foreign investment laws, privatization, more flexible 
contractual arrangements, the deregulation of some markets (complete 
deregulation in the case of derivatives), price liberalization and the unrestricted 
availability of extracted crude oil. The reactivation of most economies in the 
region in the 1990s also helped to foster investment, as did the improved long-
term growth prospects for the region. Together these elements stimulated the 
participation and repositioning of transnational corporations in the region's 
mining and hydrocarbon sectors. 
These incentives also benefited domestic private firms that entered the 
sector. In oil and gas production, the most important firms include Bridas, 
Perez Companc, Pluspetrol and Astra in Argentina, and PBE Trading, 
Productos Industriales Venezolanos, Tecnoconsul, Hidropetrol and Servioil 
in Venezuela. The increased strength of these private and public companies 
boosted regional energy integration. 
Deregulation and privatization gave rise to new microsectoral 
phenomena, including the integration of gas and electricity and of oil and 
gas. This integration is most prevalent in Argentina. As Gadano (1998) points 
out, the existence of a large gas supply at competitive prices makes the 
petrochemicals industry an attractive business both for hydrocarbon products 
and for large international petrochemical firms. 
Thermoelectricity generation is another activity that contributed to the 
growth of natural gas production. In response to rising demand for electricity 
and a high level of obsolescence of the existing thermoelectric equipment in 
the region, gas producers entered the electricity market in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil and Chile. The constant increase in electricity supply, which was partly 
due to the building of new plants, sparked a sharp fall in electricity prices. 
The number of thermoelectric projects underway in Argentina and Chile could 
actually cause an oversupply, especially if hydroelectricity enters another 
period of high production. 
2. Types of  Financing 
Since the late 1980s, transnational mining and oil companies have forged 
investment partnerships and jointly carried out the exploitation of copper, 
gold and hydrocarbons, in particular. This is a marked contrast to the disputes 
between firms, especially in the copper industry, which were common in the 
early 1970s, when global competition for reserves was initiated. The current 
strategy has enabled firms to use their own capital to finance some of the 
investment necessary for exploitation, while the rest has come from 
partnerships between public firms, national capital, international investment 
societies and the World Bank. Tables III-11 and III-12 illustrate the partnerships 
involved in metal exploitation in Chile and Peru. 
Table 111-11 
CHILE: TYPES OF FINANCING FOR MINING PROJECTS 
o o 
PROJECT, BY REGION PROJECT FINANCING MILLIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
DOLLARS PERIOD 
REGION I 
Cerro Colorado Contribution from partners: RíoAlgom, Canada 
Syndicated loan led by Citibank; sales contracts with the Mitsubishi agency 






Quebrada Blanca Contribution from partners: Comineo, Teck Resources, Sociedad Minera 
Pudahuel and Enami 





Collahuasi Contribution from partners: Minera Mantos Minorco and Falconbridge Ltda., 







Contribution from partners: Codelco, Cyprus Amax; loan from international 
banks 
Contribution from partners: Marvis Corp. (30%), Anglo American Corp. 
(13%), Somin (26%), Inversiones Sudamericanas (6.5%), other national 
investors 





El Lince Contribution from partners: Grupo Luksic, Outokumpu, and Chemical Bank 60 1990-1992 
Ivan y Zar Contribution from partners: Rayrock Resources, Discovery Minera 36 1992-1994 
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Table III-ll continued 





Tesoro/Leonor Antofagasta Holdings (61%), Equatorial Treasure Ltd. (Australia) (39%) 









Lomas Bayas Westmin - Canada 




Escondida First expansion: Contribution from partners: BHP-UTAH, RTZ, Jeco, IFC + 












La Candelaria Contribution from partners: Phelps Dodge (United States) and Sumitomo 
(Japan) 






Los Pelambres Antofagasta Holdings (60%) + Japanese consortia: Mitsubishi Material Corp 
(15%) and Nippon Mining & Metals (25%) 









Source: Graciela Moguillansky, La inversion en Chile: ¿elfin  de un ciclo âe expansión?, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999. 
Table 111-12 
PERU: INTERNATIONAL BANK FINANCING FOR MINING PROJECTS 




Southern Peru Copper 
Corporation (SPCC) 
Eximbank ( 1996 -2001) 
Mitsui & Co. Ltd. 
Bonds 
Banco de Crédito del Perú, Banco Continental, Banco Wiese 
Syndicated loan: Credit Suisse, First Boston, Chase Securities, Deutsche 
Bank, Morgan Grenfell,  Goldmann Sachs, JP Morgan 
Promissory notes backed by export guarantees 
945 1997 -2007 
Cerro Verde Banco de Crédito del Perú 
ABM AMRO Bank 
Chase Manhattan Bank of New York 
Citibank N.A. 
Banco Internacional del Perú 
334 .5 1997 -2005 
Yanacocha Loan from International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
DEG loan 
Bank of New York-Salomon Brothers 
155.3 
La Oroya BT Alex-Brown-Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. UBS 
Securities 
Banco de Crédito del Perú, Crédito Leasing S.A. 




Refinería de Zinc 
Cajamarqilla 
Lead Managers: Citicorp Securities, Inc., Bank of Montreal Export 
Development Corp. 
Banco de Crédito del Perú 
250 1998-2002 
Buenaventura ADS (American Depository Shares). In US: ING Barings, JP Morgan, 
Salomon Brothers 
Barings-Nesbitt Bums, SBC Warburg 
112 
Total 2112 
Source: Ministerio de Energía y Minas del Perú, taken from Humberto Campodónico, "Las reformas estructurales en el sector minero peruano y las 
características de la inversión 1992-2008", Reformas económicas series, No. 24 (LC/L.1209), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America 
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In Chile -where most of the region's mining projects were carried out in 
the 1990s- statistics from the Foreign Investment Committee indicate that 
between 30% and 40% of the capital was put up by the partners themselves, 
with the rest coming from syndicated loans from international commercial 
banks. In addition, a lower percentage was often financed through long-term 
purchasing contracts, particularly in the case of mineral concentrates. 
Unlike their Chile counterparts, mining firms in Peru not only financed 
part of their projects on the international market, but also borrowed actively 
in the domestic financial market. Oil companies in Argentina did the same. In 
the Argentine hydrocarbon sector, the use of tradable debt instruments was 
very widespread. The number of operations increased considerably, reaching 
US$ 2.13 billion in 1997. Resources were also obtained on the stock market, 
where the stocks of YPF, Cadipsa, Capex and Compañía General de 
Combustibles (CGC) are traded. 
The opening of the capital account, financial liberalization and sectoral 
reform policies enabled these firms to overcome the difficulties of raising 
investment funds for large projects. However, as a result of the international 
financial crisis, which began in Asia and then worsened with the Russian 
collapse, loans were frozen, particularly for mining, and prices fell sharply. 
Many firms were in the process of raising funds for various projects, and they 
suffered considerable setbacks. 
E. CAPITAL F O R M A T I O N A N D S E C T O R A L 
P E R F O R M A N C E 
A number of positive elements combined in the 1990s to foster investment 
in mining and hydrocarbons, but the projects will only materialize in the future. 
According to sectoral information, Chile accounted for 67% of the region's 
investment in mining over the past decade. Brazil came second with 19%, 
followed by Peru and Argentina (tables III-13 and III-14). Three factors 
contributed to investment growth in the sector: institutional changes, which 
opened up new investment opportunities for transnational firms; the shift of 
the world market toward higher-value minerals; and strong international 
liquidity, which provided large volumes of investment. 
In the case of Chile, the level of investment shown in the table represents 
the peak of a 15 year sectoral investment cycle which began in the 1980s and 
which should end around 2000. In the 1970s, issues related to the institutional 
framework (for example, new foreign investment laws and the mining law) 
were key in attracting foreign investors to Chile and particularly to mining 
exploration. These factors were not enough to stimulate projects, however. 
Investment did not take off until a decade later, with the Escondida project in 
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Table III-13 
INVESTMENT IN MINING, 1990-1998 
(millions  of  dollars) 
COUNTRY CUMULATIVE TOTAL 1990-1998 ANNUAL AVERAGE 
Argentina 2 288 381 
Chile 15 505 1 723 
Brazil 4 436 493 
Peru 2 925 418 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
Table III-14 
INVESTMENT IN MINING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 1990-1997 
COUNTRY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Argentina 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.27 0.24 
Brazil 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Chile 3.91 2.54 2.62 3.95 5.41 4.00 3.97 3.90 
Peru 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.43 0.86 0.74 0.83 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
the late 1980s. Financing for the project was restricted at first by the difficulties 
in the international financial market.26 
In the 1990s, Chile benefited from the high levels of liquidity in 
international capital markets, and was consequently able to finance mega-
projects. This positive environment also enabled Argentina and Peru to create 
the conditions for sectoral development and to attract foreign capital. In Peru 
investment began to recover from a period of stagnation, thanks to the 1992 
26 See Moguillansky (1998b) on the development of investment in the Chilean mining sector. 
ECLAC 105 
institutional reform and to the process of privatizing public mining companies. 
Privatization forced the firms to make investment commitments to increase 
exploitation, smelting and refining. Later, an aggressive exploration 
programme was promoted. New technical and legal measures fostered the 
rapid growth in the number of hectares under mining exploration, which rose 
from 10 million to 17 million hectares. Companies such as RTZ, Asarco, 
Newmont, Phelps Dodge and Cyprus Amax carried out the exploitation. 
In Argentina, institutional reform and the positive international market 
for minerals in the 1990s attracted foreign direct investment flows to the sector. 
Inflows grew from US$ 2 million in 1992 to US$ 316 million in 1996. This 
increase coincided with the establishment of several important foreign firms 
in the country, which carried out prospecting, exploration and, in some cases, 
the exploitation of new mineral deposits. 
Table III-15 lists the projects that will potentially be developed over the next 
few years in Argentina, Chile and Peru. In most cases, the implementation of the 
projects will depend on the evolution of the world mineral market. At the moment, 
the copper situation is very uncertain, as the international price has been well 
below the long-term price considered profitable for the business. The closure of 
low-grade mines should foster the sector's recovery in the medium term. 
Brazil is the only one of the four countries in which mining investment 
stagnated in the 1990s. The sector developed very differently from that in 
other countries, largely because of the poor performance of the international 
market for Brazil's traditional minerals, low levels of exploration and lack of 
geological data on the vast country, the strategy of State-owned CVRD which 
pushed rationalization and the discovery of new reserves over the expansion 
of productive capacity, and the high cost of infrastructure for mineral 
production in the Amazon. 
Evaluating the performance of investment in hydrocarbons is more 
complex than for mining (table III-16). Institutional reforms stimulated 
exploration, with recovery evident in all the countries which implemented 
reforms, but exploration did not always lead to the discovery of economically 
exploitable reserves. In addition, although figures on investment are available 
(table III-17), it is not possible to evaluate how well the policies have worked 
given the short time that has elapsed since the reforms were implemented. 
(Table III-18 shows data on the physical volume of oil production.) In many 
cases, new firms are still in the exploration stage, when investment levels are 
much lower than those associated with production and industrial 
development. However, microeconomic analysis can provide more data on 
the investment behaviour of private firms. 
Table 111-15 
PROJECTS IN THE PIPELINE FOR 2001 TO 2007 
PROJECT INVESTOR METAL INVESTMENT IN MILLIONS DOLLARS 
CHILE 
Spence RioAlgom, Canada Copper 500 
Los Bronces y las Tórtolas Exxon Minerals International Inc. US. Copper 550 
San Antonio Codelco and private bidding (60 ó 95% of the shares) Copper 250 
Tuina Yuma Copper Corp., Canada Copper 30 
Relincho Outokumpu-Equatorial Copper 200 
Santa Catalina Cía. Minera Santa Catalina S.A. Copper 100 
Ivan y Zar Rayrock Resources Ltda. and Discovery Minera Copper 36 
Aldebarán/Cerro Casale Placer Dome, Arizona Star, Berna Gold Gold 1,300 
Refinería de cobre Acec Union Miniere, Belgium, 20% Copper 
Brasil Arbi Participações 500 
Fundición de cobre Hyundai Copper 400 
ARGENTINA 
El Pachón Cambior Inc. y Compañía Minera San José Copper-gold 800 
Agua Rica Northern Orion Exploration y BHP Copper Copper-gold 500 
Potasio Río Colorado Grupo Minera Tea - Cra Potassium 150 
San Jorge Northern Orion Exploration Copper-gold 110 
PERU 
Antamina RioAlgom, Noranda Teck Copper 1,064 
Cuajone Southern Peru Copper Corp. Copper 499 
Cerro Verde Cyprus Amax Copper 50 
Doe Run Perú Doe Run Copper 166 
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Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project 
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Table III-16 
P E R F O R M A N C E INDICATORS IN T H E MIN ING S E C T O R , 1970-1998 
INDICATOR AND COUNTRY 1970 1980 1990 1997 1998 
EXPORTS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
Argentina 8 174 302 407 699 
Brazil 277 1 894 4 257 4 913 4 975 
Chile 1 066 2 900 4 489 7 792 6 211 
Peru 505 1 499 1 558 2 403 1 985 
EXPORT INDEX 1 9 9 0 = 1 0 0 
Argentina 3 58 100 135 231 
Brazil 6 44 100 115 117 
Chile 24 65 100 174 138 
Peru 32 96 100 154 127 
PHYSICAL VOLUME OF PRODUCTION 1 9 9 0 = 100 
Brazil 27 68 100 120 n.a. 
Chile 74 82 100 169 n.a. 
Peru 133 120 100 147 n.a. 
Source: Foreign Trade Database of Latin America and the Caribbean (Banco de Datos del Comercio 
Exterior de América Latina y el Caribe, BADACEL), Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC); Statistical Yearbook for  Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, 
various issues. 
Table III-17 
I N V E S T M E N T C O E F F I C I E N T IN T H E H Y D R O C A R B O N 
S E C T O R , 1988-1997 
(percent) 
COUNTRY 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Bolivia 2.56 3.20 3.92 3.56 2.84 2.95 2.86 2.41 n.a. 
Brazil n.a. 0.48 0.55 0.57 0.50 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.38 
Colombia 1.12 1.13 1.22 1.98 1.26 2.05 1.70 1.67 1.61 
Mexico 0.80 0.73 0.92 0.79 0.67 0.69 0.78 0.94 1.04 
Peru 0.50 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.21 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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Table III-18 
INDEX OF THE PHYSICAL VOLUME OF OIL PRODUCTION, 1970-1997 
(1990 = 100) 
COUNTRY 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Argentina 81 102 100 102 115 123 138 149 157 167 
Bolivia 116 109 100 106 102 106 123 136 140 143 
Brazil 26 29 100 99 100 101 105 109 124 133 
Colombia 50 29 100 97 100 103 103 133 143 135 
Mexico 20 83 100 105 105 105 105 103 112 117 
Peru 56 152 100 89 90 98 99 94 93 92 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook 
for  Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, various issues. 
The case of Argentina illustrates how firms behaved after privatization. 
Oil and gas reserves grew jointly with production, maintaining a horizon of 
between 9 and 10 years (Gadano, 1998). YPF, which by 1998 accounted for 
approximately 43% of oil production and 34% of gas production, invested an 
average of US$ 1.9 billion per year in expanding capital for upstream activities 
(both domestically and abroad) and for downstream activities. According to 
Gadano's data, US$ 7.25 billion was invested in the oil and gas derivatives 
industry between 1990 and 1997, thereby increasing the share of these products 
in hydrocarbon exports. 
Since 1997, the capitalization of the Bolivian State hydrocarbon company 
has led to investment commitments of US$ 4.3 billion in the space of eight 
years. This investment involves new areas of exploration and exploitation, 
including partnerships with other countries -particularly with Petrobras- and 
the construction of the gas pipeline between Bolivia and Brazil. This will enable 
a marked increase in exports, which should rise from the current 10% of total 
exports to 35%. The total should rise even more once the project to build a 
new gas pipeline between Santa Cruz (Bolivia) and Cuibá (Brazil) is finished. 
Colombia traditionally was not a large oil exporter, but in the last decade 
the discovery of sizeable reserves made it an important producer. Most 
exploration and development was carried out via partnership contracts with 
the State company, given that the terms of these contracts improved the 
situation for foreign investment (Fainboim and Rodríguez, 2000). 
In Mexico the State is legally required to retain control over oil. The 
economic consequence is that most investment decisions to date have been 
based on macroeconomic factors, which are frequently short-term, which 
override microeconomic considerations and which limit financing of the 
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industry. Private investment in the sector has been meagre, while public 
investment has recovered significantly since the end of the tequila crisis (Torres, 
1999). 
Investment in the Brazilian oil sector performed modestly in the 1990s, 
both in absolute terms and as a proportion of GDP. This was partially due to 
previous investment levels and partially to the financial constraints faced by 
Petrobras. 
In Peru sectoral reform is also in its early stages, and its effect on 
investment is still quite small. However, starting in 1993, the State firm 
Petroperú signed 37 licensing contracts for hydrocarbon exploration, which 
brought in investment of US$ 1.27 billion dollars over seven years. In the case 
of oil discovery, private firms will make the investments necessary to develop 
production. Of the wells explored to date, not one has registered enough oil 
to make exploitation commercially feasible. 
Insufficient time has passed for assessing private investor behaviour in 
the hydrocarbon sector. However, foreign participation in exploration, the 
acquisition of State enterprises and strategic partnerships with firms that 
remain in the State sector are all good indicators of strong future investment 
growth in the sector. 

CHAPTER I V 
I N V E S T M E N T IN I N F R A S T R U C T U R E 
A country's infrastructure is composed of a number of specific sectors, 
such as electricity, telecommunications, rural and urban roads, sewage and 
water supply, irrigation, ports and airports. This study concentrates on the 
first three sectors, because of the advances made in these areas as a result of 
the reforms and their importance to productive growth and international 
competitiveness.27 
Despite differences in the services offered and in the characteristics of 
the respective markets, the reform process has been similar in the electricity 
and telecommunications sectors, allowing them to be analysed together. Roads 
are addressed in a separate section. The nature of the latter activity required a 
new form of private sector participation -concessions-, which became 
widespread in the region in the 1990s. 
A. T H E N E W I N S T I T U T I O N A L F R A M E W O R K IN 
E L E C T R I C I T Y A N D T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S 
The main objective of the reform process in electricity and 
telecommunications has been to include the private sector in the ownership, 
management and generation of infrastructure services. In general, the first 
27 The information contained in the text, tables, boxes and figures in this chapter, which come from this 
study's database, are taken from the following authors or bibliographical references: Barja (1999b, 
1999c); Bielschowsky (1999b); Campodónico (1999a, 1999d); Celani (1998); Cordero (2000); Delgado 
(1998); Escobar (1999); Fainboim and Rodríguez (2000); Moguillansky (1997a, 1997b, 1998a); Romero 
(1998); Rodríguez (1999); Scheinver (1999). 
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step towards achieving this goal was the creation of an institutional framework 
to serve as the basis for privatization. 
The electricity and telecommunications sectors were deeply transformed 
in the 1990s. Previously, public service State monopolies -limited by a 
centralized structure, with vertically integrated markets- were concerned 
mainly with guaranteeing supply and creating positive externalities, and they 
operated in a framework in which pricing policy was not designed to maximize 
profits. The government often prioritized distributive and inflation-controlling 
criteria, while management did not always follow cost-minimizing policies. 
The foreign debt crisis, the scarcity of financial resources and the pressure 
exerted by multinational organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank forced sectoral reform. 
There followed a radical change, which led to the privatization of public 
utilities or the award of long-term concessions, changes in industrial 
organization and market structure, the introduction of new rules of the game, 
and new legislation and regulatory institutions. 
The participation of the private sector and the new institutional 
framework changed the way investment decisions are made. This chapter 
evaluates the changes and analyses whether the development of public services 
can be better executed in this new context than under the logic of the public 
sector. 
The level of private sector participation in infrastructure activities remains 
uneven between countries, and outcomes are not yet definitive. In some 
countries privatization was carried out before changes in legislation and the 
rules of the game were introduced, whereas in others the sequence was 
reversed. The sequence of these processes is significant because once the terms 
of purchase have been negotiated with the companies in question, it is difficult 
to change them retroactively. Any change in the regulation of a particular 
sector causes great uncertainty among investors, which in turn can threaten 
the level of investment. 
1. The Privatization  Process 
The political, macroeconomic and international context in which the 
companies were sold determined the type of participants involved and the 
commitments negotiated between the public and private sectors. An example 
of this is the contrast between the privatization of the large public utilities in 
Chile in the mid-1980s and the experience five or ten years later in Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia or Peru. 
Indeed, Chile was the first country in the region to privatize these 
companies, and the process was carried out when the domestic and regional 
economies were going through a major crisis. The new policies and 
mechanisms that emerged were crucial to the success of the process, because 
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they managed to attract private sector participation. The new policies included 
measures to guarantee higher profits and reduce uncertainty. They included 
the following: (a) the modernization of the management structure and the 
write-off of firms' debts before privatization; (b) a new tariff regime, set several 
years before the sale, which guaranteed a high return on investment; and (c) 
other incentives designed to encourage firms to invest in the new business, 
such as subsidized shares and loans, new mechanisms -again involving 
subsidies- which enabled public sector employees to acquire controlling stakes 
in the companies, and a new institutional framework that initially spurred 
investment, although it was subsequently perceived as obstructing the healthy 
development of the sector. With the exception of Argentina, which also began 
privatization relatively early, the other countries initiated the process in the 
second half of the 1990s in a context of economic stability and abundant 
international liquidity. As illustrated in table IV-1, much of the process was 
carried out before the Asian crisis. These conditions, together with the success 
of the Chilean experience in terms of the growth and profitability of the 
companies, attracted the participation of foreign investors. Acting in consortia 
and backed by international financing, European, North American and Chilean 
firms took over the companies (see table A-8 in the annex). 
The negotiations between the State and investors in the 1990s helped 
overcome some of the deficiencies in existing regulations and corrected some 
of the errors committed during the pioneering Chilean process. In some cases 
this allowed the government to maximize its revenue from the sale of the 
companies or created incentives for subsequent investment. 
2. Market  Structure 
Even though the privatization process was designed to create competitive 
markets, the tendency towards mergers and the concentration of ownership -
encouraged by the lack of anti-trust legislation- quickly gave rise to oligopolies 
markets. 
The way in which State enterprises were privatized shaped the structure 
of the post-reform market. In general, two trends occurred in each of the sectors 
studied. In the electricity sector the company was "deverticalized", and 
separate markets were created for generation, distribution, transmission and, 
in some countries, commercialization (see table IV-2). Although the markets 
for generation and commercialization can both work well under competitive 
conditions, in the case of generation competition tends to be restricted or 
oligopolistic. In the case of distribution and transmission markets, it is not 
economically feasible to have more than one company operating in each 
geographical area. In the telecommunications sector, by contrast, the trend 
was to preserve the vertical integration of the company, giving the private 
operator a long period of monopoly rights. 
Table IV-1 
SECTORAL REFORM AND THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS 
REFORM OF ELECTRICITY SECTOR PRIVATIZATION OF ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
ARGENTINA 
Law 23,696 of 1989 1992: Sale of share packages 
Provincial firms from 1995 
Atomic energy (underway) 
Binational hydroelectric plants (underway) 
BOLIVIA 
Reform process (1994) 1995: Capitalization of generating companies 
1995: Bidding for distribution company Elfec 
1997: Sale of transmission company 
BRAZIL 
Law 8,631 and Decree 774 March 1993 Law 9,074 of 1995: sale of local distributor firms 
Law 8,987 of 1995: independent electricity production 
COLOMBIA 
Laws 142 and 143, 1994: 
Competition in generation 
Creation of wholesale market 
1995-1997: Sale of share packages in generating companies 
CHILE 
1982 General law of electricity services 
1982 Reform of price system 
1986-1989: Sale of generating, distribution and transmission companies 
MEXICO 
1989: Start of restructuring of public enterprise 
1992: Redefinition of public services and modification of public 
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Table IV-1 continued 
REFORM OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR PRIVATIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
PERU 
Dl 674, 1991: Constitution of Copri 1994: Sale of generating, distribution, and transmission companies 
ARGENTINA 
Reform Law No. 23,696,1989 1990: Sale of shares in Entel to two basic telephone operators; constitution 
Decree 731/89 of geographical monopolies 
BOLIVIA 
Telecommunications Law 1995: Entel monopoly on national long distance and international calls 
Capitalization of Entel Regional monopolies in basic telephone services 
Exclusive concession for basic telephone service co-operatives Duopoly in cellular telephone service 
BRAZIL 
1995: Constitutional amendment No.8 1997: Privatization of Telebras 
1996-1997: Cellular telephone law Opening of cellular telephone market 
General telecommunications law Creation of competition through "mirror" firms in regional markets for 
basic and long distance services 
COLOMBIA 
1989: Opening of new private concessions 1994: competition in local telephone service 
1990: Local telephone service regulation 1993: introduction of mobile cellular telephones 
1998: introduction of competition in long distance service 
CHILE 
1982: General telecommunications law 1990-1994: Vertically segmented markets in local and long distance 
1994: Reforms to the law: Introduction of multi-carrier system services for Entel and CTC 
Free entry for new competitors to all products 
1994 all markets open to competition 
Table IV-1 continued 
REFORM OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR PRIVATIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
MEXICO 
1995: Federal telecommunications Law 1990: Privatization of Telmex 
1997: Competition in national long distance and international calls Monopoly in basic and long distance services 
1997: Opening to competition in all market segments 
PERU 
New telecommunications Law Private monopoly 
1999: competition introduced 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
Table IV-2 
STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRICITY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
ARGENTINA 
Vertical break-up into generation, transport and distribution 
Horizontal separation of generating companies 
Competitive market for generation with low minimum entry thresholds: 40 firms 
Transmission companies: 6 monopoly firms (benefiting from economies of scale) 
Distribution companies: 25 firms, legal monopolies with potential competition 
Definition of an exclusivity period In two geographical monopolies for basic phone services 
Cellular market shared between Telefónica and Telecom 
Competition in new service segments (1998) 
Competition in mobile phones, cable TV and other areas 
BOLIVIA 
Separation of generation, transport and distribution 
Limit on potential generation capacity per firm: 35% of the market 
Creation of wholesale market In generation: 4 firms with exclusive rights until 1999 
Creation of 6 distribution firms, regional monopolies 
BRAZIL 
Continued Entel monopoly in national and international long distance service 
Continued regional monopolies for basic services 
Duopoly In cellular market 
Generation: State run, in process of privatization 
Transmission: 100% State-run; Electrobras and State firms being prepared for privatization 
Distribution: privatization of State monopolies 1995-1998 
Decree 1,009 de 1993: 
Open access to federal  transmission network 
Open access to distribution 
1997: Opening of cellular telephone market 
1998: Incorporation of 9 mobile telephone operators 
Three private regional monopolies In basic telephone services 
Duopoly in long distance service 
Opening to competition In basic telephone services from new operators In each region. 
COLOMBIA 
Vertical Integration In large firms 
Private ownership of 50% of generation and 30% of distribution 
Generation: 23 private and 13 public sector firms 
Commercialization: 35 public and 39 private firms 
Transmission: 8 public and 3 private firms 
Distribution: 34 public and 3 private firms 
38 local telephone companies, of which 4 cover 84% of installed lines 
Three regional duopolies In cellular services 
From 1998 competition in long distance calls, and competition In value added services 
Table IV-2 continued 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
CHILE 
Vertical integration In generation and transmission 1989-1993: Vertically segmented markets maintained for local 
Interconnected Central System (ICS): telephone service in hands of Entel and CTC 
Oligopoly In generation Free entry to all competitors for new services 
Distribution: 10 firms (private monopolies) 1994: Opening to competition of all markets 
Northern Interconnected Central System (NICS): 
Generation: strong competition since introduction of gas pipelines 
Distribution: 3 regional firms (monopolies) 
MEXICO 
State monopoly: 1990-1997: Definition of an exclusivity period for a private monopoly 
Generation: 94.3% State, 5.7% private 1998: Opening to competition 
Transmission and distribution: 100% State 
PERU 
Private vertically Integrated monopoly o 
Introduction of competition In 1999 w 
n 






Separation of generating, transmission and distribution activities 
Generation: 
51% private (5 firms) 
49% State (3 firms) 
Distribution: 
3 firms, regional private monopolies 
6 public sector regional firms 
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It is worth noting that the trend toward mergers and acquisitions of 
companies by international operators has led to a situation in which markets 
that were vertically disintegrated at the time of privatization or which were 
opened up to competition by subsequent legislation have once again become 
vertically integrated, especially when there was no legislation to prevent this. 
This situation is found in the electricity and telecommunications sectors of 
more than one country in the region.28 
In other cases, the legislation allowed new entrants into the market, but 
sunk costs were prohibitive in practice. This is evident in basic telephone 
services characterized by a dominant operator, and in the market for generation 
when electricity plants are grouped into a single company rather than being 
separated horizontally under different ownership. Nevertheless, technological 
progress in both telecommunications (mobile telephones) and the electricity 
sector (plants with combined cycles) has allowed products and services to be 
developed at much lower costs and has consequently fostered competition. 
Table IV-3 summarizes the current structure of both sectors. 
3. Regulation 
One of the negatives in this post-reform transition stage is the weakness 
of supervision and regulation, which is evident in all of the countries studied. 
The characteristics of the regulatory framework shape future investment in 
two ways: (a) by fostering competition and maintaining a separation between 
companies that could be vertically and horizontally linked, and (b) by 
facilitating the negotiation of the pricing structure in the regulated market, 
which fosters investment while allowing the consumer to benefit from any 
productivity gains. 
a. Promotion of  Competition 
While there is no consensus in economic theory about the real effect of 
competition on innovation and investment, its influence has clearly had a 
positive effect on technological progress. Fierce competition in 
telecommunications at the global level has led to a degree of technological 
progress not experienced in other sectors. It also led the transnational 
corporations in the Latin American market to push for innovation and to 
introduce new services and products to strengthen their position when the 
telecommunications market was opened. 
28 See Moguillansky (1997b, 1998a) and Campodónico (1999a). 
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Table IV- 3 
DEGREE OF MARKET COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR GENERATION DISTRIBUTION TRANSMISSION 
Potential competition 
Oligopoly in practice 
Private monopoly State or private monopoly 




Competitive market in 
some countries 
Potential competition 
competitive market in 
Chile, and recently in 
other countries 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
The Chilean experience is a good example of how telecommunications 
companies behaved after the market was opened up to competition. The 
introduction of a multi-carrier system for long distance services and the 
liberalization of other segments of the market benefited the country not only 
because they triggered the introduction of new technology and 
competitiveness, but also because competition led to an extraordinary 
reduction in the prices of products and services, which was not the case in 
other countries. At the moment, the major obstacle to future sectoral growth 
is the trend for the largest company to merge with or acquire the other 
companies when anti-monopoly legislation is not fully developed. 
In Colombia, there is a similar situation in basic telephone services: the 
free entry of new operators in a structure of decentralized networks paved the 
way for competition in a segment of the market that is monopolistic in the 
majority of countries. The same also occurs in the market for electricity 
generation. In Colombia and Argentina, not only has competition allowed prices 
to fall dramatically in the free market to which the largest consumers have access, 
but it has also secured the supply and increased the quality of services. 
b. The Pricing Regime 
The pricing regime reflects the structure of regulated markets in the wake 
of privatization. These are markets with no potential for competition (see table 
IV-4), and a regulatory body periodically negotiates the prices charged by the 
natural monopolies. In market segments which do have potential for 




REGULATED MARKETS IN THE ELECTRICITY AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTORS 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
Generation 
(Consumption below 0.5, 1 or 2 MW, depending 
on the limit fixed in each country) 
Basic telephone service 
Transmission Long distance service 
(Except in countries where the market 
is open to competition) 
Distribution Mobile telephone service 
(From 1998, in Chile) 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
There are several ways in which prices are set in regulated markets in 
different countries, both in the electricity sector and in telecommunications. 
In the former, these formulae are based on models with parameters negotiated 
with the companies. Although the pricing model can be the same in different 
cases, the parameters are not necessarily the same. In general, the prices are 
set to incorporate the cost of operation, maintenance, reserves, and expansion 
or new investments; some countries also take into account a minimum return 
on investment (in Bolivia 9%, in Chile 10% and in Peru 12%). Other countries 
introduced a system of price capping, which was based on prices in developed 
countries and was set for a fixed period of time (see table A-10 in the annex). 
Still others (Argentina) included efficiency considerations in the parameters 
used to set prices, thus making prices subject to certain quality objectives and 
to periodic revisions, after which future price reductions were set as a function 
of the productivity and efficiency levels achieved. 
In the telecommunications sector, State companies were privatized 
without establishing a pricing regime, which caused subsequent difficulties 
when the regulatory body tried to change the rules of the game. In those 
countries where the corresponding legislation was not approved, prices have 
remained high, cross-subsidies have prevailed and the regulatory bodies have 
struggled to reduce prices in line with efficiency and productivity gains. 
Companies which combine accounting records for related services make the 
task even more difficult. 
Bolivia, Chile and Colombia established pricing models that were rather 
more transparent (see table A-11 in the annex). Among these countries, Chile 
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is the only one that has already undergone negotiations between the regulatory 
body and the monopoly in basic telephone services. After intense discussions, 
the regulatory body succeed in getting the dominant company to reduce its 
prices in line with productivity gains. 
The pricing model in regulated markets determines the profitability of 
companies. Using the accounts of these companies, it is possible to calculate 
the profitability achieved after privatization. The results obtained show that 
(a) the profitability of the sector is quite high in most countries, which explains 
why international firms are keen to enter the region; (b) in the case of Chile, 
despite the price cuts agreed every four years the basic telephone service 
company (Companía de Telecomunicaciones de Chile, CTC) has managed to 
expand its business in non-regulated markets and increase its profitability by 
becoming a universal provider; and (c) also in Chile, when the Empresa 
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) was privatized, it was the only long 
distance service provider, but profits fell sharply when competitors entered 
this segment of the market -eight companies currently operate in the sector-
and ENTEL was forced to expand its business into other markets (see table 
IV-5). 
Table IV-5 
PROFITABILITY OF PRIVATIZED FIRMS IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR3', 1991-1997 
COUNTRY FIRM 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Argentina TELECOM + TELEFÓNICA: 4.0 9.0 12.0 16.0 19.0 17.0 25.0 
Monopoly in entire market 
Chile CTC: Monopoly in basic 15.1 17.5 20.0 16.9 15.8 20.4 20.0 
market until 1994 
ENTEL: Monopoly in long 47.9 47.8 48.2 36.5 16.9 2.3 4.8 
distance market until 1994 
Bolivia ENTEL: Monopoly in long n.a. n.a. 5.8 8.1 3.2 6.1 6.2 
distance market 
Mexico TELMEX: Monopoly in entire 
market 26.1 24.3 22.7 13.1 11.3 13.0 14.5 
Peru TELEFÓNICA DEL PERÚ: 
Monopoly in entire market n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.9 21.1 20.8 20.8 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
a/ Measured as net profits as share of assets. 
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B. I N V E S T M E N T A F T E R T H E R E F O R M S IN E L E C T R I C I T Y 
A N D T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S 
An evaluation of sectoral and particularly investment performance in 
the post-reform period should take into account the specific characteristics of 
the period and the fact that not much time has elapsed since the reforms took 
place. The bulk of privatizations occurred in the second half of the 1990s, 
which makes it impossible to reach a definitive conclusion about the process. 
Moreover, an important share of the investments was determined by transitory 
factors that will no longer apply once the sectoral reforms have been 
consolidated (see table IV-6). Rather than evaluate the figures, therefore, we 
aim to show the series of factors that spurred investment and the factors that 
will shape future sectoral development. 
1. Transitory  Factors  that  Determined  Sectoral  Investment 
a. Pent-up Demand in Telecommunications 
In the telecommunications sector, investors, especially international firms, 
were attracted by the very high levels of pent-up demand, as well as the outdated 
technology and low productivity levels that prevailed in the region. At the time 
of privatization, there was a severe shortage of telephone lines and technology 
was outdated. These two factors explain the strong investment in all the 
countries, which is reflected in the investment-to-GDP ratios (see table IV-7). 
In the electricity sector, by contrast, supply was practically universal at 
the time of privatization in most countries, at least in urban areas, so there 
was virtually no pent-up demand in the sector. In some countries, like Chile 
and Argentina, the abundance of energy reserves and previous State 
investment explain the lower investment ratios after privatizations. In the 
case of Argentina, the large hydroelectric projects at Chocón, Cerros Colorados, 
Piedra de Águila and Yaciretá, together with the nuclear plants, provided 
enough supply to last for several years. This did not hold back private sector 
participation, however, which was concentrated on thermoelectric energy 
generation (combined cycle plants) and distribution; investment in these 
segments was very dynamic.29 Lower costs resulting from technological 
29 Between 1993 and 1997 this gave rise to an expansion of 2,300 MW in the country, and an additional 
4,500 MW were approved for two new plants and expansion at existing facilities, which were expected 
to go ahead between 1998 and 2000. The private sector has also played an active role in distribution, 
investing the equivalent of US$ 284 million annually. 
Table IV-6 
TEMPORARY FACTORS INFLUENCING INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
COUNTRY ELECTRICITY SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
PRE-REFORM RESERVES INVESTMENT STATE PRICE INCENTIVES PRE-REFORM RESERVES INVESTMENT STATE PRICE INCENTIVES 
AND SUPPLY COMMITMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN AND OTHER FORMS OF AND SUPPLY COMMITMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN AND OTHER FORMS OF 
EXPANSION OF QUALITY INVESTMENT INCENTIVES EXPANSION OF QUALITY INVESTMENT INCENTIVES 
IMPROVEMENTS IMPROVEMENTS 
Argentina Large generating 
reserves 
Lack of maintenance 
In distribution and 
transmission 
Commitment with 
fines imposed If not 
met 
Medium Large shortage Yes No Maintenance 
of cross-subsidy 





profitability of 9% 
over the expansion 
of fixed assets 
Large shortage Yes No Fixing of initial 
high prices 
Brazil Shortages In 
generation and 
distribution 
High Large shortage. 
Previous State 
investment 
Yes No Fixing of initial 
high prices 






Medium State guarantee to 
buy the service 
Large shortage Yes No Fixing of initial 
high tariff 
Subsidies for low 
Income sectors 
Chile Moderate generating 
reserves 
None None Minimum 
profitability 10% 
on expansion of 
fixed assets 
Large shortage No No Minimum 
profitability 10% 








M n o z o 






Table IV-2 continued 
COUNTRY ELECTRICITY SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
PRE-REFORM RESERVES INVESTMENT STATE PRICE INCENTIVES PRE-REFORM RESERVES INVESTMENT STATE PRICE INCENTIVES 
AND SUPPLY COMMITMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN AND OTHER FORMS OF AND SUPPLY COMMITMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN AND OTHER FORMS OF 
EXPANSION OF QUALITY INVESTMENT INCENTIVES EXPANSION OF QUALITY INVESTMENT INCENTIVES 
IMPROVEMENTS IMPROVEMENTS 
Mexico State monopoly Large shortage Yes No Fixing of initial 
high prices 
Peru Shortage in 
generation 




on expansion of 
fixed assets 
Large shortage Yes No Maintenance 
of cross-subsidy 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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Table IV-7 
INVESTMENT IN THE ELECTRICITY AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTORS, 1980-1997 
(Percentage  of  GDP) 
1980-1988 1989 1990-1995 1997 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
Argentina 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Bolivia n.a. 0.8 1.5 2.3 
Brazil 1.6 1.7 1.1 0.6 
Colombia 2.4 1.7 2.2 2.6 
Costa Rica 1.9 n.a. 1.8 2.6 
Chile 1.7 2.0 1.3 2.1 
Mexico n.a. 0.6 0.6 n.a. 
Peru 1.4 0.4 1.1 1.2 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
Argentina n.a. n.a. 0.7 n.a. 
Bolivia n.a. n.a. 0.7 2.3 
Brazil 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Colombia 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.4 
Costa Rica n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Chile 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.9 
Mexico n.a. 0.4 0.5 0.2 
Peru 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.8 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
progress in machinery, equipment and infrastructure also explain the lower 
levels of investment. In Chile, the State generator, Empresa Nacional de 
Electricidad S.A. (ENDESA), carried out large hydroelectric projects before 
privatization, but afterwards the private sector had to continue to raise 
investment to meet the demand created by rapid economic growth.30 
b. Investment, Expansion and Modernization Commitments 
The investment, expansion and modernization commitments taken on 
by the investors when they acquired controlling stakes in the companies were 
an important factor in spurring investment in the period after privatization. 
30 Since the privatization process was completed in Chile in 1989, the rate of investment has accelerated 
strongly, reaching double the average annual levels observed in the 1980s. Annual investment of 1.5% 
of GDP in the 1990s has allowed the electricity supply to expand at a sufficient rate to satisfy the 
growth in demand for electricity consumption at a rate of 7.5% of GDP. 
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Two types of instruments spurred investment, and they are related to the 
way in which the controlling stakes in the companies were made available in 
the 1990s. The first led to direct investment commitments, as was the case in 
Bolivia through the capitalization mechanism.31 The second type of instrument 
required the company to carry out projects within a period fixed at the time 
of the sale, as occurred in Peru. Table IV-8 shows the required investments, 
based on the most conservative assumptions of demand growth. 
Table IV-8 
INVESTMENT COMMITMENTS IN CAPITALIZED AND PRIVATIZED 
FIRMS IN PERU AND BOLIVIA IN ELECTRICITY AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
(millions  of  dollars) 
COUNTRY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
GENERATION DISTRIBUTION 
Bolivia 610 250 200 
Peru n.a. 244 25.6 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
In these and other countries, additional demands for expansion and 
improvements in the quality of services implicitly required large investments. 
Table IV-9 illustrates this in the case of telecommunications, in which 
investment commitments have helped to rapidly incorporate new 
technologies, provide new services and greatly increase access to basic 
telephone services. 
In telecommunications, the investment commitments were actually 
exceeded, and the sector grew dynamically in all countries (see table IV-10). 
This is largely explained by the opening up of the sector to international 
investors and their struggle for regional market share, as well as the existing 
levels of pent-up demand. 
31 In Bolivia's capitalization process, the State provided the State company, and the national or foreign 
investor contributed a level of capital equivalent to the market value of the State company, creating 
a company of double the value. The investor received 50% of the shares and took administrative 
control of the company, and the remainder of the shares were distributed to the citizens either directly 
or through the reformed pension fund system. 
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Table IV-9 
INVESTMENT IN EXPANSION AND MODERNIZATION COMMITMENTS 
IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
COUNTRY EXPANSION PROGRAMME 
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
AMOUNT YEARS FULFILMENT RATE 
Argentina Telefónica +Telecom 15 000 1991-1997 more than 100% 
Bolivia Entel 408 1996-1998 more than 100% 
Other 300 1996-1997 
Mexico Telmex 13 000 1990-1997 more than 100% 
Peru Telefónica del Perú 2009 1994-1997 more than 100% 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
Table IV-10 
INDICATORS OF SUPPLY, TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND 
PRODUCTIVITY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
1986 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
TELEPHONE DENSITY (NUMBER OF LINES IN SERVICE PER 1 0 0 INHABITANTS) 
Argentina 6.7 n.a. 9.5 9.7 11.0 12.1 14.1 15.9 n.a. 
chile 6.6 7.4 8.9 9.0 9.9 11.4 12.1 13.6 14.3 
Brazil 3.7 n.a. 5.7 6.0 6.4 6.8 7.3 7.4 n.a. 
Costa Rica 6.9 n.a. 9.3 9.9 10.3 11.3 13.0 16.3 n.a. 
Mexico 4.9 5.9 6.5 7.1 7.8 8.6 9.4 9.7 9.4 
Peru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.0 2.9 3.4 4.7 5.9 
United States 41.4 n.a. 54.5 55.3 56.4 57.7 60.2 62.6 n.a. 
DIGITALIZATION (PERCENTAGE) 
Argentina 0 0 0 12 32 54 72 85 96 
Chile 37 51 64 70.6 76 100 100 100 100 
Mexico 14 27 29 39 52 65 83 88 90 
Peru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 53 77 85 88 
Latin America 1.4 16.6 23.6 27.8 39.6 49.8 60.7 69 74.5 
United States 26 41 47 52.7 58.7 66 74.1 78.4 80.5 
LINES IN SERVICE PER EMPLOYEE 
Brazil 70 80 85 90 100 110 130 160 170 
Chile 65 70 84 125 152 177 208 235 291 
Argentina 70 59 62 70 90 110 150 170 296 
Mexico 95 100 110 120 130 150 160 170 160 
Peru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 98 155 281 
Uruguay 72 59 60 65 65 70 100 110 150 
Latin America 72 78 86 98 110 123 139 158 185 
united states 140 150 149 154 163 170 174 183 190 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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c. Pricing Incentives 
In the regulated markets of some countries, the pricing model ensured a 
minimum return on the cost of the fixed assets required to expand the system, 
which served to spur new investments. As indicated above, this occurred in 
Bolivia, Chile and Peru, although some companies still made a much higher 
return than the minimum stipulated level. In the telecommunications sector 
in several countries, the pricing model was set at the time of privatization 
based on a high initial price which was indexed to inflation. This guaranteed 
significant benefits for the private owners, but it has prevented consumers 
from benefiting from productivity gains. In many cases, cross-subsidies 
between services were maintained for some time, phasing out gradually. Some 
countries established mechanisms to finance subsidies to low income groups 
who cannot pay the prices charged by the privatized company.32 
The introduction of competition in these services forced countries to 
reform pricing legislation, incorporating new pricing models which will apply 
in the coming years. This process generates uncertainty in the private sector. 
d. Other Types of  Incentives 
Another way of providing incentives for private investment, specifically 
in the case of the electricity sector, has been for the State to guarantee energy 
purchases in generation, transmission or distribution projects. 
The lack of incentives to encourage expansion in electricity generation in 
Colombia led the State to guarantee payment for the purchase of energy in 
projects to the value of US$ 3 billion. These investments have increased the 
capacity of the thermoelectric component in electricity supply, improving 
generating capacity and easing problems caused by hydrological factors. 
In Mexico, private investment was geared towards projects to expand 
the electricity system managed by the State. Build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
contracts were drawn up in generation and transmission, as were contracts 
for the construction of complementary works, and independent production 
schemes were developed. From the outset, private sector participation in the 
electricity industry was seen as complementary. It has become increasingly 
important over the years, however, and in some activities it is now crucial. In 
1997-2000 private companies are expected to finance 48% of all investment 
destined to expand the Sistema Eléctrico National (National Electricity System). 
32 In the Colombian telecommunications sector, the Solidarity and Redistribution Fund was established 
to provide subsidies, which were partly financed by charging a higher prices to high income 
customers. 
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Brazil has lagged far behind in terms of investment levels, because of the 
fiscal constraints on investment by State-owned companies and a long period 
of transition during which uncertainty in the business environment was a 
disincentive for large-scale private investment. 
e. State Sponsored Investment 
In most countries the State participated strongly in investment in 
electricity, using its own resources to invest in providing electricity to the 
whole population. The State played an important role in sectoral investment 
not only in countries like Mexico (where the electricity system is still State-
run) and Brazil (which only opened up the sector to private investment in the 
late 1990) but also in other countries in which the private sector was 
participating. In Argentina, for example, the State continued to head up large 
investments in bi-national hydroelectric plants and the expansion of nuclear 
energy. The combined investment of the public and private sectors paved the 
way for an annual increase of 30% in installed generating capacity. The State 
also played an active role in distribution, carrying out electricity projects in 
areas with a lower population density. In Peru, of the total US$ 330 million of 
projected investment in generation over the next few years, 51% will be met 
by the State; the same will also occurs in transmission and distribution projects 
(table IV-11). 
2. Future  Prospects 
Reforms in the electricity and telecommunications sectors were designed 
to increase private sector investment. National and international investors 
reacted by channelling resources into those services and segments of the market 
that guaranteed the highest return. The outlook for these sectors depends on 
the following factors: 
a) The regulatory role of the State: Until now, the State has focused on 
creating incentives for the private sector and to a much lesser extent on 
defending consumer interests. While this has served to attract large 
conglomerates to infrastructure activities in the short term, competition 
will suffer in the medium term if a high degree of concentration prevails 
in these industries. Monopoly profits damage productive sectors as well 
as small consumers. Future development thus depends on strengthening 
the institutional framework (that is, regulation and supervising functions, 
and the legislation and rules that govern the markets). 
b) The convergence between private and social interests: Private companies 
only allocate their resources to profitable market segments. In no country 
are firms under any obligation to continue expanding the systems once 
the initial investment commitments have been carried out. This is not a 
Table IV-11 
INVESTMENT BEFORE AND AFTER PRIVATIZATIONS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
COUNTRY PUBLIC SECTOR 
(ANNUAL AVERAGE 
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
(ANNUAL AVERAGE IN 
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
TOTAL ELECTRICITY SECTOR 




(ANNUAL AVERAGE IN 
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
PROJECTIONS OF ANNUAL 
CAPACITY INCREASE 









Private sector: 714 





Bolivia 1996-1997: 84 1998-2002 
Generation: 41.5 
Distributional .5 
1998-2002: Over 7% 
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Investment in gas 
pipelines: 500 
1997-2005: 9.3 % 1989-1998: 7.5% 
1997-2000: 8.5% 
Mexico 1989-1997:1762 Contributes to financing: 
1989-1995: 514 
1997-2006: 25114 
Public sector: 52% 
Private financing: 48% 
1997-2006: 
Generation: 4.5 % 
Transmission: 2.5% 
Distribution: 1.9% 
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Generation: 



















Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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major problem in telecommunications, given that competition between 
operators at the global level and the speed of technological progress 
suggest that the sector will continue to grow for some time, but the story 
is different in the electricity sector. In the pre-reform period, the State 
carried out infrastructure development as a way of creating economies 
of scale and fostering growth. In the post-reform period investments are 
currently determined by profitability, together with low levels of risk and 
uncertainty. The State has to balance this against the demands of 
competitiveness and benefits for consumers. Indeed, given that the same 
international operators are present in different countries, a similar 
institutional framework should be established among them to keep the 
sector from falling behind in any country that chooses to implement 
change on its own. At the same time, the institutional framework should 
be strengthened to ensure greater competition. 
c) How the least attractive markets are handled: With a few exceptions, regulation 
has not determined either the targets or the means by which necessary 
investments can be carried out in markets that do not attract private 
interest. In the transitional period, the State has assumed this task, which 
raises the question of whether it should continue to do so in the future. 
Only in a few countries and certain market segments have incentives 
been developed to meet targets of providing broad-scale coverage. Private 
companies will not provide services in less profitable areas unless there 
is a scheme to establish both specific service targets and a clear, equitable 
mechanism for financing the necessary investments. 
C. R E F O R M OF R O A D I N F R A S T R U C T U R E 
As in the case of the electricity and telecommunications sectors, private 
participation in road infrastructure was stimulated by the public sector in an 
effort to overcome the sharp deficit in investment resulting from the State 
financial crisis of the 1980s. One consequence of this lack of investment was 
that the highways deteriorated. With very few exceptions in the region, recent 
investments represent restoration projects or a timid step toward the 
reconstruction of lost competitiveness. 
The implementation of large infrastructure projects under the new 
concession arrangements requires the joint participation of a number of actors 
-such as construction firms, financial institutions, institutional investors and 
governments- each if which has a different logic with regard to the profitability 
of the business. This type of undertaking was unknown in the region before 
the early 1990s. Consequently, more than a few problems arose in the course 
of the first efforts. For instance, many companies failed as a result of financial 
difficulties (this was the case in Mexico), and the construction firms lacked 
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experience with the demands of completing the projects on time, with the 
type of financing involved, and with operating and administering the 
concessions. 
The governments also faced unforeseen problems during the process, 
such as financial crises in the projects, the inability to fulfil the contracts, lack 
of supervision on the jobs, and lack of standards and rules. As a result, this 
process is still in transition, and any evaluation of the results to date will be 
far from conclusive. What can be analysed at the moment are the lessons 
learned from developments in the different countries, which have to do with 
the experience gained on the part of concessionaires, governments, financial 
institutions and users. 
1. Reforms  to the Institutional  and Legal Framework 
In order to spur private sector participation in road infrastructure, 
governments had to change or adapt the legislation and norms governing 
concessions, bidding, contracts and guarantees. Their efforts, which began in 
the early 1990s, were mainly directed at strengthening the legal basis which 
would give support and stability to the rules in the bidding and adjudication 
processes, as well as making sure the contracts were legally consistent. The 
degree of progress and achievements in consolidating the legal changes varied 
considerably among the different countries. 
Some countries -Argentina, Chile and Mexico- sought to implement a 
broader reform of the State through constitutional and legislative reforms of 
a more far-reaching nature, and it was in this context that the concessions in 
road infrastructure were developed. In other countries -for example, Brazil-
a legal framework was established which provided broad support for the 
privatization of State companies and concessions of public services. This 
occurred without thorough reforms to the State apparatus or to the regulatory 
framework. The changes undertaken in Colombia and Peru, in turn, focused 
much more on administrative reforms and the reorganization of the State 
apparatus itself (see table IV-12). 
2. The Establishment of  State  Guarantees 
Although there is no consensus on the benefits of offering State guarantees 
to spur private investment, half of the countries studied provided them. In 
these cases the underlying assumption is that the success of the concessions 
depends on risks being shared appropriately between the concessionaire and 
the State. The guarantees given to the concessionaires and their financial 
backers form part of this distribution of risks. 
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Table IV-12 
REFORM OF THE STATE: LAWS ON ROAD CONCESSIONS 
Argentina Reform of State law: Changed the law on concessions for public works and 
permitted tolls 
Decree 1,817/92: Increased length of concession to 13 years 
Brazil Federal Law 8,666/93:Regulated bidding and contracting by public entities 
Federal Law 8,987/95 (and its complement 9,074/95): Regulated 
concessions for public services and contracts with private concessionaires 
Federal Law 9,277/96: Delegated to the State and municipalities the ability 
to grant road concessions 
Chile Decree 164, 1991: Regulated granting of concessions on all public works 
Supreme decree 240, 1991: Regulated concession and defined bidding 
process and concession contracts as result of negotiations with private sector 
Colombia Decree 2,171/92: Made Ministry of Public Works into Ministry of Transport 
and created Invias 
Law 60/93: Redefined competition of various levels of government, leaving 
road network to Invias 
Law 80/93 (General statute on administrative contracting): Defined 
concession contracts and obligations involved in maintaining economic and 
financial equilibrium of the contract 
Law 105/93 (Transport law): Introduced ability to give guarantees to 
concessionaires 
Law 99/93 (Environmental law): Established environmental licences 
Law 188/95: Consolidated road decentralization 
Mexico Promoted road concessions within a scheme to involve private firms in i 
nfrastructure  investment 
Peru Decree Law 674/92: Confirmed intention to privatize State enterprises and 
attract foreign investment in road network 
Decree Law 758 (Private investment promotion law in infrastructure  and 
public services): Enabled government to negotiate concession contracts 
with national and foreign legal persons 
Supreme decree 189/92: Regulated concessions on services in all levels of 
government and the toll levels 
Decree Law 839/96: Adjusted concession mechanism 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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In Chile, Colombia and Peru, the public sector reduced the level of 
uncertainty facing private investors by guaranteeing profit levels, ensuring 
income based on minimum traffic levels or covering a certain percentage of 
the cost, or with other formulae. 
In Colombia the so-called second generation projects, that is, those 
corresponding to a second wave of concessions, incorporated government 
guarantees which did not figure in the first projects and which were necessary 
in order to attract interest from the private sector. The State committed to 
assuming the cost of land expropriations required to carry out the projects, 
covering the risks associated with terrorist attacks and with changes in 
environmental laws and collecting the tolls in areas where the communities 
were opposed to the projects. In the case of Chile, from the outset the concession 
law introduced legal mechanisms which were designed to limit the risks that 
the concessionaires would assume during the stages of construction and 
operation or might face as a result of disputes with the State and changes in 
the tax regime (Moguillansky, 1997a). Judging by the statements of foreign 
investors in the local press, Chile's concession system is considered to entail 
low risk. Investors base this conclusion on the following factors: (a) Chile's 
good country risk rating; (b) the existence of a regulated system that clearly 
defines the rules of the game for participants; and (c) State guarantees for 
traffic flows, which make the Chilean system predictable and profitable over 
time, avoiding speculation over future benefits (see table IV-13). 
Table IV-13 
STATE GUARANTEES FOR ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS 
Argentina Concessions have no guarantee of minimum traffic  flow or State guarantees 
Brazil Concessions have no guarantee of minimum traffic  flow or State guarantees 
Chile Guarantee of minimum income (up to 70%), depending on level of risk involved 
in project 
Colombia Ability to grant guarantee to private concessionaires from national budget 
Possibility of delegating process of property acquisition 
Time limit on guarantee of minimum income through concept of expected income: 
once the expected income is reached, the concession reverts to the State 
Mexico Concessions have no guarantee of minimum traffic  flow or State guarantees 
Peru Levels of monthly income are guaranteed by contract with the government 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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D. T H E E V O L U T I O N OF I N V E S T M E N T S A N D 
PRIVATE S E C T O R PARTICIPATION 
In the second half of the 1990s, large investments in road infrastructure 
took place in Chile, Mexico and Peru. Investments were more moderate in 
Argentina and Colombia, whereas in Brazil they remained below the levels 
seen in the previous two decades (table IV-14). 
Private participation accounts for part of this dynamism, especially in 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. In Argentina private concessionaires 
invested an annual average of US$ 217 million in road construction between 
1991 and 1997, equivalent to about 40% of total investments in the sector. In 
Chile investments reached an annual average of US$ 256 million between 
1995 and 1997, when private investment began to materialize. Mexico is a 
special case because of the amount of resources spent (around US$ 2 billion a 
year between 1991 and 1994, which is practically double the amount invested 
by the public sector) and because of the scale of failure. In Colombia, the private 
sector invested a total of US$ 360 million between 1994 and 1997, which in 
1997 represented about 42% of all the resources invested in road infrastructure. 
Table IV-14 
INVESTMENT IN ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE, 1971-1996 
(Index  numbers  based  on constant  prices;  period  1986-1990 = 100) 
ARGENTINA BRAZIL A / CHILE COLOMBIA MEXICO PERU 
1971/1975 177 144 n.a. n.a. 133 265 
1976/1980 220 155 n.a. n.a. 127 257 
1981/1985 114 79 107 n.a. 155 399 
1986/1990 100 100 100 100b/ 100 100e/ 
1991/1993 74 78 160 86c/ 371 189f/ 
1994/1996 117 95 328 129d/ 334 453 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 




e/ Includes 1991. 
f/ Excludes 1991. 
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In Argentina, Chile and Mexico, private capital accounted for between 
20% and 70% of total investment (see table IV-15), whereas the share in Brazil 
and Peru remains very low. These two countries have only recently initiated 
the process, with the aim of maintaining and modernizing the roads with the 
highest level of traffic density. 
Table IV-15 
SHARE OF PRIVATE CAPITAL IN ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT, 1991-1997 
(percent) 
ARGENTINA CHILE MEXICO 
1991-1993 46.4 0.0 69.8 
1994 55.0 0.0 58.6 
1995 35.5 7.6 27.2 
1996 29.2 22.3 12.1 
1997 n.a. 40.9 n.a. 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
1. The Response of  the Concessionaires 
The consortiums were generally led by domestic construction companies 
that were accustomed to carrying out public works projects. For these 
companies, the concessions represented an opportunity to use their spare 
capacity and receive income for construction, repair and improvement services 
they provided directly to the concessionaire. They were thus able to avoid the 
delays and uncertainties that they encountered with government payments. 
In some countries, foreign consortiums were encouraged to participate so as 
to increase the levels of experience and competition in the bidding process, 
which the country lacked. 
The concessionaires transformed -to varying degrees- the approach of 
public works construction companies by adopting the role of service providers. 
The notion of risk was also introduced in investments in roads, as was the 
need to negotiate with the authorities to obtain some level of guarantee against 
market uncertainties. 
The financial backers of the concessionaires had the opportunity to place 
their resources at relatively high rates of return, initially in the short term (the 
construction stage) and afterwards in the long term (during the term of the 
concession). This was justified by the uncertainty of this new line of business. 
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2. The Response of  the Government 
Road concessions provided a series of benefits for governments which 
allowed them to allocate available resources to other types of expenditure 
and to carry out infrastructure works which would otherwise have been 
postponed. Indeed, governments avoided the costs of maintaining and 
improving the stretch of roads that were operated in concession. Because of 
their volume of traffic, these roads had suffered the most damage. This helped 
to recover the value of the national patrimony and to gain additional benefits 
over the concession period. However, the entire portfolio of projects that can 
be put to concession (i.e., with sufficient traffic to make the business profitable) 
is relatively small in relation to the countries' total road infrastructure 
requirements. This means that the State will have to maintain and repair the 
existing network, leading it to the search for new formulae and alternative 
sources of sustainable finance in the long term. 
3. Financing the Concessions 
The programme of public infrastructure concessions posed a challenge 
for the construction industry, as well as for the domestic financial system, 
which until then had not dealt with this type of business. Three types of 
domestic financial institutions can participate in this process: (a) private 
investment companies; (b) domestic and foreign banks; and (c) institutional 
investors (pension funds, insurance companies and investment funds). 
Several private investment companies joined construction companies to 
form consortiums, which participated in the bidding for infrastructure projects. 
An analysis of the process in Chile shows that at the beginning, they contributed 
only a small share of their own resources for the financing, which made it difficult 
for the commercial banks to approve the projects. In the concessions carried out 
after 1997, the consortiums substantially raised their financing levels by 
contributing more of their own resources, which also helped to incorporate 
foreign banks in the construction phase of the project. In Colombia and Brazil 
foreign banks also provided capital for the operations phase of the concession. 
The other main source of financing was the domestic banking system. For 
banks to participate, legislative guarantees and a greater contribution of the 
concessionaires' own resources were required. In some countries domestic banks 
have thus far only given short-term loans with relatively high costs in terms of 
interest rates and commissions. These loans have to be refinanced by the 
consortium once the construction phase is finished; otherwise their financial 




TYPES OF CONCESSION FINANCING IN ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCING 
Argentina No consolidated road financing scheme to date 
Few important concession projects without State support 
Private financing from Argentine banks 
Brazil Long-term financing for concessionaires provided exclusively by the National 
Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) 
Bridge loans from foreign banks, awaiting long-term foreign financing 
Chile For construction: Chilean and foreign commercial banks 
For long-term refinancing: insurance companies, national investment funds 
and AFPs (these have yet to materialize) 
Colombia Financing for construction from Colombian financial entities and, for some 
projects, from foreign bank affiliates 
Mexico Resources from governmental units (such as Capufe, Pemex and state 
governments), up to 30% 
Project costs and right of way charged to national budget 
Private financing from Mexican and foreign banks 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
The institutions which theoretically should participate in the long-term 
financing of concession projects -but which so far have failed to do so- are 
the private pension funds. In countries in which pension funds have been 
established, their participation could take a number of forms: 
a) acquiring quotas issued by other investment funds, which in turn acquire 
bonds or shares in the concessionaire; 
b) acquiring bonds or other instruments issued directly by the concessionaire 
and placed through a public offering (these bonds could correspond to 
the construction phase or to the operating period of the concession); and 
c) acquiring a stake in the concessionaire once the period of concession has 
begun. 
In Chile, the ministers of Public Works and of Finance have made great 
efforts to get institutional investors to participate in financing infrastructure 
projects. Apparently, this participation will be secured through infrastructure 
bond issues, the design of which took into account the form and transferability 
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of the instruments, interest rates and flexibility, interest payments and 
amortization, and the terms of guarantees. Other factors considered include 
clauses addressing rescue, representation and payment currency; the 
declaration and security of the issuer; its obligations, limitations and 
restrictions; and its risk rating. The bonds would cover the construction and 
operation phases of the concession, and the instrument would carry a sovereign 
guarantee on 100% of the value of the debt. 
4. Future  Prospects 
Private concessions will never fully substitute for public investment in 
roads. The stretches of road that are profitable for the private sector constitute 
a small fraction of the whole road network, although they involve a large 
amount of resources that will be invested in the coming years. Nevertheless, 
governments must address and overcome several problems to ensure the 
success of the process. 
a) As of 1998, no country had established institutions or mechanisms to 
regulate the concessions. The lack of regulation has had several negative 
effects, such as shortcomings in technical information and engineering 
projects; the possibility of changes in the route and the recurrent 
imposition of additional works; inadequate or superficial cost estimations, 
which have an unfavourable bearing on the price of the tolls and 
consequently on the competitiveness of the system. 
b) The authorities have lacked technical capacity in the auction and bidding 
processes, and the interests of consumers have been sidelined. 
c) The concession programmes have often been characterized by 
contradictions between the objective of maximizing the fiscal revenue 
from the award of the concession and that of maximizing investment 
commitments in the auctions and bidding processes. When the 
government's main concern was to secure a windfall, the investment 
commitments were relaxed. 
d) The resistance of local communities to paying tolls and, in some cases, 
land improvement taxes hinder the concession process. Problems between 
users and service providers are exacerbated when there is a lack of 
regulatory mechanisms or recourse to dispute arbitration. 
e) Tolls have frequently been set too high, which has in some cases offset 
the reduction in operational costs -stemming from higher security, less 
damage to vehicles and the faster journey time- obtained by the repair 
and improvement of the stretches of road awarded in concession. 
CHAPTER V 
S Y N T H E S I S A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 
This book has presented an analysis of capital accumulation in Latin 
America over the last decade. Although it only studied eight countries, together 
they account for 80% of the population and almost 90% of regional output. 
The analytical focus considered macroeconomic, sectoral and microeconomic 
factors, together with their effects on capital formation. This methodology 
enabled us to assess the impact of structural transformation, institutional 
change, market structure and firms' strategies with regard to investment 
decisions. Sectoral analysis made it possible to identify resource allocation 
after the reforms and the strengths and weaknesses generated as a result. 
A. T H E P O S T - R E F O R M T R A N S I T I O N STAGE A N D ITS 
E F F E C T S O N I N V E S T O R B E H A V I O U R 
As discussed above, the countries are still experiencing a transition stage 
in which the economic reforms have led to a series of reactions in the area of 
investment decisions, which affect both the short and medium term but which 
will not necessarily continue in the long term. These reactions are related to 
the existence of two types of investment determinants: permanent and 
transitory. The latter had a very strong influence on investment in the 1990s. 
Permanent factors are those which have always determined investment 
in market economies. They include fluctuations in demand, the 
macroeconomic environment, relative prices, technological progress and the 
market positioning strategies of firms. Transitory factors are those which are 
only important in the short and medium term following the implementation 
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of the reforms. They have worked alongside permanent factors throughout 
the transition stage. Chile is the only country that managed to conclude the 
major part of the transition stage in the 1990s, achieving a reasonably 
consolidated model. 
All the countries experienced two phases in the transition process, 
characterized by different performance, as described in detail in the first 
chapter. During the first phase most countries experienced a negative 
macroeconomic environment for investment, and the transitory reactions of 
firms tended to depress investment levels even further. Key among the 
reactions were the extreme caution demonstrated by firms and their efforts to 
rationalize productive processes. During the second phase the opposite 
occurred: investment was boosted by improved macroeconomic conditions, 
and the transitory reactions of firms now tended to increase investment. There 
was a strong and generalized push to modernize machinery (in contrast to 
the "disembodied" technological progress that characterized the 
rationalization phase), which aimed to reduce costs and improve quality 
(rather than expand capacity). 
Transitory reactions also occurred within sectors. In the second transitory 
phase, all cases saw a short wave of investment based on one-time 
opportunities, which ended automatically as soon as the opportunities were 
exhausted. Important examples include the strategic repositioning of 
transnational firms in Latin America, as a result of their liquidity and ability 
to change their market position in the wake of institutional reform; large 
investments by privatized firms, which were conditions of the contracts 
negotiated during the bidding process and which took the form of investment 
commitments, expansion and modernization; and the particularly high levels 
of investment in telecommunications that began once the private sector became 
involved. These and other elements discussed in the sectoral chapters of the 
book generated far higher investment levels than in "normal" times. 
Indeed, during the second phase of post-reform investment, some 
countries managed to raise average investment levels above those recorded 
prior to the crisis in the 1980s. In the two largest countries (Brazil and Mexico), 
however, investment remained below that registered in the 1970s and 1960s. 
Chile is the only country where the reforms reached a degree of maturity in 
the 1990s: the transitory factors were coming to an end and thus had a much 
weaker influence on investment. In the first half of the 1980s a massive private 
investment drive took off in Chile, fostered by State policies to manage the 
macroeconomy efficiently and to guarantee high profitability and low levels 
of uncertainty. By the late 1990s, this investment growth was tailing off owing 
to the falling returns to natural resource investment and the fall-out from the 
Asian crisis (Moguillansky, 1999). 
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B. A N O V E R A L L C O N C L U S I O N : A N U N C E R T A I N 
F U T U R E F O R A G G R E G A T E I N V E S T M E N T 
Firms are now confronted by two new situations: macroeconomic 
instability owing to the volatility of foreign capital flows, and the consolidation 
of the new institutional framework brought about by the reforms. These 
generate a new set of microeconomic incentives, but there is no guarantee 
that they will resolve the equation of profitability and risk in a way that will 
increase investment in capacity expansion beyond what the previous economic 
model achieved. 
Once the transition phase is complete and the incentives stemming from 
deregulation and market opening are no longer so strong, the region will be 
confronted by an unstable picture: 
a) High levels of  vulnerability: This is a consequence of financial globalization, 
the lack of a global and regional architecture to protect economies from 
the volatility of international capital flows and the fragility of the region's 
financial systems. These factors do not provide a positive macroeconomic 
environment for investment in capacity expansion, given that this type 
of investment involves considerable sunk costs. 
b) Lower profits  and higher risks: These stem from changes in the behaviour of 
domestic firms in tradable goods sectors. Before the onset of 
macroeconomic instability caused by the debt crisis in the 1980s, 
investment in tradable goods was very profitable -although this 
profitability was often rather skewed owing to high protection levels-
thanks to a microeconomic environment of low risk and uncertainty, and 
a cost of capital which in many countries was negative. The economic 
reforms, in contrast, created a microeconomic environment characterized 
by an open, unprotected market with higher risks and greater 
uncertainties. For this reason national firms have concentrated investment 
in highly profitable sectors, unwilling to take the risk of developing 
projects that require innovation, research and development, that have a 
long lead time, that are exposed to low profit margins or that reap benefits 
only in the long term. 
c) Lower public investment in infrastructure:  Before the crisis in the public sector, 
governments invested in public utilities with a view to creating positive 
externalities but generally without considering whether the projects 
would be profitable, risky or uncertain. Privatization of these sectors 
brought about demands for higher profits, the incorporation of risk into 
pricing decisions, and an aversion to macro- and microeconomic 
uncertainty. If the State does not compensate for these risks, particularly 
in energy sectors (electricity and hydrocarbons), road infrastructure, water 
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and sanitation, there is no reason to expect that investment should be 
any higher than in the past. 
d) New firms  and business strategies: Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flooded out of the region, but the 1990s witnessed 
an increase in FDI, particularly as a result of mergers and acquisitions of 
local firms by transnational corporations. Macroeconomic stability, market 
liberalization and deregulation in Latin America attracted capital inflows. 
The question is whether this will bring about a new investment cycle, 
with capital going to new sectors and businesses. To date there have been 
no clear signs about whether this will occur, which makes it difficult to 
forecast future investment. While this seems to be the most positive way 
to increase investment, it will also increase competition for national firms. 
In sum, the new environment created by the reforms combines 
macroeconomic uncertainty, stemming from the globalization of financial 
markets, with microeconomic uncertainties, related to the behaviour of firms 
in light of the new rules of the game prevailing in the market. These two 
types of uncertainty reinforce each other, affecting the "entrepreneurial spirit" 
and propensity to invest. 
C. S E C T O R A L B E H A V I O U R A N D W E A K N E S S E S 
Thus far, post-reform investment performance has not been sufficient to 
provide high and sustained levels of growth, and many countries experienced 
extremely volatile growth rates in the 1990s. Furthermore, at the sectoral level, 
investment was not just low, but its composition actually reduced countries' 
capacity for successful insertion into the world economy in the future. Few 
countries saw investment grow in tradables sectors. What little investment 
did occur in tradables flowed into primary export sectors, which suffer from 
high levels of price volatility and consequent economic vulnerability. Low 
investment in manufacturing explains the loss of the sector's importance in 
total GDP and the deterioration of the sector's trade balance, with the sole 
exception of Mexico. 
These results merit comment. First, as shown above, the period analysed 
represents a transition stage in which the economy slowly adapts to a new 
investment regime. Second, in the 1990s investment performance was affected 
by macroeconomic fluctuations. The instability in the wake of the 1994 Mexican 
crisis, the Asian crisis and the Russian financial crisis, as well as the 
macroeconomic response to these external shocks, changed the way in which 
resources were allocated. This was particularly evident in countries where 
the reforms had sought to serve two rather contradictory objectives, in which 
liberalization was used both to stabilize prices and to change resource 
allocation. 
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In this light, the conclusions of this study point to the need for a revision 
of the reforms. We are not advocating a deepening of liberalization as extreme 
liberals espouse, nor a return to closed, State-run economies as the severest 
critics of the reforms would have. Rather, any revision of the reforms should 
seek to strengthen the complementary roles of the State and the private sector 
to foster investment growth and more efficient resource allocation over the 
long term. 
1. Industrial  Sector 
Except in Chile, industrial investment was for the most part defensive. 
The coefficient of sectoral investment was lower in the 1990s than the average 
rates during the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, the allocation of investment 
was heterogeneous -with strong investment growth concentrated in branches 
that produced industrial commodities based on natural resources- which 
added to the growing disarticulation and disintegration of production chains. 
Concentration in natural resource-based manufacturing essentially 
removed the region from the high growth, high technology sectors that 
dominate international trade. The only exceptions were areas that benefited 
from specific sectoral policy, such as the automotive industries in Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico and electronic assembly plants in Brazil and Mexico. 
At the same time, there was an increasing disarticulation, or even 
disintegration, of production chains, since the fast-growing sectors did not 
transmit their dynamism to other parts of the economy. The result was 
increased the reliance on imported inputs and the strengthening of assembly 
operations. Thus, a key weakness of the post-reform model was its inability 
to increase demand for productive, high-skilled employment or to support 
sectors that would increase local technological capacity. The resulting need to 
import factor inputs led to a deterioration in the balance of payments. 
a. The Manufacturing  Trade  Balance Followed a Negative Trend 
As the post-reform period progressed, the trade balance deteriorated 
sharply in the sectors in which investment grew fastest, and also in the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. The deficit reached and in some cases 
surpassed that of the pre-reform period. This happened both in the most 
industrialized countries (Argentina, Brazil and Colombia) and in Chile and 
Peru. The rising trade deficit is significant because it demonstrates that even 
in countries with a growing proportion of new investment in export activities, 
the productive structure -particularly for assembly plants- requires higher 
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import levels. The external balance tends to be achieved at times of recession 
or macroeconomic adjustment, rather than, as was expected, at times of growth. 
Manufacturing export growth was evident in Chile through the mid-1990s 
and in Mexico, particularly after the tequila crisis. Chile continues to maintain 
an export orientation, and a high degree of diversity in its markets, while the 
Mexican manufacturing sector is dominated by assembly plants that sell the 
majority of their output to the United States. Argentina occupies an 
intermediate position; its exports are largely sold in Mercosur. Manufacturing 
in Brazil and Colombia, however, continues to be focused largely on serving 
the domestic market. 
Although export growth was strongly linked with investment in some 
countries, branches that received relatively low investment levels also began 
to export. Nonetheless, the strong capital inflows and the resulting appreciation 
of local currencies made it impossible for exporters to maintain profits at a 
level that would enable an expansion of productive capacity. The result was a 
reduction in investment. 
b. The Bulk of  Investment Was  Concentrated in Transnational  Corporations and 
National Conglomerates 
Transnational corporations have been keen to acquire firms with a high 
local and international market profile. This is evident not only in industry but 
also in other productive and public services sectors, which underwent 
privatization. Large firms in general benefited from the opening of trade and 
financial and capital markets, as well as from privatization. They implemented 
projects that were designed to modernize production and raise 
competitiveness, and they expanded productive capacity so that they could 
gain competitive advantage in fast-growing sectors. In the late 1990s, however, 
transnational companies began to buy up the highest profile firms from local 
groups. 
c. Small and Medium-sized Firms Were  the Weakest  Players in the 
Investment Process 
The available data on these firms in some countries indicate -particularly 
in the case of small firms- that they had only a marginal share in capital 
formation, which made them extremely vulnerable. Although growth and 
indirect demand from other fast-growing sectors enabled them to begin 
modernization, their development was constrained by a number of factors: 
- The inability to compete with imported products, which appeared in all 
branches of manufacturing; 
- The abolition of preferential loan rates and consequent reliance on the 
domestic financial system (which had prohibitively high rates), together 
with the firms' strong sensitivity to cyclical monetary adjustment; and 
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- The end of technological development policies and technical assistance, 
although some countries maintained some of these support mechanisms. 
2. Mining  and Hydrocarbon  Sectors 
Institutional change in the mining and hydrocarbon sector expanded in 
the 1990s, to the extent that some countries actually privatized their deposits 
completely. Nonetheless, the economic power of these firms and the strategic 
nature of the product -particularly oil, on which the global competitiveness 
of the economy depends- have forced the countries to carry out privatization 
very carefully, in some cases establishing strategic partnerships with 
transnational capital instead of privatizing. 
a. The Primary Objective of  the Sectoral Reforms  Was  to Encourage Investment 
by Domestic and Foreign Private Firms 
Institutional change deregulated the treatment of foreign investment and 
modified the administrative regimes governing mining concessions and oil 
legislation. It simplified the tax regime for mining and hydrocarbons, and it 
strengthened the property rights of large firms in these sectors. By doing this, 
governments aimed to attract new actors to the sector and to compensate for 
the fall in public investment caused by fiscal constraints. 
b. Firm Strategies Fostered Investment Growth 
Both State firms and transnational corporations experienced investment 
growth. Aiming to increase their share of the world market, State firms 
implemented groundbreaking policies: they formed strategic partnerships 
with transnational firms, internationalized production and invested heavily. 
Brazil and Mexico, however, did not form such partnerships. In the case of 
Brazil, the transformation process began only recently, and in the case of 
Mexico, the constitution bans the involvement of the private sector, even 
through strategic partnerships. 
Chile benefited most from the increase in exploration and exploitation of 
mineral deposits in the 1990s. Its pioneering sectoral reforms attracted 
transnational mining companies just at a point when the global economy 
entered an upswing. This cycle began in the second half of the 1980s and was 
aided by the sharp increase in international prices, particularly of gold and 
copper, and by technological progress that enabled the industry to cut costs 
considerably. Mining investment in the 1990s accounted for four percentage 
points of the increase in investment as a share of GDP. The lack of a mining 
policy, however, prevented the sector's growth from having positive 
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externalities on related sectors, such as machinery and equipment manufacturers 
and engineering, research and development activities into the diversification 
of copper usage. It also prevented the production of higher value added 
derivatives and the development of links to the domestic capital market. 
As a share of GDP, mining investment grew fastest in Chile, followed by 
Peru and Argentina, while Brazil experienced zero growth. There are three 
principal reasons for this: institutional changes, which opened up new 
opportunities for investment in the first two countries; developments in the 
international market, which was positive for high-value minerals; and strong 
international liquidity, which enabled firms to tap large investment flows. 
Given that quite a long time elapses between the discovery of reserves 
and exploitation, investment in Peru and Argentina was constrained by the 
sharp fall in mineral prices and illiquidity that followed the Asian and Russian 
crises. The Brazilian mining industry developed rather differently than that 
in other countries, principally because sectoral reform is quite recent and the 
main State firm, which was privatized in 1997, prioritized productivity 
increases over expanded production. The low level of investment relative to 
exploitation potential is also explained by the oversupply of Brazilian minerals 
in world markets, the lack of exploration and information on the country's 
reserves, and the high infrastructure costs in the Amazon region. 
In the hydrocarbon sector, the participation of foreign investment either 
in stand-alone projects or in partnership with State firms heralds renewed 
growth. Foreign investment in the hydrocarbon industry has been incorporated 
into the different links of the production chain. On the one hand, changes in 
contracts encouraged exploration. On the other, a network of oil and gas 
pipelines developed as a result of private capital and government efforts to 
foster regional energy integration. In addition, partnerships between State 
firms and transnational corporations led to new exploitation projects both at 
home and abroad. 
When discussing incentives for foreign investment, it is important to 
consider the other side of the coin, that is, the loss of income to the State and 
society as a whole, which stems from reductions in income tax and royalties. 
At the same time, the lack of incentives to encourage linkages between the 
extractive sectors and related manufacturing and services sectors has 
prevented the spread of technology and sharing of growth which these 
investments could generate. 
3. Infrastructure  Sectors 
Post-reform investment in infrastructure grew strongly in the 1990s 
relative to the 1980s -apart from in Brazil and Peru- and its share of GDP also 
increased. 
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a. The Telecommunications Sector Has Undoubtedly Been the Leader in this Process 
Although most countries granted periods of monopoly rights to private 
firms, placing barriers to entry in these markets, five basic factors stimulated 
investment in the sector. 
- The fight among the main transnational operators for market share at the 
global level was a major factor behind the investment effort of private 
monopolies in the region. 
- The rapid technological development of the sector forced private 
monopolies to remain on the forefront of new technology in services, 
equipment and products so as not to lose their market share once the 
sector was liberalized. 
- Pricing legislation provided high profits negotiated between the 
government and firms at the time of privatization. 
- Large pent-up demand and technical deficiencies provided a tremendous 
opportunity in these markets for most large operators. 
- The goals of expansion and high-quality service imposed during the 
privatization negotiations required large investments. 
The main constraints on the future development of the 
telecommunications sector are the institutional weakness of regulators and 
poor competition policies. These failings slow pricing negotiations and the 
possibility of transferring some of the monopoly rents and productivity gains 
to consumers. In some countries, these weaknesses were highlighted when 
the opening of some market segments to competition was delayed, despite 
the fact that it was economically and technically feasible. In other countries, 
such as Chile in 1995, these failings led to a lack of legal instruments to block 
mergers and strategic partnerships between large firms, which undermined 
fair competition. The larger countries have expressed concern that the 
opportunity to develop domestic production would be lost; this is particularly 
the case in Brazil, which has the capacity to produce software and equipment. 
b. Investment Growth is Least Widespread  in the Electricity Sector 
An objective assessment of investment performance in the electricity sector 
must take into account a number of key elements in order to avoid reaching 
erroneous conclusions about the process. These are as follows: (i) the situation 
prevailing in the sector before privatization and the requirements of the system's 
expansion; (ii) State participation in the sector, which varied among the countries; 
(iii) pricing legislation; and (iv) incentives for new firms to satisfy growing 
demand. Bearing these elements in mind, we conclude the following: 
- The electricity sector experienced much less dynamic growth than did 
telecommunications, in both technological development and 
investment. 
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- To date, it is only in Chile and Argentina that the private sector has worked 
to foster capital accumulation in the sector, but the quality of service has 
deteriorated. 
- Among the other countries, private investment grew thanks to specific 
sectoral policy instruments, such as purchase guarantees in Colombia 
and Mexico and capitalization or investment commitments in Bolivia and 
Peru. In Brazil, where privatization is still underway, the volume of both 
private and public investment has been quite low. 
- It is not certain that future private participation will meet the requirements 
to increase coverage. This is an important issue for governments and 
regulatory bodies. The future of the sector will depend on the 
strengthening of regulation, the creation of incentives and State action in 
areas in which providing service is not profitable for the private sector. 
As in the case of telecommunications, weak institutions and regulations 
impede adequate electricity coverage and quality. The extreme case is Chile: a 
decade after the entire system was privatized, frequent power cuts in recent 
years demonstrated that while the post-reform rules of the game might have 
stimulated investment, but they did not ensure the quality or efficiency expected. 
c. In the 1990s the Private Sector Became Involved in the Financing and 
Management of  Road Infrastructure 
Road infrastructure concessions provided several benefits for 
governments, most importantly by freeing up resources for other types of 
spending. The private sector, for its part, benefited from the creation of a new 
business, which was complemented by financial, construction and 
management activities. Although private sector involvement means that the 
State does not have to bear the costs of maintaining and expanding heavily 
used roads, it is important to remember that the portfolio of projects for which 
concessions are possible is very small relative to the countries' total road 
infrastructure requirements. 
Infrastructure concessions brought with them a new challenge not only 
for the construction industry, which had to incorporate new standards and 
modernize works, machinery and equipment, but also for the domestic 
financial system, which in the future will have to provide long-term 
instruments for refinancing during the operating stage of the projects. 
As in the other infrastructure sectors that have been opened up to the private 
sector, one of the challenges to the efficient functioning of the concession 
programmes in the future is the creation of regulatory bodies and mechanisms. 
To date the lack of regulation has caused a number of problems in the sector, 
including poor quality technical information and engineering projects, and 
inadequate and superficial cost estimates. These problems have a negative effect 
on tolls and, consequently, on the competitiveness of the system. 
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TOTAL GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT, 1950-1998 
(percentage  of  GDP in constant  1980 prices) 
YEAR ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA MEXICO PERU 
1950 15.47 9.07 18.77 19.05 16.01 16.05 14.83 18.31 
1951 18.31 12.24 21.65 20.76 15.41 15.51 17.49 19.82 
1952 17.17 12.47 21.59 20.59 15.62 18.16 17.61 20.89 
1953 16.11 7.75 17.67 19.76 19.92 18.10 16.10 23.07 
1954 14.85 10.16 17.30 19.06 21.69 18.98 15.85 20.22 
1955 16.10 15.85 15.46 22.09 22.07 17.77 16.57 21.98 
1956 16.67 15.60 16.14 20.92 20.12 17.20 18.26 25.96 
1957 17.37 14.81 16.92 21.67 14.76 15.27 18.40 27.07 
1958 17.84 11.42 16.65 20.77 13.70 15.91 16.55 24.07 
1959 15.10 11.86 17.87 17.99 13.72 15.88 16.08 18.87 
1960 21.15 13.26 16.96 21.87 15.50 14.47 17.20 17.83 
1961 23.03 10.85 16.13 21.14 16.01 14.95 16.52 20.69 
1962 21.36 16.30 15.90 22.66 15.24 16.68 16.64 21.97 
1963 18.59 15.93 15.24 24.46 13.58 16.33 17.18 19.94 
1964 18.75 15.62 15.02 22.56 14.39 15.05 18.51 18.38 
1965 17.99 16.09 14.24 21.03 13.12 16.98 18.66 20.56 
1966 18.51 13.38 16.47 19.53 14.19 16.07 19.00 21.27 
1967 18.98 14.33 16.00 19.32 14.82 16.59 20.33 18.83 
1968 20.52 19.60 17.50 20.41 15.92 15.45 20.61 16.18 
1969 22.74 15.83 19.27 20.67 16.42 16.12 20.81 16.32 
1970 22.77 15.19 20.57 21.57 17.34 18.39 21.08 16.81 
1971 23.79 15.92 21.31 19.33 17.16 19.96 19.89 18.20 
1972 23.62 16.59 22.22 15.64 15.62 19.40 20.57 18.39 
1973 21.18 15.34 23.58 14.99 15.91 19.53 21.78 23.78 
1974 20.96 16.19 24.70 16.44 16.35 20.31 22.14 27.54 
1975 21.19 18.11 25.77 14.89 15.37 19.65 22.91 27.58 
1976 23.46 18.05 25.02 12.32 16.07 23.03 22.08 23.34 
1977 26.74 18.30 23.56 13.59 15.54 23.78 19.91 21.36 
1978 24.16 19.91 23.51 14.78 15.66 24.19 21.18 19.43 
1979 24.17 18.49 22.88 15.84 15.43 26.58 23.33 20.18 
1980 25.05 14.25 23.56 18.64 16.77 23.90 24.76 23.49 
1981 22.57 13.77 21.62 20.70 17.43 18.36 26.46 26.10 
1982 18.69 10.24 19.98 14.16 17.78 14.30 22.15 25.50 
1983 18.01 9.14 17.22 12.25 17.71 15.05 16.58 20.46 
1984 17.20 10.18 16.31 14.54 17.35 17.57 17.03 18.36 
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Table A- continued 
YEAR ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA MEXICO PERU 
1985 15.84 12.37 16.44 15.79 15.95 18.38 17.91 15.93 
1986 16.48 13.37 18.76 15.31 16.22 19.51 16.41 17.28 
1987 18.39 13.66 17.87 17.48 15.52 20.53 16.09 18.90 
1988 17.47 13.60 17.00 18.60 16.53 19.13 16.81 17.80 
1989 14.73 12.84 16.67 21.87 15.15 20.89 17.06 16.19 
1990 12.66 13.94 15.53 21.62 14.04 23.10 18.37 17.46 
1991 15.07 15.77 14.65 19.99 12.92 19.69 19.57 17.36 
1992 18.24 17.39 13.81 22.08 13.96 22.25 20.93 18.17 
1993 19.92 17.11 14.09 24.34 18.02 25.69 20.01 19.21 
1994 22.35 15.04 15.41 24.45 20.71 22.59 20.77 22.30 
1995 19.61 16.35 16.28 27.30 20.29 21.58 15.71 24.73 
1996 20.48 17.50 16.36 27.87 18.26 20.33 17.38 23.14 
1997 23.90 21.91 17.41 29.47 17.94 22.98 19.70 25.43 
1998 24.45 26.46 16.94 28.90 15.44 26.77 20.80 25.23 
Source: André Hofman, "La inversión en América Latina: base de datos, 1950-1998", Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), unpublished. 
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Table A-2 
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT IN MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT, 1950-1998 
(percentage  of  GDP in constant  1980 prices) 
YEAR ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA MEXICO PERU 
1950 2.56 4.3 9.18 6.22 6.34 4.10 2.67 7.32 
1951 3.80 5.9 12.32 7.13 6.78 3.97 3.28 8.26 
1952 3.49 6.0 11.23 7.01 6.85 4.64 3.08 8.50 
1953 3.14 3.7 6.34 5.97 9.82 4.63 3.15 8.24 
1954 2.86 4.9 7.57 5.25 10.08 4.86 2.91 6.53 
1955 3.60 7.6 6.00 6.59 10.21 4.55 3.12 6.51 
1956 3.93 7.5 6.22 7.65 8.85 4.38 3.35 9.47 
1957 4.08 7.1 7.07 9.22 4.84 3.96 3.44 10.30 
1958 3.94 6.0 6.64 9.00 4.54 3.99 3.01 8.56 
1959 3.39 6.0 7.61 6.32 4.21 4.13 3.01 7.67 
1960 5.96 6.6 6.65 7.46 6.15 3.87 3.08 7.30 
1961 6.97 5.6 6.26 8.64 6.25 2.69 6.59 8.67 
1962 6.52 9.5 6.21 7.82 5.63 3.75 6.64 9.88 
1963 5.33 8.9 6.04 6.47 5.07 4.79 6.86 9.85 
1964 5.51 8.7 5.87 6.91 5.75 5.27 7.39 8.41 
1965 5.33 8.3 5.42 5.98 4.90 5.58 7.45 9.52 
1966 5.40 6.5 6.93 6.66 5.54 6.08 7.58 10.06 
1967 5.42 6.7 6.45 6.74 4.77 5.98 8.11 9.17 
1968 5.72 10.8 7.18 7.44 5.43 4.96 8.22 7.98 
1969 6.31 8.0 7.93 7.05 5.71 6.18 8.30 7.81 
1970 6.26 7.7 8.55 7.29 6.86 8.20 8.41 7.70 
1971 6.64 7.4 9.17 6.06 7.17 9.17 7.92 8.55 
1972 6.92 8.0 9.43 4.71 6.58 8.97 8.24 8.01 
1973 6.58 8.0 10.02 5.36 6.12 9.37 8.89 12.16 
1974 6.21 8.8 11.02 4.99 6.39 9.51 9.28 14.74 
1975 5.87 9.2 11.71 5.84 6.23 8.89 9.79 14.95 
1976 6.20 9.0 10.96 4.97 6.83 10.26 9.04 11.39 
1977 8.23 9.7 9.47 6.35 6.32 11.03 7.70 9.75 
1978 6.53 10.2 9.25 7.19 6.86 11.75 8.39 8.32 
1979 7.29 10.1 9.03 7.67 7.18 12.60 9.99 8.43 
1980 8.06 8.2 8.96 8.62 7.72 10.19 10.87 10.87 
1981 9.27 7.4 7.30 9.40 7.91 7.82 11.92 12.41 
1982 6.83 6.7 6.12 5.90 7.99 5.58 8.47 11.62 
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Table A-2 continued 
YEAR ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA MEXICO PERU 
1983 7.38 2.5 5.01 4.19 7.70 6.12 5.51 7.85 
1984 7.76 4.4 4.86 4.55 7.29 7.54 5.93 6.30 
1985 6.88 5.3 5.19 5.08 5.82 7.98 6.70 5.43 
1986 7.29 5.7 6.42 4.64 6.09 9.05 5.92 5.48 
1987 8.15 5.8 5.87 5.96 6.77 10.40 5.60 5.96 
1988 7.56 5.7 5.36 6.70 7.06 9.24 6.57 4.47 
1989 6.71 4.9 5.05 8.66 6.75 10.38 7.02 3.48 
1990 5.96 6.1 4.55 8.03 6.65 12.72 8.01 3.82 
1991 5.91 7.9 4.14 7.69 5.76 10.23 9.15 3.87 
1992 7.15 8.7 3.90 8.89 6.41 12.67 10.24 3.88 
1993 7.81 8.3 4.08 9.70 9.88 14.89 9.20 3.86 
1994 8.76 6.5 5.12 10.20 10.81 12.11 9.66 4.51 
1995 7.69 7.6 6.08 12.37 10.60 11.67 6.55 5.30 
1996 8.03 8.6 6.11 12.44 9.53 11.00 7.66 5.12 
1997 9.37 11.8 6.50 13.25 9.37 12.43 9.62 5.33 
1998 9.59 15.2 6.32 12.99 8.06 15.31 10.73 4.99 
Source: André Hofman, "La inversión en América Latina: base de datos, 1950-1998", Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), unpublished. 
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Table A-3 
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT IN RESIDENTIAL AND 
NON-RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION, 1950-1998 
(percentage  of  GDP in constant  1980 prices) 
YEAR ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA MEXICO PERU 
1950 12.90 4.73 9.59 12.84 9.67 11.94 12.16 10.99 
1951 14.51 6.38 9.33 13.63 8.63 11.54 14.21 11.57 
1952 13.68 6.50 10.36 13.58 8.77 13.51 14.53 12.39 
1953 12.97 4.04 11.33 13.79 10.10 13.47 12.95 14.84 
1954 11.99 5.29 9.73 13.81 11.61 14.13 12.94 13.69 
1955 12.50 8.26 9.46 15.50 11.86 13.22 13.45 15.46 
1956 12.75 8.13 9.92 13.27 11.27 12.82 14.91 16.50 
1957 13.30 7.72 9.85 12.46 9.92 11.30 14.96 16.78 
1958 13.91 5.40 10.01 11.77 9.16 11.92 13.54 15.50 
1959 11.72 5.89 10.26 11.67 9.52 11.76 13.07 11.20 
1960 15.19 6.63 10.31 14.41 9.36 10.61 14.11 10.53 
1961 16.05 5.26 9.86 12.50 9.75 12.27 9.93 12.02 
1962 14.84 6.80 9.68 14.84 9.61 12.92 10.00 12.09 
1963 13.26 6.99 9.20 17.99 8.51 11.55 10.33 10.09 
1964 13.24 6.88 9.15 15.65 8.64 9.79 11.13 9.97 
1965 12.66 7.81 8.82 15.04 8.21 11.39 11.22 11.04 
1966 13.11 6.90 9.54 12.86 8.64 9.99 11.42 11.21 
1967 13.56 7.60 9.55 12.58 10.06 10.61 12.22 9.66 
1968 14.80 8.78 10.33 12.98 10.49 10.49 12.38 8.20 
1969 16.44 7.80 11.33 13.63 10.72 9.95 12.51 8.52 
1970 16.51 7.49 12.01 14.27 10.47 10.19 12.67 9.11 
1971 17.15 8.56 12.14 13.27 9.98 10.79 11.96 9.65 
1972 16.70 8.62 12.79 10.93 9.04 10.43 12.33 10.38 
1973 14.61 7.33 13.56 9.63 9.79 10.17 12.89 11.63 
1974 14.75 7.40 13.68 11.46 9.96 10.80 12.86 12.79 
1975 15.31 8.95 14.06 9.04 9.14 10.76 13.12 12.63 
1976 17.26 9.04 14.05 7.34 9.23 12.77 13.03 11.96 
1977 18.51 8.61 14.09 7.24 9.21 12.74 12.21 11.61 
1978 17.63 9.70 14.26 7.59 8.80 12.45 12.79 11.11 
1979 16.88 8.39 13.85 8.17 8.25 13.98 13.34 11.74 
1980 16.99 6.02 14.60 10.01 9.06 13.71 13.89 12.61 
1981 13.30 6.36 14.32 11.30 9.52 10.54 14.53 13.69 
1982 11.85 3.57 13.86 8.26 9.78 8.71 13.68 13.89 
1983 10.64 6.61 12.22 8.06 10.01 8.93 11.07 12.61 
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Table A- continued 
YEAR ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA MEXICO PERU 
1984 9.44 5.83 11.45 9.99 10.06 10.03 11.10 12.06 
1985 8.96 7.08 11.25 10.71 10.12 10.41 11.21 10.50 
1986 9.19 7.65 12.34 10.67 10.13 10.47 10.49 11.80 
1987 10.24 7.82 12.00 11.53 8.75 10.14 10.50 12.93 
1988 9.91 7.79 11.64 11.90 9.47 9.89 10.24 13.33 
1989 8.02 7.95 11.62 13.21 8.40 10.51 10.04 12.71 
1990 6.70 7.84 10.98 13.58 7.39 10.38 10.35 13.64 
1991 9.16 7.89 10.51 12.30 7.16 9.46 10.40 13.50 
1992 11.09 8.67 9.91 13.19 7.55 9.58 10.66 14.29 
1993 12.11 8.79 10.01 14.64 8.14 10.80 10.79 15.34 
1994 13.59 8.53 10.29 14.25 9.89 10.48 11.09 17.79 
1995 11.92 8.73 10.20 14.92 9.70 9.90 9.16 19.73 
1996 12.45 8.92 10.25 15.43 8.72 9.33 9.71 18.46 
1997 14.53 10.12 10.91 16.22 8.57 10.54 10.06 20.29 
1998 14.86 11.25 10.61 15.91 7.38 11.46 10.03 20.13 
Source: André Hofman, "La inversión en América Latina: base de datos, 1950-1998", Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), unpublished. 
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Table A-4 
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT IN NON-RESIDENTIAL 
CONSTRUCTION, 1950-1998 
(percentage  of  GDP in constant  1980 prices) 
Year Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Mexico Peru 
1950 5.73 3.4 5.50 6.00 5.80 9.59 9.48 6.68 
1951 7.54 4.6 5.06 7.26 5.18 9.25 11.63 7.04 
1952 6.41 4.7 5.86 7.37 5.26 10.85 11.79 7.53 
1953 6.60 2.9 6.53 6.85 6.06 10.83 10.11 9.02 
1954 5.54 3.8 5.45 6.09 6.97 11.34 10.00 8.32 
1955 5.97 5.9 5.26 6.64 7.11 10.62 10.46 9.40 
1956 6.08 5.8 5.57 7.47 6.76 10.37 11.81 10.03 
1957 6.34 5.5 5.56 8.41 5.95 8.86 11.80 10.20 
1958 6.64 4.3 5.72 8.09 5.49 9.87 10.24 9.43 
1959 5.59 4.7 5.90 6.59 5.71 9.19 9.61 6.81 
1960 7.22 5.3 6.00 8.35 5.61 7.88 10.58 6.40 
1961 7.61 4.1 5.75 7.59 6.83 9.62 6.05 7.31 
1962 7.00 5.3 5.61 8.38 6.73 10.16 5.92 7.35 
1963 6.24 5.4 5.21 10.74 5.95 8.04 6.16 6.14 
1964 6.20 5.3 5.16 9.84 6.05 7.40 7.03 6.06 
1965 5.90 6.1 4.88 8.93 5.75 8.91 6.98 6.72 
1966 6.08 4.9 5.39 7.19 6.05 7.78 7.06 6.82 
1967 6.26 5.5 5.39 7.40 7.04 8.05 7.70 5.87 
1968 6.81 6.0 6.04 7.23 7.34 7.30 7.79 4.99 
1969 7.52 5.4 6.84 7.34 7.50 7.67 7.75 5.18 
1970 6.79 5.2 7.30 8.24 7.23 7.80 7.77 5.54 
1971 7.88 6.2 7.40 6.87 7.01 7.76 6.16 5.65 
1972 8.11 6.1 7.96 5.49 6.55 8.02 6.76 6.21 
1973 6.84 5.0 8.62 5.03 6.72 7.44 7.62 6.07 
1974 6.46 5.0 8.74 6.26 7.09 8.13 7.99 6.16 
1975 4.81 6.2 9.02 4.55 6.72 7.30 7.69 5.79 
1976 7.20 6.3 9.06 3.83 6.77 9.58 7.28 6.00 
1977 10.08 5.9 9.09 3.97 6.57 9.52 6.86 6.01 
1978 8.86 6.7 9.20 4.99 5.97 8.89 8.19 6.85 
1979 7.94 5.6 8.92 4.86 5.84 10.23 8.74 6.16 
1980 7.94 3.9 9.51 5.66 6.80 9.95 9.45 6.59 
1981 4.91 4.3 9.19 7.43 7.17 8.11 10.13 6.41 
1982 4.51 2.0 8.80 5.39 7.37 6.79 9.18 6.59 
1983 4.13 5.2 7.49 5.62 7.17 6.86 6.65 6.36 
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Table A- continued 
YEAR ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA MEXICO PERU 
1984 2.88 4.3 6.93 7.74 7.29 7.53 6.62 6.43 
1985 2.51 5.2 6.81 7.79 7.34 7.97 6.49 5.54 
1986 2.56 5.6 7.53 7.39 7.31 7.91 5.66 6.34 
1987 2.83 5.8 7.32 8.03 5.85 7.24 5.55 6.63 
1988 2.72 5.7 7.10 8.01 6.77 6.77 5.41 7.28 
1989 2.19 6.0 7.09 8.95 5.79 7.31 5.14 7.50 
1990 1.82 5.7 6.70 9.42 5.07 7.93 5.08 7.95 
1991 2.47 5.4 6.41 7.98 4.48 7.15 4.78 7.83 
1992 2.97 6.0 6.04 8.56 4.66 7.36 4.65 8.25 
1993 3.23 6.1 6.10 9.53 4.40 8.33 5.05 8.93 
1994 3.60 6.2 6.28 9.12 5.60 7.96 5.12 10.11 
1995 3.14 6.2 6.22 9.20 5.49 7.53 4.64 11.21 
1996 3.25 6.2 6.25 9.58 4.94 6.98 4.72 10.49 
1997 3.77 7.0 6.65 10.04 4.85 7.89 4.40 11.53 
1998 3.83 7.7 6.47 9.88 4.18 8.36 4.06 11.44 
Source: André Hofman, "La inversión en América Latina: base de datos, 1950-1998", Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), unpublished. 
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Table A-5 
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT IN RESIDENTIAL 
CONSTRUCTION, 1950-1998 
(percentage  of  GDP in constant  1980 prices) 
Year Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Mexico Peru 
1984 9.44 5.83 11.45 9.99 10.06 10.03 11.10 12.06 
1950 7.17 1.3 4.09 6.84 3.87 2.35 2.69 4.31 
1951 6.97 1.8 4.27 6.37 3.45 2.29 2.57 4.53 
1952 7.27 1.8 4.51 6.21 3.51 2.66 2.73 4.85 
1953 6.37 1.1 4.80 6.94 4.04 2.65 2.84 5.81 
1954 6.45 1.5 4.27 7.72 4.64 2.78 2.94 5.36 
1955 6.53 2.3 4.20 8.85 4.74 2.61 2.99 6.06 
1956 6.67 2.3 4.35 5.79 4.51 2.45 3.10 6.46 
1957 6.96 2.2 4.28 4.05 3.97 2.45 3.16 6.57 
1958 7.27 1.1 4.29 3.67 3.66 2.05 3.30 6.08 
1959 6.12 1.2 4.36 5.08 3.81 2.56 3.46 4.39 
1960 7.97 1.3 4.30 6.06 3.74 2.73 3.53 4.13 
1961 8.44 1.1 4.11 4.91 2.93 2.65 3.88 4.71 
1962 7.84 1.5 4.07 6.45 2.88 2.76 4.08 4.74 
1963 7.02 1.5 3.99 7.25 2.55 3.51 4.16 3.95 
1964 7.04 1.6 4.00 5.80 2.59 2.39 4.10 3.90 
1965 6.77 1.7 3.94 6.12 2.46 2.48 4.24 4.33 
1966 7.03 2.0 4.16 5.67 2.59 2.21 4.36 4.39 
1967 7.30 2.1 4.16 5.18 3.02 2.56 4.52 3.78 
1968 7.99 2.8 4.29 5.75 3.15 3.19 4.60 3.21 
1969 8.91 2.4 4.49 6.29 3.22 2.28 4.76 3.34 
1970 9.71 2.3 4.72 6.03 3.24 2.38 4.90 3.57 
1971 9.27 2.4 4.74 6.40 2.98 3.03 5.81 4.00 
1972 8.59 2.5 4.83 5.43 2.49 2.41 5.58 4.17 
1973 7.77 2.3 4.94 4.60 3.07 2.73 5.27 5.56 
1974 8.29 2.4 4.94 5.20 2.87 2.67 4.87 6.64 
1975 10.51 2.7 5.05 4.49 2.41 3.46 5.43 6.85 
1976 10.06 2.7 4.99 3.51 2.46 3.19 5.75 5.96 
1977 8.43 2.7 5.01 3.28 2.64 3.23 5.35 5.61 
1978 8.76 3.0 5.06 2.60 2.83 3.55 4.60 4.27 
1979 8.95 2.8 4.93 3.31 2.40 3.75 4.60 5.59 
1980 9.04 2.1 5.09 4.35 2.26 3.75 4.44 6.02 
1981 8.39 2.1 5.13 3.87 2.35 2.43 4.41 7.28 
1982 7.34 1.5 5.06 2.87 2.41 1.92 4.50 7.30 
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Table A- continued 
YEAR ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA MEXICO PERU 
1983 6.51 1.4 4.73 2.44 2.84 2.07 4.42 6.25 
1984 6.57 1.5 4.52 2.25 2.77 2.51 4.48 5.63 
1985 6.45 1.9 4.44 2.92 2.78 2.44 4.72 4.96 
1986 6.63 2.0 4.81 3.28 2.82 2.55 4.83 5.45 
1987 7.41 2.0 4.68 3.50 2.90 2.89 4.95 6.31 
1988 7.18 2.0 4.54 3.88 2.70 3.12 4.83 6.05 
1989 5.83 2.0 4.53 4.26 2.61 3.19 4.90 5.21 
1990 4.88 2.2 4.28 4.16 2.32 2.45 5.28 5.70 
1991 6.69 2.5 4.10 4.32 2.68 2.31 5.62 5.67 
1992 8.12 2.7 3.86 4.63 2.89 2.22 6.01 6.04 
1993 8.88 2.7 3.90 5.11 3.74 2.47 5.75 6.42 
1994 9.99 2.3 4.01 5.13 4.29 2.52 5.97 7.68 
1995 8.79 2.5 3.98 5.73 4.21 2.37 4.51 8.52 
1996 9.20 2.7 4.00 5.85 3.79 2.35 4.99 7.97 
1997 10.75 3.1 4.25 6.18 3.72 2.66 5.66 8.76 
1998 11.03 3.5 4.14 6.03 3.20 3.10 5.98 8.69 
Source: André Hofman, "La inversión en América Latina: base de datos, 1950-1998", Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), unpublished. 
ECLAC 173 
Table A-a 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 1970-1998 
(percentage  of  GDP in constant  1980 prices) 
ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA MEXICO PERU 
Year 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1966 1980 1979 
1970 8.07 8.50 - - 5.03 4.21 6.58 4.47 
1971 8.55 9.40 - - 5.44 5.08 4.85 4.20 
1972 8.46 9.51 - - 5.75 6.18 6.27 5.02 
1973 6.80 6.13 - - 5.46 5.59 8.07 5.89 
1974 6.72 5.71 - - 4.65 5.52 7.79 10.22 
1975 7.74 7.42 - - 5.19 6.25 8.97 8.53 
1976 9.85 9.98 - - 5.45 8.04 7.96 6.62 
1977 9.93 11.44 9.49 - 9.02 9.68 8.24 4.72 
1978 8.81 13.91 8.45 - 6.77 8.05 9.85 3.64 
1979 7.46 11.50 6.93 - 6.71 8.59 10.60 5.28 
1980 6.16 7.37 6.93 7.89 8.15 10.58 10.66 7.74 
1981 5.50 6.49 7.24 7.47 8.72 8.67 12.00 8.73 
1982 4.34 8.20 6.56 3.33 9.78 6.61 9.80 8.70 
1983 5.20 6.38 5.20 3.98 10.14 7.90 6.55 6.59 
1984 4.36 - 5.04 7.74 9.71 6.74 6.58 4.95 
1985 4.03 - 5.29 6.98 9.01 9.83 6.47 4.13 
1986 3.70 - 5.79 7.35 7.93 9.52 5.76 4.32 
1987 5.70 6.10 5.30 7.18 7.61 8.39 4.96 5.08 
1988 5.73 7.90 4.57 6.96 7.82 6.96 4.70 3.30 
1989 4.39 8.50 3.71 5.83 7.36 7.72 4.71 4.20 
1990 3.54 8.30 3.78 5.03 7.69 7.40 5.08 2.29 
1991 2.20 8.70 4.95 5.48 7.48 6.30 4.69 3.79 
1992 1.81 10.00 3.80 6.62 7.31 5.90 4.33 4.52 
1993 2.13 9.20 4.40 5.83 9.56 6.00 4.15 5.46 
1994 2.07 9.00 2.70 5.76 8.25 4.40 2.27 3.65 
1995 1.14 8.50 2.50 4.80 8.72 4.88 1.84 3.60 
1996 1.21 8.20 2.90 6.60 11.85 5.01 1.91 3.20 
1997 1.18 7.20 - 6.20 12.30 5.66 1.95 3.20 
1998 1.12 6.30 - 6.10 10.90 5.54 1.72 2.90 
Source: Authors' compilation of figures from fiscal accounts of each country. 
Note: Figures on public investment correspond in the case of Argentina and Mexico to Federal 
Government capital spending; in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica to capital spending of 
the non-financial public sector; in Brazil to central public sector capital spending, and in Peru to 
central government capital spending. The calculations differ from national accounts methodology, 
so the figures should simply be used as a reference. 
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Table A-7 
INVESTMENT IN DYNAMIC BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY 
LEVEL OF INVESTMENT SHARE OF MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT 
BRAZIL 
ISIC CLASSIFICATION 
PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM 
1970-1988 1992-1993 1995-1997 1970-1988 1992-1993 1995-1997 
Food products 100.0 82.6 142.3 10.0 10.8 11.2 
Other chemicals 100.0 23.7 218.3 1.2 0.4 1.8 
Plastic products 100.0 56.6 196.4 2.3 1.8 3.6 
Iron, steel and metal products 100.0 52.2 161.6 18.2 12.3 22.8 
Electrical machinery 100.0 61.3 135.6 4.3 3.5 4.6 
Transport equipment 100.0 43.0 227.2 7.7 4.3 13.4 
Total 100.0 58.1 169.5 43.7 33.2 57.4 
CHILE 
POST-REFORM POST-REFORM 
ISIC CLASSIFICATION 1979-1985 1986-1989 1990-1995 1979-1985 1986-1989 1990-1995 
Food products 100.0 172.0 365.5 35.7 41.3 28.8 
Food products (312) 100.0 164.9 474.8 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Drinks 100.0 170.4 481.0 5.8 7.7 6.5 
Tobacco 100.0 74.2 175.7 2.1 1.2 0.9 
Furniture 100.0 160.9 390.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Paper and pulp 100.0 130.3 1094.8 14.0 10.9 27.2 
Press and publications 100.0 99.3 243.1 6.8 4.5 3.6 
Chemical industry 100.0 258.2 991.1 3.2 5.3 6.3 
Plastic products 100.0 196.1 695.4 3.4 4.3 4.9 
Glass 100.0 108.1 462.8 1.0 0.8 1.1 
Other non-metal minerals 100.0 69.1 200.5 13.4 5.9 5.5 
Iron and steel 100.0 104.2 402.1 4.3 3.4 3.6 
Non-ferrous  metals 100.0 299.4 797.2 0.8 1.8 1.6 
Metal products 100.0 258.0 497.5 5.0 8.4 5.7 
Scientific instruments 100.0 246.8 776.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Other 100.0 91.1 259.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Total 100.0 150.6 493.9 75.1 63.9 79.5 
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Table A-7 (continued) 
LEVEL OF INVESTMENT SHARE OF MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT 
COLOMBIA 
ISIC CLASSIFICATION 
PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM 
1970-1989 1990-1991 1992-1995 1970-1989 1990-1991 1992-1995 
Food products 100.0 130.5 200.8 12.6 11.6 14.3 
Food products (312) 100.0 134.3 290.6 2.4 2.4 4.2 
Drinks 100.0 197.7 215.3 6.1 8.7 7.5 
Clothing 100.0 115.2 197.0 1.8 1.4 1.9 
Wood products 100.0 62.7 154.7 1.3 0.5 1.0 
Paper and pulp 100.0 257.8 313.2 3.5 6.6 6.8 
other chemicals 100.0 153.9 271.3 3.7 4.0 5.5 
oil refineries 100.0 182.3 248.4 8.6 10.2 11.1 
oil and coal products 100.0 113.4 259.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 
Rubber products 100.0 93.2 222.4 1.4 0.9 1.6 
Plastic products 100.0 179.9 260.8 3.4 4.5 5.1 
Glass 100.0 80.8 208.1 1.5 0.9 1.7 
other non-metal minerals 100.0 137.7 191.1 7.5 7.7 8.5 
Metal products 100.0 76.8 130.5 3.8 2.0 2.7 
Total 100.0 151.1 222.1 57.8 61.7 72.1 
MEXICO 
PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM PRE-REFORM POST-REFoRM 
ISIC CLASSIFICATION 1970-1985 1986-1990 1991-1994 1970-1985 1986-1990 1991-1994 
Food products 100.0 86.8 132.2 10.6 13.7 12.1 
Drinks 100.0 72.1 155.3 4.9 5.1 6.4 
Tobacco 100.0 81.3 265.3 0.4 0.5 1.0 
Wood products 100.0 28.2 46.5 1.6 0.6 0.6 
other chemicals 100.0 104.0 174.0 6.6 9.7 9.7 
Plastic products 100.0 59.1 110.4 2.9 2.5 2.8 
Metal products 100.0 72.4 135.8 3.5 3.7 4.1 
Electrical machinery 100.0 90.1 119.9 5.6 7.5 5.6 
Transport equipment 100.0 94.1 236.0 9.5 13.9 19.0 
Total 100.0 86.7 162.7 45.7 57.2 61.3 
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Table A-7 (continued) 
LEVEL OF INVESTMENT SHARE OF MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT 
PERU 
ISIC CLASSIFICATION 
PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM 
1972-1989 1992-1993 1994-1997 1972-1989 1992-1993 1994-1997 
Food products 100 47.6 79.7 14.1 23.2 29.1 
Textiles 100 41.0 19.2 18.7 25.7 9.7 
Clothing 100 38.8 90.4 2.2 3.0 5.1 
Leather Products 100 9.4 42.0 1.0 0.3 1.0 
Wood products 100 n.a. 62.7 0.6 -0.1 0.9 
Furniture 100 5.9 36.7 0.9 0.2 0.9 
Paper and pulp 100 35.4 87.4 1.4 1.7 2.8 
Chemical industry 100 26.5 25.9 5.7 5.1 3.5 
Other chemicals 100 21.0 43.4 3.7 2.6 3.7 
other non-metal minerals 100 29.6 42.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Metal products 100 17.5 50.8 4.5 2.5 5.3 
Total 100 39.8 54.0 55.2 66.5 64.2 
Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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Table A-8 
PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN OPERATORS IN PRIVATIZED 




















Brazil Enersis Chile/Spain 
Endesa Chile 
Chilectra Chile 
Endesa España Spain 
Gas Natural Spain 
AES Corporation United States 
Houston Industries Energy United States 
Enron International United States 
Southern Electric United States 
Community Energy Alternatives United States 
Electricité de France France 
Iberdrola Portugal 
Electricidad de Portugal Portugal 
Pluspetrol Argentina 
Tractebel Belgium 
Bolivia Dominion Energy, Inc. 
Energy Initiatives, inc. 
Constellation Energy, inc. 
Liberty Power Latin America 
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Telefónica de España 
Bellsouth, Motorola 















Colombia Bell Canada Canada 
Mexico Bell Atlantic 









Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
Table A-9 
INCOME FROM SALE OF PUBLIC UTILITIES FIRMS 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
COUNTRY FIRMS MILLIONS OF YEAR FIRMS MILLIONS OF YEAR 
DOLLARS DOLLARS 
Argentina Segba 1 294 1 992 Telefónica 3 036 1990 
Hidronor 1 401 1992 Telecom 2510 1990 
Transener 234 1992 
Other provincial firms 676 1995 
Bolivia37 Corani 59 1995 
Guaracachi 47 1995 
Valle Hermoso 34 1995 
Electropaz + Elfeo 65 1996 
Elfec 50 1996 
Ende 40 1997 
Brazil Light Servicios de Electricidad 2 508 1996 Telefonía Móvil 7 542 
Cerj 588 1996 Área 1 2 450 1997 
Coelba 1 598 1997 Área 2 1 220 1997 
CDSA 714 1997 Área 3 1 330 1998 
Cía Centra Oeste de distribución de energía 1 372 1997 Área 4 457 1998 
Cía Norte, Nordeste de distribución de energía eléctrica 1 486 1997 Área 5 680 1998 
Cía Energética do Río Grande Do Norte 607 1997 Área 6 347 1998 
Coelce 868 1998 Área 7 314 1998 
Eletropaulo Metropolitana de Eletricidade S.A. 1 777 1998 Área 9 232 1998 
Área 10 512 1998 
Table A- (continued) 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
COUNTRY FIRMS MILLIONS OF YEAR FIRMS MILLIONS OF YEAR 
DOLLARS DOLLARS 
Chileb' Endesa 330 1986-1989 Telex Chile n.a 1986 
Chilgener 0.05 1986-1987 CTC 212 1987-1989 
Chilectra 72 1983-1987 Entel 77 1986-1988 
Chilquinta 0.04 
Colbun n.a. 1996-1997 
Edelaysen Sale in progress 
Edelnor Sale in progress 
Colombia Empresa de Energía de Bogotá (EEB) 1 230 1998 
Central Hidroeléctrica Chivor 645 1997 
Epsa 535 1997 
Central Hidroeléctrica Betania 497 1997 
Mexico Not privatized Telmex 1 757 1990 
lusacell 1 712 1997 
Satélites Mexicanos 692 1997 
Panamsat 650 1997 
Grupo MVS 120 1997 
Corporación Mobicom 54 1997 
Peru0' Edegel 598.8 1995-1997 
Ca h ua 48.5 1995-1997 Entel Perú + Cptsa 2002 1994 
Etevensa 203.4 1995-1997 
Egenor 264.5 1995-1997 
Empresa Eléctrica de Piura 19.7 1995-1997 
Edelnor 209.3 1994-1997 
Luz del Sur 406.9 1994-1997 
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Table A- (continued) 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
COUNTRY FIRMS MILLIONS OF 
DOLLARS 
YEAR FIRMS MILLIONS OF YEAR 
DOLLARS 
Peru0' Eléctrica De Cañete 





Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project, 
a/ Capitalization and management rights. 
b / Figures based on information collected by Luders and Hachette (1992) for 1986-1988. The last package of ENDESA shares was sold in 1989, so that 
income is not included in the figure. 
c / Peruvian sales generally correspond to 60% of the total shares in the firm, with the rest remaining in State hands. The figures do not include 
investment commitments. 
Table A-10 
PRICING LAWS AND THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTRICITY PRICES 
LEGISLATION PRICING CHARACTERISTICS PRICING HISTORY 
ARGENTINA 
Law 24 065 
Generation: 
Open access for firms to 
Térmica 
Regulated hydroelectricity 
Transmission:  Private 
monopoly, with open access to 
the network 
Distribution:  Private 
monopoly, should satisfy all 
demand with obligatory access 
to third parties 
Generation:  Price determined in wholesale market, based on 
marginal cost of generating 1 MWH 
Transmission:  Pay for energy transported, transport capacity and 
connection; toll payment, maximum income regulated, fixed annual 
amount recalculated every five years, plus complementary and 
connection charges. 
Distribution:  Composed of two items: 
Cost of buying energy in wholesale market passed on to users 
Value added by distributor: fixing of maximum prices or price cap, 
based on average of wholesale and retail prices in the United States. 
Value added includes investment costs of expansion of 
repositioning of networks, operation and maintenance 
Real annual reduction in the 
monomial price (energy plus 
power) of 6.2%, between 1992 
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BOLIVIA 
Electricity law Generation:  Price is determined by short-term marginal cost of the 
companies plus a fixed price for investment in increasing capacity 
Transmission:  Fixed maximum prices which include cost of 
operation, maintenance and administration plus an investment cost. 
Distribution:  Price fixed based on rate of return to capital of 9% 
applied on net assets and working capital 
Market began to set prices in May 
1996 
Sharp price volatility between 
May 1996 and December 1997 
Market price (spot) of energy: 
decrease of 2.79% a year 
Price of power: increase of 






Table A-10 (continued) 
LEGISLATION PRICING CHARACTERISTICS PRICING HISTORY 
Brazil 
Temporary regime 1995-2002 Generation:  Transition rules, 1998-2003: 
Real 1998 prices held for four years 
2002: Liberalization of 25% of price of energy sold a year 
Creation in 1998 of wholesale market 
Transmission:  Maximum prices fixed in negotiations 
Distribution:  Costs of generation and transmission markets, 
adjusted to maximum price regime or price cap and 
revised every 5 years 
COLOMBIA 
Unregulated  consumers:  0.5 MW of power or270 MW/month of 
energy: Set by supply and demand 
Prices  for  regulated  consumers:  Prices after 1998 included 
economic costs generated throughout the production chain. These 
prices are adjusted through a maximum price (price cap) set until 
2000. Residential consumers on low-incomes receive subsidies 
which reduce the price, while high-income residences, 
manufacturing and commerce pay surcharges. 
public services 
Resolution Creg 218 of 1997: 
Changes price legislation for 
transmission 
Resolution Creg 031 of 1997: 
Fixed price for regulated 
consumers 
Decree 3087 of 1997: Creates 
solidarity and income 
redistribution fund and 
regulates solidarity 
contributions and subsidies on 
Table A- (continued) 
LEGISLATION PRICING CHARACTERISTICS PRICING HISTORY 
CHILE 
General electricity services law 
DFL 1 of 1982 
Sets regulated prices 
Law 18922 de 1990 
Transport system regulation 
Generation:  Free market rate: demand over 2 MW 
Transmission:  Cost of toll covers annual operating and maintenance 
costs, plus investment assuming installations have useful life of 30 
years, plus an annual income of 10% on investment considered to 
be new 
Distribution:  Regulated prices for demand under 2 MW, depending 
on distribution system. 
Node prices: Biannual price review for power and energy in high 
voltage nodes. Weighted average of future marginal operating 
costs, needed to satisfy higher energy consumption. Prices should 
also finance an excess earned from investment in generation and 
transmission with a minimum annual rate of 10% 
Distribution rates: Determined every four years. Calculated on the 
basis of annual profitability of 10% on investment considered to be 
new, and on operating and maintenance costs of model distribution firms. 
Distribution: Real annual drop of 
9.2% between 1989 and 1995 
Node price of the Metropolitan 
Region (hydroelectric 
generation): Real annual average 
drop of 5% between 1989 and 
1995 
Node price of the Second Region 
(hydroelectric generation): Real 
annual average drop of 12% 
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Electricity concessions law of 
1992 
Generation: 
Free market rate: Demand over 1 MW 
Transmission:  Transport prices cover annual operation and 
maintenance costs, plus investments, assuming a useful of thirty 
years on all installations. For the cost of investment, an annual rent 
of 12% of the replacement value is applied. 
Distribution:  High voltage price for demand below 1 MW: Biannual 
price review for power and energy in high voltage nodes. Weighted 
average of future marginal operating costs, needed to satisfy higher 
energy consumption. Prices should also finance an excess earned 
from investment in generation and transmission with a minimum 
annual rate of 12% 
Distribution  rates:  Calculated on the basis of annual profitability of 
12% on investment considered to be new, and on operating and 
maintenance costs of model distribution firms. 
Between 1993 and 1998 the high 
voltage price fell on average by 
0.6% a year. 
Table A-11 
PRICING IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
LEGISLATION CHARACTERISTICS OF PRICING 
ARGENTINA 
Regulatory framework  (1990) Absence of regulatory framework  at the moment of privatization 
Reformulation of price setting Negotiation with the private monopoly to maintain high rates during the period of compliance with the 
mechanism (1992) expansion and modernization programme 
Price cap system, with the price set in U.S. dollars and readjusted for inflation 
Allowance of cross-subsidies between national and international long distance services 
BOLIVIA 
Telecommunications law Price cap system, adjusted for inflationa and productivity 
(1995) The price cap is calculated as a weighted average of the prices of a basket of services. The 
productivity factor is recalculated every three years 
COLOMBIA 
Regulated rates on local Long distance rates to be deregulated in 2001 Local service: Price cap system, which incorporates in 
(resolution 087 de 1997), long the cost the hook-up charges, fixed charges and variable consumption charges. These costs are defined on 
distance (resolution 086 de the basis of the average reference  cost, which is established by the regulatory body and adjusted for each operator, 
1997) and mobile telephone taking into account fixed and variable costs 
services Cross-subsidies: The rate thus calculated does not incorporate subsidies and surcharges established for types of consumers. 
Long distance: Transition to a system of access charges based on costs 
Table A-ll (continued) 




DFL No 1,1987: Only non-
competitive services are 
regulated 
The price is set based on the incremental costs of providing service, including firms' plans for expansion 
over the next five years. If no expansion is planned, the price reflects the costs of exploitation 
and capital associated with the repositioning of company assets 
MEXICO 
Rate regulation under 
consideration 
Regulation of basic and long 
distance services during the 
transition period 
Implementation of a new price and rate system planned for 1999 
Currently, rates governed by the system inherited from the State monopoly in both basic and long distance service 
There is no accounting separation of the costs of service in the different  markets, and cross-subsidies continue 
PERU 
Negotiations with the private monopoly firm provide for a gradual rate adjustment, destined to eliminate 
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Source: Authors' compilation from the database of the research project. 
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